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88th Congress }  
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

THE WENNERSTROEM SPY CASE

How it touched the U.S. and NATO

EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY  
OF A NOTED DOUBLE-AGENT

*Stig Eric Constant Wennerstroem*

A Translation Prepared for the  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE



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*Should we explain why & when  
asterisks are used?*

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#### EDITOR'S NOTE

On June 12, 1964, Stig Eric Constans Wennerstroem, retired colonel in the Swedish Air Force, was convicted of gross espionage and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Wennerstroem is 57. He may be paroled in 10 years.

By his own testimony, the airforce officer had spied for the Soviet from 1948 until his arrest June 20, 1963.

The United States was one of his victims. He had served in Washington as Sweden's air attaché from April 1952 to May 1957.

For this reason the Internal Security Subcommittee has obtained a transcript of the Wennerstroem investigation and examination and excerpted pertinent parts of the record for printing as a subcommittee document, for the information of Senators.

*The reader will understand that for security reasons there have been deletions made by the Swedish government.*

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### THE WENNERSTROEM CASE PERIOD OF SERVICE IN WASHINGTON

PROTOCOL RECORDED INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM  
FEBRUARY 5, 1964

Chief of interrogation: Rune Beckman. Witness: G. Brännemo

Mr. BECKMAN. First I shall give a brief summary of the background described in the chapter dealing with the period of service in Moscow, which has a direct relationship to the chapter dealing with the service in Washington, and is of basic significance, in certain instances, of the development of the case during the period of time described in the present chapter, concerning Colonel Wennerstroem's illegal intelligence activities.

The preparation of the service in Washington started in Moscow. Colonel Wennerstroem gave his contact man a report about his legal work to be performed in Washington as conceived by Colonel Wennerstroem on the occasion of the yearly meetings of attachés in Stockholm. The most interesting fact which Colonel Wennerstroem had to report was that a purchasing office was under the air attaché in Washington; it was staffed with personnel from the Swedish Air Administration. The most characteristic feature of the purchasing activities was the fact that the purchases concerned a great number of items of modern construction in limited quantities; this provided an opportunity to establish contacts in an area of the American war industry which was very great compared to the volume of the purchases made.

Another branch of activity for the air attaché in Washington, which was of interest to the instructing party was to procure, as far as possible, technical descriptions and publications concerning war material. These were activities which to a great extent met the objectives of the Soviet intelligence service formulated as a result of the fourth government meeting in Moscow.

The result was that Colonel Wennerstroem's main job in the United States of America was to devote himself to the performance of technical assignments. Through continuous orientation during the period in Washington with which we are concerned in this interrogation, the activities of Colonel Wennerstroem were directed toward areas which were of essential importance to the instructing party, within the technical sector. Other areas of activity which suggested themselves for Colonel Wennerstroem and which were easy to tackle, were completely excluded from the illegal activities in view of the necessity of concentration and the avoidance of unnecessary risks and duplication which would only overload the connections and processing in Moscow. It was important to note that the Soviet intelligence network in the U.S.A., for instance in the operational field, was so well developed that Colonel Wennerstroem, as a rule, had no need for reporting data concerning this field. However, in special cases, Colonel Wennerstroem being the top agent, was able to act on his own initiative and send in data which transgressed the actual scope of his assignment, if Colonel Wennerstroem himself deemed them to be particularly valuable.

The main assignment, which was to follow the technical development in the U.S.A., among others with regard to aircraft, rockets, robots, bombsights, radar, cameras, and the development of the electronic microinstruments, was quite in line with what Colonel Wennerstroem expected to be his Swedish assignment in the U.S.A.

To give a definition of the material it was decided that Colonel Wennerstroem only should send in reports which bore the date of the current year or last year. It was quite in line with this work that Colonel Wennerstroem was expected to support the technical service

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of the Soviets in the U.S.A. by establishing as many contacts as possible with industrialists and people who used these industries. To enable the Soviet intelligence service in the U.S.A. to gear its activities toward the proper persons and objects, it was necessary to map out the organization of industry in the best possible manner with regard to its personnel, set-up, production and planning for the future. Colonel Wennerstroem was supposed to contribute to this by reporting everything which would facilitate this mapping.

In addition, Colonel Wennerstroem was asked to follow the planning of the aerial warfare against the Soviet Union in the U.S.A., in the same way as the attempts made previously in this direction. Special interest was shown in data concerning which role the American Navy was to play in this respect. The Soviet Union showed great interest in the development of nuclear weapons in the U.S.A. In spite of the fact that data were apparently desired with regard to this sector, it was however made clear to Colonel Wennerstroem that it was considered senseless for him to work in this field. However, it was requested that Colonel Wennerstroem should try to follow the information given by the U.S.A. to Great Britain on this development.

The same interest as was shown for the development of nuclear weapons concerned also intercontinental missiles. The Soviet Union felt that such development had taken place only in the Soviet Union; therefore, there was no instruction that Colonel Wennerstroem should follow this development in the U.S.A. On the other hand, it was requested that Colonel Wennerstroem should not lose sight of this sector and give a report as soon as he observed any signs which pointed in the direction of a start of such development in the U.S.A.

Finally, it can be stated that Colonel Wennerstroem, in spite of the fact that, as a rule, organizational assignments did not enter his sphere of activities, was asked to report when he heard talk on possible changes within this sector, but only if such changes had not taken place, because, in the other case, such information would be reported from other quarters.

Colonel Wennerstroem's contact man told the Colonel that the red thread in their work together was to contribute toward the great goal in the best way possible so that an outbalanced situation be obtained in the interest of peace with regard to the power ratio between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

With regard to the nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles one relied mainly on its own power. On the other hand, when the technical armaments were concerned, the resources were limited and one wanted to depend on the results obtained by the technical intelligence service to which Colonel Wennerstroem now belonged.

In addition to this summary it may be stated as a matter of introduction that various circumstances concerning this chapter have been discussed more or less in detail previously during preparatory or analytical interrogations and also in proceedings and similar transactions which were not carried out with the idea of obtaining data. The idea is now to summarize, systematize and supplement the completely diversified picture of Colonel Wennerstroem's intelligence work in the U.S.A. obtained so far and to establish the proper background for his activities, and, finally, to exemplify the result of Colonel Wennerstroem's illegal intelligence work.

\* \* \* Colonel Wennerstroem left Moscow on January 3, 1952, according to the travel bills.

Mr. BECKMAN. He was in Stockholm from January 7 until March 26, 1952 when he left by boat from Göteborg to take up his service as an air attaché in Washington.

Colonel Wennerstroem, please give a general and summarizing description, against the background of these actual data, of what happened in Stockholm during the intermediary period with emphasis on the circumstances which are of importance under the aspect of intelligence work.

WENNERSTROEM. The intermediary period in Stockholm was used for preparations for the new job. No contact whatsoever with foreign intelligence services were established. Concerning the preparations a call with General Jacobsson is to be noted. This call was part of a comprehensive preparatory work within the Air Administration. Many different things had to be clarified and prepared since the main part of my work in Washington was to be technical and therefore to be done for the Air Administration.

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General Jacobsson had himself been in the U.S.A. for a long time and gave various tips with regard to his experiences. Among others, he described how he had found out what should be done to get and maintain contacts. He pointed out, for instance, that I observe the entirely different view of the position of women in the U.S.A. compared with that in Sweden. If it is desired to have closer contacts in the U.S.A., it is necessary, in most cases, to include the women. He said that women had a much greater influence over the men than we realize. If a closer contact with somebody is desired and if the spouse of the party concerned could be interested in the meetings, she would be a driving factor to a great extent. When I came out, I found out that his statements were completely right.

He also pointed out that, for purely official trips, it is not appropriate to be accompanied by one's wife, according to Swedish conception. According to the American view, on the other hand, it is a decisive plus if the party concerned is accompanied by his wife. Even in this respect, it was noticed subsequently, that he was completely right.

### THE FIRST WEEKS IN WASHINGTON

B: On April 7, 1952, the Wennerstroem family arrived in New York, and on April 8, they came to Washington. During this period of time we will first try to obtain a fundamental knowledge of the local conditions prevailing in Washington, such as the location of the places concerned, and we will speak of Colonel Wennerstroem's regular working conditions, colleagues, responsibilities, etc. If Colonel Wennerstroem could report on this point I will interject my questions if necessary.

W: With regard to accommodation I had to solve this problem in a way which was very simple for me. In the course of time I had established quite close contacts with Americans in Moscow. One of these was somebody of the "Marine Corps" who came to Washington 1 or 2 months before my arrival. He had assumed the job to obtain accommodations through a service agency in the Pentagon for me, and a school for the child. These were the two greatest problems to be solved by persons moving to Washington.

The third important problem was the purchase of a car. This problem was solved by the fact that the Marine Corps officer in question had two cars of which I borrowed one until I had managed to purchase a car.

When we arrived in Washington by train I met this Marine Corps officer and he told us which accommodations he had rented; he gave information as to which schools had been contacted; he also fulfilled his promise and gave me one of his cars on a long-term basis. This made it possible for not a single minute to be lost on these more trivial problems upon my arrival.

B: I have heard that Colonel Wennerstroem subsequently changed his place of residence and I'd like to inquire whether this change of residence had anything to do with the illegal intelligence work.

W: No, this was not the case. I changed my residence for the reason that during an especially heavy rainfall, some defect was caused in the floor so that the water entered the cellar. During subsequent rainfalls the cellar was filled with water every time. The trouble getting the water out or to call the fire brigade to take it out was too great; so that after a year and a half we decided to change our residence.

B: To come to the place of work proper, the Swedish Embassy in Washington. Could the Colonel describe how the rooms of the defense attachés were equipped in the Embassy?

W: There was a wing of the building which was entirely occupied by military personnel. It contained four floors. The navy and army attachés each had one floor. I myself had two, one serving as office for the air attaché and one as purchasing office.

B: Could Colonel Wennerstroem give a report on his colleagues when he came to Washington, mainly in his own section?

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W: There was the deputy air attaché, Captain Blomberg. He was subsequently exchanged several times during my period of service. After Blomberg came Captain Boheman, Schnell, and von Celsing. When I arrived, a Mr. Strid of the Air Administration was Chief of the Purchasing Office; he was subsequently replaced by Mr. Ahlstrom. With regard to female personnel I had altogether three ladies. The navy attaché was the then Commander Ostberg who had a deputy and two ladies. The army attaché was Colonel Moeller who died subsequently, having two deputy army attachés and two ladies.

B: Let us now describe with a few words, in a general and summarizing manner, the regular work of an air attaché and his section at the Embassy.

W: My general job which was common to all air attachés, was to follow the entire development of the air force in the country concerned. In the U.S.A. there is an extremely great air aviation organization with the Navy, in addition to the Air Force proper. For this reason conditions in the U.S.A. were of a special nature; an air attaché may, if he desires, become accredited both to the Air Force and the Navy. This was so in my case. It may be appropriate to point out that my Swedish intelligence service was of a general nature whereas my assignments for the Soviet intelligence service were specialized. Apart from this, there were special instructions and assignments depending upon local circumstances. The most comprehensive assignment concerned was the management of the Purchasing Office of the Air Administration. This work gave, for instance, the result that a total of approximately 7,000 official communications were received or sent out which concerned the air attachés. About two thirds of this work pertains to the Purchasing Office of the Air Administration.

Another responsibility was to prepare and pay visits to the military installations and industries. A great number of persons, military and civilian, from Sweden paid such visits. In the U.S.A. everything which is done for the account of the military, concerning permits for visiting, are under the military. The Armed Forces is usually called "clearance" certificates for all visitors. The only possibility to obtain such "clearance" is to work through the military part of the Embassy. This work became particularly comprehensive and was not simplified in cases where an enterprise manufactured material for all three branches of the Armed Forces.

The next special assignment pertained to the procurement of military or technical publications of various kinds. A similar processing concerning clearance was applied in this respect. No military publications or publications from an enterprise which manufactured war material, was available other than through the military part of the Embassy. This activity became very comprehensive also.

Finally, where procurement was made in the open market, with regard to various types of publications: either single copies were purchased or subscriptions were made. In this field it may be pointed out that there was a special agreement between the Air Force and an institution in the U.S.A. which is called NACA. This is an agency which compiles all technical literature dealing with air navigation, military and civilian, and the Air Administration, FOA, etc. and other institutions in Sweden which ordered hundreds of publications every year.

B: I like to raise a question with regard to the publications which came from the official authorities in the U.S.A. I have noted, when I looked them over, that are often stamped with a text stating that they should not be given to outside persons or third countries. I'd like to ask Colonel W. how he judged this point at the Embassy and how he handled such publications under the aspect of the secrecy stamp.

W: In principle, no secrecy stamp was affixed, but in the accompanying letter it was pointed out that such stamp existed. The matter was thus left to the domestic authorities.

B: I'd like to refer to the introduction which General Jacobsson gave prior to the departure and I'd like to have a report of the results of same.

W: \* \* \* Thanks to General Jacobsson I came into contact with all the leading circles within an extremely short time. The speed with regard to this was of very great importance to my work. Since the ladies, precisely as General Jacobsson had predicted, were always

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present, it was in almost all cases a double contact, partly between myself and the officials, partly between our wives. After I first learned this, such persons liked to speak to me and my wife whom she knew from a greater reception. This, in turn, impressed their assistants whom I had not met yet. When I had made their acquaintance, I concentrated on those who had contact with their highest chiefs. This had also the significance that through the limited number I met through \* \* \* I was able to meet many others, also. When I was invited to one of them whom I had met, through \* \* \* he had, in turn, invited, as a rule, persons of a corresponding position as his own. In this way I also met the chiefs of the Navy very soon.

B: Did Colonel W. establish contact with persons engaged in the American intelligence service, during his first weeks in Washington?

W: Yes, I did. During the final interrogation on the period of service in Moscow, I pointed out that I knew two American officers \* \* \*.

B: Did these gentlemen show special interest for Colonel W. on the occasion that you came directly from service in Moscow?

W: Yes, they showed very great interest in this. It was personnel which, at home in Washington, compiled data coming from outside to the intelligence service. Questions concerned were not details but an evaluation and judgment of the situation. The general attitude was that the U.S.A. was so far distant from the Soviet Union and in general, people knew so little about the conditions in the Soviet Union that a judgment and evaluation could be suspected to be one-sided in every case. On the other hand, it was held that a person such as I who had been raised in a country bordering the Soviet Union and stayed in the country itself for a sufficiently long time, in many instances, would be able to give a correct judgment and evaluation. A long series of discussions took place on this problem. The Americans showed great interest for several weeks, but there was no longer any interest on their side after I could no longer obtain information from the Soviet Union which was of value when I was in Washington \* \* \*.

B: In connection with what Colonel W. has now said, I'd like to put forward the following idea. The General in Moscow said with satisfaction that Colonel W. had contacts with the American intelligence service. He must have realized that this entailed that the Americans expected certain information on Soviet conditions from Colonel W. Was the consequence of this that Colonel W. consulted the General on what he should give the Americans in order to maintain the confidence which they had for you which was important for the General to utilize?

W: No, no such reasoning entered his mind, but he expressed only the general desire to maintain contacts and he left the steps to be taken to my own judgment.

B: Another point which may be raised in this connection is whether it was realized in the complicated double game that the Americans should believe that they were conducting a double game with Colonel W. as a double agent in the Soviet intelligence service.

W: The Americans did not know anything about my relationship to the Soviet intelligence service and nothing of that sort had ever been mentioned.

B: In the conclusion of this chapter I'd like to ask Colonel W. to report on the first contact with the agent of the Soviet intelligence service in Washington which was somewhat held up.

W: After my arrival in Washington I called on my colleagues within the air attaché group, as was customary. Among them was the Soviet Air attaché, a general with the name of Kuvinov. I assumed that he would become my contact man, but I could not be certain. The contact in Washington, through the code word indicated during the interrogation concerning the period in Moscow, was not established during my visit. After this visit counter visits started the normal diplomatic way from all on whom I had called. The Soviet Air attaché stayed for quite a time and, if my memory serves me right, only in August. He called on me at my office at the Embassy.

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On that occasion the code words agreed upon were exchanged. I thought I would be quite safe at my own office; therefore, I went into special problems. However, the Soviet Air attaché considered himself experienced in the matter and an expert on conditions and did not accept any risky conversation. He quickly put his hand over my mouth, by the way without saying anything, and instead he showed me a slip of paper with notes. On the slip he suggested that I should visit him at a later date and that all the details could be clarified there. Therefore, nothing was laid down at this meeting.

### METHOD AND CONSPIRATORY BEHAVIOR OF COLONEL W.'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FOR SOVIET ACCOUNT

B: At the beginning we'd like to make an attempt to clarify who were Colonel W.'s various contact men within the Soviet intelligence service in Washington. We have already clarified that the first contact man was Major General Viktor Kuvinov who, according to a list of diplomats, was air attaché in Washington up to October 20, 1954. Could Colonel W. say who replaced him as contact in Washington?

W: First it was Lieutenant Colonel Bogatyrev and subsequently Lieutenant Colonel Antonov.

B: Concerning these persons, do you know that Bogatyrev was a deputy air attaché up to October 24, 1956, and that Antonov stayed behind in Washington up to sometime in 1957. Since we have now clarified this point shall we come back to the point where we concluded the analysis of developments previously and speak of the developments taking place when Colonel W. met Kuvinov for the second time.

\* \* \* \* \*

Colonel W. reported during an interrogation on July 4, 1963, on his second meeting with the Soviet contact man in Washington, Major General Kuvinov and the method and conspiracy by illegal activities which, at that time, were designed and the manner in which same were pursued subsequently.

"On the indicated day I came to your office which, incidently, was located quite near to the Swedish Embassy, where the military officials were accommodated in a separate building. Three different media were to be applied for the meeting and the delivery of the material. First we could meet at the various gatherings where we two had been invited and a great number resulted from such meetings. Further, we could meet at the routine meetings which were laid down each time; they were arranged in such a manner that we met at places which were out of the way, where it was possible to walk quietly and in calmness and speak with each other or where one could perhaps sit down in the terrain or in a park and speak to each other \* \* \* First I'd like to go into various methods used when we met at the events or similar gatherings. Here it was merely a question of delivering a small quantity of material and that could, among others, be done by way of handshaking. At that time, this was something new for me. However, the Soviet General said that it was not so easy as usually believed and we started with exercises on a large scale, as I remember. He had very large hands which greatly facilitated the procedure. After some exercise we found that we had familiarized ourselves with the proper technique.

"L: What kind of material was delivered in this way? That is to say by shaking hands.

"W: The material which was delivered from my side was usually a roll of film, and this was done when we greeted each other. It could happen also that I delivered two film rolls; the second roll was delivered when we said goodbye to each other. Naturally, he did not give me any film in such instances since this could be done under much—shall we say—simpler and safer conditions, for instance, at meetings. But it happened that he delivered information to me. Another method of delivery which can be advantageously applied was as follows: when a number of attachés were gathered with the Americans to look at something or to listen to somebody we stood close to each other and there was more or less a crowd and

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such an object was passed from my right hand to his left hand or the other way around. Another method which was applied at the receptions at the Russian Embassy was to leave the object in one's own topcoat and the other party picked it up there; however, this was done only at the Russian Embassy. In one instance the method was as follows: it was indicated beforehand to the contact man where the pockets were located and which pocket was used; as a rule, it was the inner pocket of the topcoat. When one went into the reception it was always necessary to know the number where one's topcoat was hanging; in such case it was not even necessary to greet or contact the respective party, in this case the Soviet Air General; it was only necessary to say the number 24 or whatever number it was, when passing by, and the party concerned would go out as soon as possible to pick up the object and when he comes back he nods almost unnoticed. In this way speaking with each other at all at the reception is avoided. We used all opportunities to deliver material and especially those where it was completely official and completely apparent that we met. As an example, I'd like to mention that the delivery was done in the Pentagon when we both were there on some occasion and that the Americans had also included us in a group which had gathered there. Another delivery was effected, for example, in an American aircraft. The Air Force attachés were frequently invited to come to other places in the U.S.A. and transportation was arranged; in this way we met in the same aircraft where it was easy to deliver the material. I'd like to mention that, on such occasions, the procedure was as follows: one took strong safety pins along which were available in every pocket; it happened often that one received an object and put it into a pocket which was easily accessible but not suitable for long storage; after this one went to the toilet as soon as possible to change over the object concerned to the back pocket of the trousers where it was secured with a safety pin. It never happened that objects were handed over under suspicious conditions or circumstances which raised suspicion; one never retired behind a tree or house or in any other manner separated from the group; on the contrary, the delivery was usually done in a crowd when people stood as close to each other as possible. I may also add that the delivery by way of handshaking was done also in the street or in a department store in some instances. It did not occur very frequently that such occasion was provided for meeting but it happened several times. It had been agreed to meet while walking in opposite directions in a certain street at a certain time or it was determined that one should meet in a certain section of a department store at a certain hour. There was only one thing to watch; one should look surprised and one should shake hands and nod to each other to continue one's way. I now go over to information on some of the routine meetings. It was necessary, in the organization of the activities, and in maintaining the entire system that one met at equal distances, for a time sufficiently long to really be able to discuss details without being interrupted. These routine meetings were held in two different manners. Either one met at a remote place in Washington, a street or in a park where one knew by experience that there were few people and where one could take a little walk together. The other method was to meet in a terrain far away from Washington. This necessitated very detailed plans, where one should drive, where one should park the cars, and where one should go to arrive at the meeting point. Just to give an example, I'd like to mention that the Soviet Air General was interested in fishing and had the American licenses concerned to go fishing at various places. In one instance it was decided that he should fish at a certain hour, at a certain place and at that time I should try to find my way through the area to reach him. He had taken food and refreshments along and the idea was that we should sit there in quietness and eat together, deliver material and discuss what should take place at the next routine meeting and when it should be held. The last mentioned reference shows that it was a meeting in the middle of the day; it was lunch time when we met. I can say that the principle was ap-

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plied that all meetings out in the open were held during the daytime, but all meetings in the city were held at remote places in the evening quite late, for example, at 10 or 10:30. At all these routine meetings, this was naturally particularly important, when one met in Washington in streets or parks, a signal was needed to indicate that one believed that some kind of danger was imminent. The whole system was very simple: one should always have the left hand freely moving back and forth as is done when people walk. If there was anything to carry, it was done with the right hand. When it was believed that danger was imminent, the left hand was put into the pocket of the trouser or topcoat when one knew that the contact man had seen his. As soon as one puts the hand into the pocket the contact man acts as if he does not know the counterpart at all. For Soviet personnel that had to attend a routine meeting, special regulations applied the idea of which was to make sure that one was not watched. This personnel was instructed to drive here and there at a certain time—this was usually done in a car—and to make sure that one was not watched or that one got rid of parties following.

"I do not recall the exact number of hours they were supposed to be on the road; but I know the period of time varied; they spoke of 2 to 5 hours. Under these circumstances I suggested perhaps, let us say two meetings which were too close to each other. It was a tremendous effort for these people to attend a routine meeting because they had to leave several hours before. \* \* \* For my part, I was not subjected to such regulations but I was told, in a general way, that I should leave in good time so that I would not go directly to the place but make suitable detours, taken care of suitable errands and made sure that I was not followed in my opinion. One was not watched so much in Washington because the diplomatic group was exceedingly large and the resources and the points to be watched were very few considering the size of the group. For instance, it was not possible at all to watch all the personnel of the Eastern countries; the authorities had to confine themselves to spot checks or to keeping an eye on a limited number of persons permanently.

"Now I like to make a few statements about films and photographic equipment. The main part of the material of which I took pictures, was reproduced by the special Kodak film which is called microfilm and particularly suitable for such purposes. After some time special film was introduced which can only be developed by the receiving party in Moscow. The idea was that I should use Kodak film for objects which were difficult or impossible to trace back to the sender if they come to the wrong party. On the other hand, when there was material in the case of which it could be assumed that it was easy to trace back to the sender, then the special film was to be used.

"I got the Kodak film from various shops myself. The special film was obtained through my contact man in such a manner that at a routine meeting I requested a certain number to be given at the next routine meeting. Concerning photographic equipment it was soon realized that the main part of the material which I delivered consisted of publications that is to say books or folders which contained mainly comprehensive descriptions of equipment. Photographic equipment suitable for this purpose was needed and when I came to Washington I had not got any such equipment. I procured a so-called polar tripod which belongs to the equipment of the Leica camera. I also procured a special arrangement for books belonging to this polar tripod, which is very practical and effective.

"L: I'd like to ask the following: Did these private purchases not draw a certain attention among your colleagues in Washington?

"W: Also from the Swedish point of view there was a need for taking pictures of this type; therefore I recall that no attention was paid to account of the fact that I was in possession of such equipment. I cannot give exact details in what way I explained this because I can not recall it. I have been asked about the volume of my deliveries of film rolls.

"L: How were these film rolls packed when they were delivered?

"W: There was no standard packaging. The roll was delivered in the form of packages. For instance, it was put into mail boxes; thus I put the rolls together into suitable packages, sometimes making several parcels. The greater part of the deliveries was made at the rou-

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tine meetings; here I used packages which did not draw attention. I never used briefcases or small baggage cases. But I used, for instance, an ordinary paper or plastic bag where I had put various other parcels on top.

"L: During your period of service in Washington you had personnel assisting you, among others some deputy air attachés. Did it ever occur that any of them became interested, curious, with regard to your work and had you any difficulty in disguising the work you did at your office with reference to the illegal activities?

"W: Yes, I had assistants, also deputy air attachés. When I arrived it was a captain with the name of Blomberg. He had served under my predecessor and worked also under my supervision for some time. He was followed by a then Captain Boheman who was succeeded by a then Captain Schnell; after this came a Captain von Delsing who remained in Washington also under my successor. I think it is extremely improbable that any of the personnel just mentioned could have had any suspicion with regard to my illegal activities. The main part of our work was exactly the same, namely to collect technical publications and similar information which was sent in to various agencies in Sweden, particularly to the Air Administration. In connection with this there was also a certain extent of photographic work involved. When I came to Washington, I introduced a red lamp in my room to prevent that I got visitors when I needed information. The system with the red lamp is a usual method and no explanation was necessary. The illegal activities in the form of photographic work were often carried out in the evenings when I went back to the Embassy when nobody was present there. If somebody discovered that, then it was not difficult to explain my presence since we had a great deal of work which it was difficult to cope with. In addition, I did all my private correspondence at the office. For example, I had my checkbooks there and all invoices and all my private correspondence. I took pictures also during the daytime under the protection of the red lamp. If, against expectation, somebody would disregard the red lamp and come in I could always say that the photographic work pertains to some material we were supposed to send to Sweden and this would not have drawn any attention."

Colonel W. stated the following during the interrogation on June 22, 1963:

"Concerning the payment of dollars from the Soviets it was decided that at the routine meetings, dollars are ordered at the same time when film is ordered for the next time. There was no limitation. The general instruction said that the request for dollars should be adjusted in such a manner that nobody notices that an excessive amount of dollars are needed."

In connection with this it is considered useful to add the following data concerning economic problems. The information was taken from the interrogation held on July 5, 1963, when Colonel W. stated the following:

"The main part of the money which I took out was used for expenses in connection with trips and the extensive representation which was necessary. Only a small part was used for personal matters. The work in America started with \$5,000 being paid as a starting capital, which I had occasion to state previously. After this I never asked for amounts as large as \$5,000. The requests concerned were one, two and three, and in some individual cases \$4,000. This was expected to be sufficient for a certain period of time. A quick estimate shows that I obtained \$750. per month on the average during my entire period in Washington. I repeat: this is only a rough estimate. Under the requisition system in effect one was always put into a peculiar situation when it was a question of saving funds. There was no reason to enter the money into the bank books or to acquire stocks or other income which would draw the attention of the Internal Revenue authorities. There was an opportunity to take out very high amounts at a later more suitable date. I had agreed with headquarters in Moscow that I could take out a very high amount if I deemed the situation to be favorable."

Colonel W continued:

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"I did not improve my economic situation with the help of these funds but I acquired a great deal of conveniences all along and I did not take any regard relative to my expenses which enabled me to save a great deal of time. My usual financial situation in Washington was particularly favorable. Our diplomatic personnel are also paid good salaries when they are abroad so they can maintain the standard which the diplomatic life requires of them. For my part, I had a monthly income of 7,500 crowns after taxes and other deductions. I lived in a relatively small house in Washington and my expenses were far below my income. During these five and a half years I was able to save money which was put, among others, on my postal savings account with the defense staff. The idea was that I should not save more than I would do ordinarily. If one lives a little bit carefully in Washington, it is possible to save. This was known by all the personnel stationed there. The real advantage which I thought I could have personally from this service was seen to be in the future and at the moment when I was apprehended here in Stockholm these plans had taken a more concrete form."

### BACKGROUND FOR THE ILLEGAL WORK IN THE UNITED STATES

The idea of a scheduled interrogation of Col. W. was to clarify which circumstances influenced the development of illegal activities in the U.S. in the course of the years, on the basis of general directives given in Moscow.

It was assumed that Col. W's two meetings with the general in Moscow were events which had a great impact on developments. According to W. these meetings were connected with the visit to Sweden at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954, also in summer 1955. \* \* \* During the interrogations of July 4 and 5, 1963, Col. W. reported as follows:

"During my period of service in Washington I paid two visits to Sweden, the first at the end of 1953 and the beginning of 1954 when I went home to attend a meeting of attachés; the second time when I had so-called home leave with the entire family; this was in summer 1955. In the two instances, the visit had been planned beforehand \* \* \*; when I met the man who, up to now, had been called "contact man general". At the time of my departure from Moscow I had been briefed that this man had entered the picture, but I had never met him prior to these two visits. \* \* \* Prior to my departure from Washington instructions were given concerning the meeting \* \* \*. It was up to me to fix the time for the meeting. In a way, it was an approximate date which I cannot recall; it was sometime in the evening, as I recall, probably at 8 p.m. It was winter and thus very dark. The place to meet was at \* \* \*. It had been determined exactly with reference to a gate. I was supposed to walk in the direction of the gate starting from the fixed point indicated, exactly at 8 o'clock. The contact man was to come from the other direction and meet me. The selected place was completely deserted at that time of the day. I had instruction to dress in a certain way. It was a certain topcoat to be worn by me; this topcoat was easy to recognize because it was very short. I was supposed to carry a brown briefcase with my right hand. The left arm was to be moved the usual way when walking. When I expected danger, then the left hand should be in the pocket of the topcoat."

The interrogation on the Moscow period showed that W. started to cooperate with the general in Moscow earlier than previously stated by him.

Col. W. continued his report as follows:

"In terms of organization this meeting did not offer any surprise. I had attended similar meetings in Moscow before. When we met in the villa \* \* \* I found that the same routine was followed which I had applied previously. First of all, the entire meeting was accompanied from the first to the last minute by very loud radio music. No tape recorders were seen and it was improbable that such recorders were used at the same time as the radio was on. Radio music is a regular routine at all meetings at all places I visited. There was no sense in thinking of a monitoring technique because the radio is switched on every time a meeting is held so that no risk of being monitored is incurred. This technique had been applied also in the past, as I have

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seen myself. When we started there were always Russian and other drinks on the table, also chocolate and fruit. These refreshments were available during the, if I may say so, official conversations. A Soviet official followed a certain memorandum and marked item after item until everything had been discussed. The same technique was used by myself although I had practically not put down anything. When the talks had come to an end, it was practice to burn all papers no longer needed; in some cases they were flushed down the toilet. Papers to be taken along from the meeting, were put into order and placed at a suitable spot in the clothing; this applied almost always to my Soviet contact man. I took notes along only in rare instances. After the meeting we went always into a large room to take a good meal. During this meal talks were held which had been scheduled by my Soviet contact man. When we had come to the middle of the meal he showed always a paper which he put on the plate, after the worst hunger had gone. On this paper there were a number of points for the discussion of general political, military or strategic problems. As soon as we had gone over these points, he marked them off. After this, there was, of course, also conversation which had not been planned. The scheduled discussions were intended to clarify my views on certain situations in the world; they wanted my reaction to statements made by well-known people with regard to conditions. These talks made it possible to obtain a clear picture of Russian views.

"S: Could the Colonel give a brief report concerning the intentions of the general which were possibly pursued through the visit? And what instructions did he give in this connection?

"W: This meeting was the first direct contact with headquarters in Moscow after I had come to Washington. At that time it was realized that I had possibilities in Washington and what kind of material I was able to send to Moscow. On that occasion it was possible to give more precise instructions. I stated previously that one wanted me to concentrate on technical problems in connection with air navigation. From the material I sent in it was found that there were great possibilities for me in Washington in this field. It was explained to me that the main job was to send descriptions of equipment of exclusively modern design, with all details, drawings, diagrams and similar illustrations to be of value to the Russian designers. The purpose was to obtain new ideas and improve conventional designs in the Soviet Union; the final objective was to save time in the process of development. He gave examples of material he had sent in, which met these requirements. I was also shown examples of general aeronavigational nature which commanded less interest; I was supposed not to waste time and effort on such information but to concentrate on the main job.

"S: I like to ask the Colonel the following question: Were there asked any questions concerning strategic planning, the position of bombers, the use made of them? Or was there no interest in NATO strategy?

"W: I had sent in data of precisely this nature; the general was quite frank when he stated that there was no sense to continue this reporting because they had contacts in this field which were better than myself. In this connection it was stated that one might have possibly special questions concerning political or strategic problems but such matters should be presented with regard to specific points within a specified area. I was asked to do what I can in this respect.

"S: Could the Colonel report on the next meeting and say whether there were other visitors?

"W: As I said, the second \* \* \* meeting during my service in Washington was held in summer 1955 when I was in Sweden on my so-called long vacation. The meeting proceeded in exactly the same manner as the first one. Nothing unusual was developed at this meeting. One continued to analyze the material which had been particularly significant, and the material which was of less interest.

"S: Could the Colonel give an example of material which was particularly appreciated and in connection with which they expressed particular satisfaction?

"W: I recall that, in this instance, one pointed toward \* \* \* where I had obtained complete descriptions. \* \* \*

"A: Can the Colonel recall the type of \* \* \*?

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"W: In view of the hectic activity during my service in Washington and the great number of types \*\*\* under study it is very difficult to locate the right types used at that time. However, I have a feeling that I can say that \*\*\* but I must make the reservation that I may be wrong and it was possible that this refers to a later date. These two visits and meetings \*\*\* were my only direct contact with headquarters in Moscow during my service in Washington."

During a basic talk on the period in Washington, between W. and the undersigned on November 19, 1963, reference was made to the above visits \*\*\*. It was found that during one of the visits \*\*\* W. wrote out his application for Soviet citizenship. This step could have had a decisive importance, said W. if he had been able to leave the country prior to his arrest. In this situation the Soviets would have intervened and proven that W. was a Soviet citizen. The idea was to get more specific assignments in this manner which W. executed in his illegal work in the United States. The interrogation of 4 July, 1963 W. gave a few examples.

"L: Did it ever happen that you were asked by your Russian employer to go on a trip to a certain place where you had to perform a specific assignment?"

"W: This happened \*\*\* and it was also requested that the trip be done by air because this procedure entailed that certain possibilities of observation were available. It was completely clear to me that the intention was to check certain data. \*\*\* The information was supplied.

"L: Did it ever occur that the Colonel was given a purely political assignment?"

"W: For the first time this happened during my period of service in Washington. It happened on the very day when I was contacted by my Soviet contactman in a precipitated manner. It was found that a message had been received from Moscow in which it was stated that the information received in Moscow points to the fact that an action was being prepared on the American side against the Soviet Union in the nature of a sudden surprising action. It was also stated in the communication that the truthfulness of this report should be checked in any case. I assumed that I was not the only party in Washington which was contacted in this situation and from which immediate action was requested. I was somewhat taken by surprise by the question because this was quite in line with what I had seen previously. To comply with the assignment I proceeded in the following manner: I expected that if something takes place which is of such great importance, namely a surprise action against the Soviet Union is being prepared, there would be a hectic activity in the Pentagon. At that time I had a great number of contacts in the Pentagon whom I knew very well and where, when I called there, I could look in without difficulty to speak to the secretaries concerned and ask them whether this or that general or this or that colonel was very busy or whether he had time to see me. I decided to drive to the Pentagon and check with a certain number of persons. As I said, I would look in at various places and get thus a picture to what extent these gentlemen were busy. I made this round and found that there was no difficulty to get in to talk to them. There was no difficulty to make an appointment for a later date in case they had no possibility of seeing me when I was present. Thus the overall impression was such, that it was impossible that anything was underway since nobody was in a particular rush. I drew my own conclusions and at a meeting in the afternoon of the same day I reported that, according to my judgment the reports received by Moscow on a American attempt to surprisal action were definitely wrong. This episode had a certain significance for the future work since I received more assignments of similar nature. I like to add that a meeting \*\*\* with my special Russian contactman which was held during my period of service in Washington, he told me that it had been found on the basis of my report and the reports from other sources, that the reports received in Moscow were completely unfounded."

A special line of development of W's illegal activities in the U.S. was described by him during the interrogation held on June 22, 1963.

"In an early stage the Soviets tried, in Washington, to obtain agents with my assistance. What the Soviets had in mind were not agents who would work with parties other than myself. The idea was that I

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should procure agencies who worked within a certain field and would give me the material which I would forward. I explained at length that I would not be able and willing to act along these lines. Their perseverance on this point had the effect that I gradually made a few attempts in this direction. I did not get any instructions whatsoever how I should proceed in this matter; this may perhaps be considered strange. On the other hand, I was supposed to give a report on my activities in this direction every time I delivered the film rolls. I made an attempt at an institution which is called NACA. At that agency I found an office in Washington from which material was sent out or where it was possible to go in and obtain material provided excess copies were available. This applied only to nonrestricted material. There were also secret records but they could only be given out upon special requisition. I went down to that agency myself and got out material which was available, that is to say which was not restricted. This was not necessary because one could easily write in to request such material but, on the other hand, certain material was discovered of whose availability one did not know. Records from this agency are secret and frequently they are downgraded after a certain time to become nonrestricted material. I got so far that I was able to find out from this lady which records had just been downgraded and were available; undoubtedly, this was of a certain value. The lady concerned attended various events in Washington and there I had an opportunity to meet her. I reported this to my employers in Moscow. Reply was immediately received that this was excellent and that I should continue. In the meantime I could never get further, for example offer her payment if she would provide more valuable material. I reported to my employer subsequently that I definitely did not want to have anything to do with this matter in the future. I received the reply that my point of view was accepted."

\* \* \* \* \*

Col. W's statement made during the interrogation held on June 22, 1963, contains a report on the last phase of development of illegal activity in the U.S.

"Since my service in Washington, after more than 5 years, came gradually to an end, I received the communication that further directives for my activities, that is to say after Washington, would be given by a person who would come to the U.S. from headquarters in Moscow. Later on it was reported that the party concerned had arrived but, unfortunately, a complication had arisen so that a meeting could not take place. Instead, I received a communication saying I should meet a contact party \* \* \*. I was asked what time and which day would be convenient and I gave the information. After some more time had elapsed, I received confirmation from Moscow that the meeting \* \* \* had been arranged and that the meeting should be held exactly in the same way as the last two times and with the same person. This concludes the period in Washington."

### METHOD APPLIED TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION

During the introductory stage covered by the report, several methods were discussed for the procurement of desirable data several times. The report of Col. W. which follows contains partly repetitions of certain developments. On the other hand, every chapter of the interrogation provides additional aspects of the situation concerned. Therefore, it was held that it was not so appropriate to tear Col. W's reports apart to a great extent.

During the interrogation held on July 4, 1963, Col. W. made the following statements:

"L: If we now go back, Col. W., to your Soviet espionage work, could you, in some way, align this illegal activity with your legal work? I mean, on the occasion of your visits to industries, various associations—did you collect material for the Soviet intelligence service at the same time as you procured material for the defense staff?"

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"W: Yes, this entire work went parallel and the result of it was precisely that these technical publications in which the Soviet intelligence service was so much interested, went partly to Sweden; some were sent to the Soviet intelligence service, and some were sent to both of them. Thus the illegal activity was completely woven into the legal work and as far as I can judge, very difficult to detect. Naturally, it was my job to watch where these publications had gone so that I did not do any missteps. This, I must say, resulted in constant pressure.

"L: I like to ask a question: did you obtain certain data in your work for Sweden, for instance, concerning a weapon or armaments to be delivered to the Swedish Armed Forces, and did it happen, in some instances, that you delivered some of these data?"

\* \* \* \* \*

Col. W. made the following statement during the interrogation held on June 22, 1963:

"It should now be appropriate to speak of the type of material I compiled in the U.S.A., for the Soviet Union. The possibilities of obtaining publications in this special field which was of interest to me, were almost fantastic. It may perhaps be explained here that the main part of what was of interest to the Russians, was not restricted material but was difficult to obtain in any case from their point of view. The Swedish Embassy received literature on this field, I can say thousands of copies, during the time I worked with the Embassy. It was literature which I had either requested in writing from the Pentagon and obtained from there, or material which I had collected during trips and visits with various installations of the Air Force or within the aircraft industry. Among this great volume of literature, I selected the material which was suitable for my purposes on the basis of the aims of the Soviet Intelligence Service, and I sent in such material, both to Sweden and Moscow. Since, for obvious reasons, there was no need to be economical, I went on trips within the U.S.A. and Canada, on all imaginable occasions, to aircraft units and the aircraft industries and staffs to the extent this was possible. Some of these trips were official trips for Sweden but many had a different nature. My lively contacts with the American Air Force resulted finally in the acquaintance with persons or in recommendations for practically speaking every place to which I went. The conditions were strange in many respects. \* \* \* The background for this situation was the tremendously large group of foreign personnel which passed through the American aircraft units all the time. This personnel is classified in various ways on the basis of the material which they are allowed to see. Some of them can only see nonrestricted material; others may see only material of a low degree of restriction and others again have access to higher classified material. When, all of a sudden, an air attaché from Sweden appeared, there was, in many cases, nobody who knew that he did not belong to the personnel which usually passed through the installation concerned. If one was questioned what so-called classification was applicable, one could say secret, that is to say by Swedish standards. Often it did not come to one's mind that this was a classification which was applicable to a foreign power and had nothing to do with America. \* \* \* I have stated this only to prove that possibilities were very great, particularly if one had occasion to be generous to offer certain material and perhaps stay a little longer than usually or if, for instance, one could come at the end of a week to a suitable place and thereafter go back and work at the beginning of the next week."

The following was revealed through an interrogation held on July 5, 1963:

"W: During that period I was not assisted by any American helpers who gave me publications consciously, that is to say Americans who could be called a kind of subagent or persons whom I remunerated for giving me material. To put it briefly: I had no subagents whatsoever. On the other hand, I established a good relationship with the greater part of the people known to me, and I selected the most valuable among them. I received different types of information from them; thus they gave me these data unconsciously. When it was a matter of visiting industries, for example, it was very easy to obtain

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descriptions of various types simply by expressing interest in a possible purchase. After I had made purchases for the Swedish Air Force and the salesmen or those parties who were connected with the sales organization of the enterprise concerned were aware of this, they were very alert as soon as I expressed interest for anything and said that this or that would be something of interest one should report to Sweden and that it was not impossible that Sweden might buy it. In this way my interest in the subject matter proper and their sales interest were aligned, and looking back I can now say that this procedure produced surprisingly good results. During that period of time I was engaged intensively in my work: I invited people from different walks of life. I invited them to my home which was the least important element but I invited them also frequently outside and this was particularly the case when I was on my trips; it occurred also when I had to deal with industrial officials at the lower level that I used the bribing system \*\*\*.

"S: Could the Colonel give a more detailed description in which way he utilized these contacts among officers and industrialists, and how he applied the tips he was given by the contact men?

"W: I made use of all these different contacts to obtain an overall picture of the situation. I found out what kind of material was available and what kind of material was being developed; I found out what kind of plants manufactured this material and the types of publications available and where they could be obtained. It must be borne in mind that a great part of this work at the Embassy in Washington, particularly of the NATO representations but also at the Swedish and other foreign agencies, was precisely to write for and request certain publications. Along the lines of this general intelligence work one would necessarily see these publications; one would either directly ask for them in writing to the Pentagon and request them or by paying a visit for example to the Air unit if one knew beforehand that these descriptions were in its possession, or a visit was paid to industries where such material was manufactured.

"S: Could the Colonel give a brief description of how it was possible to obtain, for example, by visiting a unit or industry, how it was possible that the parties concerned spoke about the things they do? Try to give a brief description.

"W: First of all I'd like to explain that the main part of interest for the Soviet intelligence service aimed at what we call nonrestricted files. They wanted above all to have merely the designs, drawings, coupling schemes, etc. to facilitate the work of their designers. To a very great extent these areas were not restricted, but the great publications which gave a description of the material were followed by a supplement of a low secrecy classification where the performance data and some general information were given. They can be characterized as data which are of interest to the staff and this was information which they wanted only in the second place. It was not difficult to obtain these nonrestricted publications. The only thing required was to write for them and request them. They were always sent provided they were nonrestricted. Out at the units and enterprises one could practically pick up what belonged to this category. These are special conditions which are not the same as what we are accustomed to. With regard to supplements to those publications which, in general, belonged to the secrecy classification which the Americans call "confidential" it is easy to give a description of how it is possible to obtain also such supplements. An American air base or an industrial plant has quite different dimensions from those to which we are accustomed. At an air base you may have 10,000 or 15,000 people and an industrial enterprise may have the same number. When I paid a visit to these places I always had an official permit and this resulted in the fact that when I came to the spot I was brought to the highest chief and had a talk with him. And subsequently the time which I spent there I was practically invited by this chief. It could be a lunch in the mess hall or it could be dinner at his home or both of them and it could happen, that, in some way, I returned the invitation. When I had to study a certain aspect with these organizations subsequently, some of the men closest to the chief, or, in the case of a military unit, for example an adjutant

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followed me being one rank lower, and introduced me to various officials who, by order of the chief, should take care of me and give me the information which I wanted, provided that the security regulations in effect were observed. This personnel which was specialized, it was frequently very difficult to keep things in order. The unit or the enterprise was so great that there was a great flow of visitors every day to take care of. Naturally, to a great extent this was American personnel from other places but there was also personnel in great numbers from the NATO countries. They were here for training or for studying certain material or for training in the operation of certain equipment. \* \* \* All these people can be characterized by saying that they had a very great interest in their particular special field and that they wanted to convey the impression that everything was well under control and orderly and that the material was very good since it had been given to so many countries. It could happen that we came to material which was considered confidential or to descriptions which were classified as confidential and sometimes there was doubt whether they could actually give this material or not. In certain cases they asked for my clearance as it is called. In such instance it is necessary to mention the things which one is permitted to see. There is a system which is applied in the American Armed Forces. One may, for example, be authorized to see sometimes confidential material or material of a higher secrecy classification which is called "secret": when I answered such a question saying that I was authorized to see some secret material it happened quite often that they did not ask me at all whether I meant Swedish or American conditions without checking this point: they took it for granted that I meant American conditions. In general, they did not ask for any verification and, in general, this was based on the fact that I had been introduced from the top by the highest chief and this carried an extremely great weight among the lower echelons. When I visited industrial enterprises the conversation was at a different angle because interest in purchasing equipment was expressed which I mentioned before."

A special method which was inspired by the employer was reported during the interrogation held on June 22, 1963.

"W: The office in Washington had a special section for purchasing. The Swedish Air Force made relatively large purchases. This resulted in the fact that I paid visits to various industries. The Soviet Union intended to make use of this in the following manner: when I visited a certain industry on behalf of Sweden they wanted certain information from a certain section. I had also to show interest for other sections and collect material from them. In this way my activities were expanded and became gradually very great. To give an idea of the order of magnitude of this work I may mention that I was given as many as \* \* \* film roles at a single routine meeting. As I had reported previously, I was also accredited at Ottawa in Canada. A great number of visits were paid to Canada and I visited there the various installations of the Canadian Air Force as well as the aircraft industry. The work was done there in similar manner as in the United States. The material from these sources was handed over together with the other material in Washington."

In connection with a survey on the developments in Washington on January 9, 1964, the undersigned asked Colonel W. to give a more detailed report of the method of bribing to obtain data.

Colonel W. reported the following:

\* \* \* \* \*

During such a survey, a few weeks later, or on January 31, 1964, we discussed again working methods used in the illegal activities in the United States. In this connection Colonel W. reported the following: "This is in reference to my work methods in the United States. Often we met first an official in the sales section and then I established contact with one of the highest chiefs. First I fostered relations with the highest chiefs so that I became known among them. When I subsequently met officials of lower rank, particularly in the sales bracket, I referred to these higher chiefs and the result was that I can say without exception, these lower officials checked with the higher chief mentioned by me. It happened very often that they expressed themselves in a positive way and said to the lower official concerned that he should

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help me in my mission etc, as much as he could. This gave me added prestige in the eyes of the lower officials. Subsequently I used the argument that I had no time and had 'fans' as the Americans call it, namely that one has access to the estimates to be used for the problems to be solved. With the statement that one had little time and a great deal of money, great progress was made, more than expected in most respects, under the circumstances and concepts prevailing in America.

"To give you another example: I was in Los Angeles and had contact with among other \* \* \*. Here I used the method described. The lower official who was, incidentally, assigned to follow me all those days, when I was present, and who was in the sales bracket, went into another room and called up the chief. Then he came back and said that the highest chief at \* \* \* wanted to speak to me and that he asked me to come there in the afternoon to see him, together with him, to his swimming pool which was his private pool. Such a little example makes such a tremendous impression, in any case in America, on a subordinate official that this could be utilized in a very efficient way."

### CIRCUMSTANCES REVEALED DURING THE INVESTIGATION

During this stage of the interrogation it was intended to survey all the circumstances revealed during the interrogations with persons who had points of contact with Colonel W. during his service as air attaché in Washington.

Under the circumstances prevailing, certain problems will be reported here instead, which had been of importance during the explanations.

During the interrogations it had been found that Colonel W. sent a popular article from an American magazine to Sweden, prior to 1955. \* \* \*

In October or November 1956, a study group of the Swedish Armed Forces went on a trip to the U.S.A. to study photographic material among others. In February 1957, one of the participants of this group wrote a handwritten letter to Colonel W. in which he described in detail his contacts with U.S. companies, among others in the film line.

This background is connected with a part of the interrogation held on July 24, 1963, with Col. W.

\* \* \* \* \*

Another factor which was of interest, was that Col. W., during his service in Washington, wrote to the literature depot of the Air Staff several times or paid a visit to it, from which he borrowed the rules and regulations and similar material during his stay in Sweden. Particular attention was given to the fact that he borrowed for example \* \* \* in the same manner as other publications relative to the conditions of the Navy.

In connection with the survey made together with Col. W. of various letters from the archives in Washington, this problem was discussed as well.

Col. W. explained that the important Swedish publications were not given out to any foreign intelligence service during the Washington period. The reason that he and perhaps particularly lower ranks were in need of such publications from the literature depot was that they all had to keep abreast of developments in Sweden. Colonel W. pointed out that he was also accredited with the American Navy.

Another factor which is of importance in the clarification of the situation is to which extent Colonel W. made use of Swedish military secret data to exchange them for data which were desired by the Soviet intelligence service.

The idea was that Colonel W., in his ambition to obtain information from his Soviet employers, was not impaired as one usually is, when it was a question of giving information on Swedish military secrets if he was able to obtain good American data within the corresponding field by making use of this information.

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In a conversation on November 19, 1963, these points were given to Colonel W. who said that he understood the idea but he denied that he had ever resorted to such means in his illegal work. Colonel W. explained in this connection that it was very simple to obtain a result by purchasing information with cash. In addition, he said, that he had never met a single person in Washington who had any interest in Swedish military conditions.

### VARIOUS SOURCES OF INFORMATION

In this chapter the idea was to give a summary of the various sources of information of importance to Colonel W. in his illegal work for the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. and to elucidate the information obtained from the various sources.

A detailed interrogation concerning this point was not held with Colonel W.

The following summary which is based on Colonel W.'s statements in various connections during the interrogations and recorded conversations, is very brief.

If the circumstances permit, an interrogation will be held with Colonel W. concerning the examples of material delivered to the Soviet Union, which are reproduced in the table which is attached to this report. During this interrogation circumstances may be revealed which will throw light on the significance of various sources of information.

#### *Colonel Wennerstroem's personal contacts*

The significance of the wide personal contacts which Colonel W. was able to utilize immediately after his arrival in Washington, have been mentioned several times.

The greatest value of these contacts was found in the fact that they prepared the grounds for Colonel W. when he, for example, wanted to get permission to visit industries or military units. These sources were sometime even verbal sources and the data given were of great value.

#### *The exchange system*

It appears suggestive that the more or less legal exchange of information between armed forces attachés was a source for Colonel W.'s illegal activity.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### *Procurement of publications*

Colonel W.'s responsibilities included the procurement of military and technical publications of various kinds. The domestic military administrations and staffs, particularly the FF,<sup>1</sup> had very wide objec-

<sup>1</sup> Swedish Air Administration.

tives in this respect. Often Colonel W. was able to meet their requests. No military publications or any publications from enterprises manufacturing war material could be requested in any way other than through the attaché section of Swedish Embassy.

Many of the publications which passed through the office of the Air attaché on such occasions, were valuable also to the Soviet intelligence service. In such cases Colonel W. took pictures of the publications and delivered the films to his Soviet contact man in Washington.

#### *Visits to industrial enterprises*

Often Colonel W. arranged his work in such a manner that he had occasion to pay visits to important industrial plants manufacturing war materials. All factors taken into account, these visits brought extraordinary results under the aspect of illegal intelligence work. The value of the visits was not on that Colonel W. was able to obtain descriptions of material and similar literature in connection with the visit. In addition, he obtained in this way a good picture of the tactics of the American Air Force and its views on future developments with regard to the type of materials to be used, etc. He was also given data on the enterprise concerned and its personnel which was of interest to the Soviet intelligence service, among others as a basis for the recruitment of agents.

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The importance of industries as a source of information was discussed during our conversation on November 19, 1963. Colonel W. stated the following among others:

"Yes. It is clear that the best help I had was precisely that I had an entree everywhere, and very good introductions since I was a buyer. But the yield for the Soviet intelligence service was not as great since I had confined myself to Swedish interests. However, there were instances where I showed interest for equipment which, I knew, I would never buy but, according to my knowledge, was of interest to the Soviet intelligence service. In this way, I had an opportunity to go sideways all the time and pick up equipment from outside."

### *Other study trips*

Colonel W. acted often on his own initiative and arranged study trips to various air bases and similar installations which familiarized him with the tactics, equipment, training, and organization of various air units. The number of aircraft, types, and details on technical material are examples of data obtained during such visits. Certain reports by Colonel W. to Sweden concerning such trips are included in the table listing examples of data delivered, which will be examined on a later occasion. These reports give a good picture of the yield obtained from such visits, particularly since Colonel W. had good personal contacts with high officials with the U.S. Air Force.

### *Study trips of other parties*

Colonel W.'s assignments included the preparation of a great number of visits to military institutions and plants which military and civilian parties from Sweden paid in America. The only possibility to obtain the permission of the American Armed Forces for such visits was a request to the military section of the Swedish Embassy.

It happened that Colonel W. followed these visitors during their study trips which opened up approximately the same possibilities for him as if he would have made these visits himself.

In addition, Colonel W. attempted always to arrange matters in such a way that he was given one copy of the report on the trip concerned. This gave W. information of value for his illegal work.

These points were taken up during a conversation on November 19, 1963. The following was revealed:

Colonel W. was asked, in a general way, about his judgment of the value of the study reports made by other parties, seen under the aspect of illegal intelligence work and he was also asked whether these reports included information on the technical development in America. Colonel W. answered as follows:

"Yes, such matters were described to a certain extent; such information was received by way of letter because it did not pay in this work to send in anything other than mere descriptions of details of equipment. On the other hand, these technicians, and especially when I accompanied them, made it possible for me to obtain an insight into the work done by them at the various plants, perhaps into the type of material upon which emphasis was to be put, which was to be eliminated or replaced. Such developments were explained by me all along by way of letter."

The continuation of the discussion with Colonel W. showed his personal visits, together with, for example, a Swedish technician, with an industrial plant, and the conversations with American technicians who provided him with sources of information, proved really valuable data for his illegal work. The subsequent reports on the trips were frequently less valuable but in exceptional cases it happened that Colonel W. took pictures of the entire report and delivered it to the Soviet contact man.

Another important source of information which opened up through study trips made by other parties was that these persons, during their visit, expressed the desire to obtain various publications concerning conditions or equipment in which they were interested. If the publications were classified to a greater or smaller extent, it was not possible to come to a decision on the delivery of the publications right on the spot. To the extent the requests could be met subsequently, the publications were sent to the party concerned through Flatt who in this way could obtain the information. An example of the fact that this method was of significance for Colonel W. in his illegal work, will be given in the survey provided by the attached table.

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### *The Swedish Embassy*

The sources of information within the Embassy were open to Colonel W.; they were the purchasing section; the report system for Sweden established by the Army and the Navy; the reporting from the civilian agencies; and the weekly meetings.

The more direct information which Colonel W. obtained through the purchasing section, were descriptions and similar material concerning items purchased in America by the FE.<sup>2</sup> It has been revealed

<sup>2</sup> Swedish Air Administration.

that Colonel W. considered this source to be of little importance when it was necessary to meet the requests of the Soviet intelligence service.

During the conversation with Colonel W. on November 19, 1963, he was asked whether the reporting done by the Army and Navy attachés to Sweden had any importance to him as a source of information. Colonel W. answered as follows:

"No. They did not want any dissipation of forces. They told me when anything was concerned which belonged to my responsibilities and which I considered valuable. There was actually no reason not to include it, but in principle they did not want me to dissipate my forces because the scope of work was big enough and had highest priority."

The undersigned asked whether the U.S. Navy, particularly its aircraft and technical equipment, were included in Colonel W.'s illegal interests and whether this led to special interest in the reports of the Navy to Sweden. Colonel W. answered as follows:

"No. I was accredited with the U.S. Navy as a Navy aircraft attaché so that there was no need for me to go to my colleague of the Navy to obtain information. I had a direct contact with the Navy; this applied to the Navy and to the Air Force. The Navy aircraft was, so to speak, simpler in design so that there was not so much work connected with them. But there were several matters which came out of this source, also in the form of technical descriptions."

Reports of the civilian agencies to Sweden and the reports of the ambassador characterized the part played by the weekly meetings as a source of information under this aspect. They were discussed during the conversation of November 19, 1963.

Colonel W. was asked whether he was instructed by his Soviet employers to watch and report on political developments. Colonel W. answered as follows:

"No, I had not got such assignment. They did not even want to have any material concerning the operation of the Air Force. They were not interested how the operations developed, how new types of aircraft were operated because they had other reporters for these problems and they wanted me to concentrate on the technical side. The more technical material I sent in, the more the general indicated that I should concentrate only on this field because I had proven that I solved these problems better than anybody else and that they could obtain information on easier problems such as political developments, from other quarters."

INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM IN STOCKHOLM, ON  
FEBRUARY 19, 1964, STARTING AT 3 P.M.

Head of Interrogation: Rune Beckman  
Witness: G. Brännemo

EXAMPLES OF PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER DATA DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET  
UNION

B: After consultation with Colonel W. and upon recommendation of the physician we will now try to resume the interrogation concerning the period in Washington to the limited extent necessitated by your condition of health. I like to point out that Colonel W. should tell us whenever he finds that the interrogation becomes too tiring or if he thinks it should be interrupted on account of his difficulty to follow.

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The intention is to go directly over to the final report on the material which we had selected, in a preliminary way, jointly, on January 9, 10, 15, and 31, as well as February 3, 1964. The procedure applied was as follows: We had access to a small selection of material from the archives of the Swedish Embassy in Washington concerning the period of time during which Colonel W. performed his service there. From this material Colonel W. selected letters and similar papers which had certain connections with his illegal work in the U.S.A. for the Soviet Union. Frequently, Colonel W. showed letters which indicated that publications and descriptions of equipment were enclosed in the letters to Sweden. We managed, in the meantime, to find these enclosures and the idea is, in connection with this final report, that they be submitted to Colonel W. and be judged by him. All material which is usually included in a table, is thus available during the interrogation period. The material we were not able to produce, will not be included in this report. As far as this was possible, we have tried to divide the material into parts so that material of similar nature is discussed during one stage. In the beginning the criterion of the classification is not quite clear but it concerns data of which we believed that, in most cases, they had been delivered by Colonel W.'s personal and good contacts in Washington.

When we start with record No. 1 in the table this record concerns a cable which the Air attaché in Washington sent to Stockholm \* \* \* and the cable deals with the alertness in the Mediterranean. Could Colonel W. give a comment on this cable?

W: I can refer to what I have said previously and request the head of interrogation to read this passage.

B: During one of the preliminary surveys which were mentioned at the beginning, Colonel W. was asked about this cable and he stated the following:

"This is a cable which was sent to the intelligence section at the Defense Staff \* \* \* it deals with the American readiness in the Mediterranean in connection with the Suez crisis. If you have my work for the Soviets in mind, this was not included in my assignment but I could perhaps refer to my statements during the final interrogation concerning Moscow and the so-called top agent. Such work is expected to require independent action. It is entirely clear that such information was also sent to Moscow. This was done in the following manner: When a brief matter was concerned, the information was given verbally to the Soviet Air attaché in Washington who saw to it subsequently that a cable was sent in the matter." \* \* \*

Has Colonel W. anything to add on this point?

W: It may perhaps be added that the value attached by the Soviets consisted in the fact that the information arrived 3 days before the event took place.

B: We go over to point No. 2 which concerns record No. ----. Could Colonel W. give a brief comment on the letter?

W: The record concerns delivery of material \* \* \*. The value of the information from the Soviet point of view is inherent in the fact that the material was reported by me before it arrived in the countries concerned.

B: Point No. 3 in the table concerns a letter No. ----. It is a letter addressed to the chief of the Defense Staff and deals with aircraft forces \* \* \*. Could Colonel W. give his comment on this letter?

W: This has connection with one of the original basic assignments given in Moscow. If it were possible to arrive at a just and complete listing of \* \* \* this was of special value. There were similar lists in Moscow based on a great number of small details. If such a list could be obtained which I had in mind, then it was possible to correct the data in Moscow so that they were correct throughout prior to a certain date. The basis would be an organization in a situation, which was completely right. Subsequently, small data coming in could be added to this basis. It was also possible to go back and evaluate data received, and at the same time, evaluate the agents who had given the information. Complete \* \* \* were delivered by me once in Stockholm, concerning \* \* \*. The same information was at least given once, in Washington. In addition, there was also given information \* \* \* which concerns the Navy. I can also recall that at a meet-

## 25 VBH - LINO

ing \* \* \* during the period in Washington, it was pointed out, that there were certain difficulties to get hold of the \* \* \* of the Navy. These data were clearly not within the reach of agents in the same way as those of the Air Force. For this reason I thought that this listing was of value.

B: As a conclusion of this point, could Colonel W. say a few words from which source he obtained such data?

W: I had met the chief of \* \* \*. He made it possible for me to pay a visit to the \* \* \* air unit which resulted in permission to borrow certain publications. These publications made it possible to compile this listing.

B: Point No. 4 concerns a communication \* \* \* deals with measures to be taken to ensure preparedness, in connection with the situation in Indochina. Could Colonel W. give his comment on this communication?

W: I do not recall the steps I took in connection with these developments. The contents are of the same nature as the information on preparedness above in connection with the Suez crisis. This communication deals with Indochina. I have certainly written a special report on this situation to Moscow.

B: I have understood from our previous conversation that it was not possible for Colonel W. to send reports of this type to his employers by simply taking pictures of the reports which go to Stockholm. It should be interesting to hear Colonel W.'s views on which differences are applied in such reporting when the reports are sent to Stockholm and at the same time to his employers in Moscow.

W: \* \* \* This is of greater value than the information itself. I have previously stated that one could not have anything in the Swedish language in the American chapter on account of translation difficulties.

B: \* \* \* Could Colonel W. give his comment on this communication?

W: A compilation of this nature can be effected if it is possible to have access to the special prints of Congress which are partly non-restricted and partly secret. Anybody may obtain the nonrestricted prints. It is more difficult to obtain the classified material. This compilation is based on both types, the interesting data originating from classified publications. The report has certainly gone to Moscow, but I cannot recall in which form. I was supposed to treat confidentially the fact that the reporting was done by means of taking pictures of classified publications.

B: Now we shall try to give a joint comment on the three communications \* \* \*. The communications are addressed to the chief of section II in the defense staff.

W: According to the basic assignment from Moscow I was not supposed to deal with problems concerning designs of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it was desired that I obtain data on how new nuclear weapons should be used and the effect expected. This was expected under the premise that the data were reported at an early stage of development. Such information is given in the three records and has certainly gone to Moscow. \* \* \*

B: Can Colonel W. say anything about the sources of these data?

W: There are many different sources, partly people in the Pentagon and partly other parties out at the Air Force units.

B: The interrogation was terminated at 4:15 P.M.

The interrogation was resumed on Friday, February 21, 1964, at 2:30 P.M. with the same head of interrogation and witness.

We shall start with point No. \* \* \* in the table which concerns a communication \* \* \*. The communication has two enclosures. I will ask Colonel W. to have a look at the communication and give his comments.

W: As can be seen from the communication, the information is taken from a publication which is indicated by a number and title. The entire publication was put under the camera for the Soviet intelligence service.

B: The next three points in the table namely \* \* \* appear to be related to a certain extent with each other. \* \* \* This is a consequence of the communications which are designated as strictly confidential. They were addressed to the chief of the Defense Department. \* \* \* I assume that Colonel W. can give a comment on all three communications together.

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W: The main part of the information was also sent to the Soviet intelligence service. However, the reports were formulated in a different way. The greatest difference was that the sources were indicated exactly. In this report we find two elements which are of special interest. \* \* \*

B: We go over to point No. ---- in the table. This is a communication \* \* \* prior to 1952. \* \* \* The communication concerns information on the strategic atomic bombers of the United States. Can Colonel W. give a comment on the communication?

W: These are supplementary data to one of the two documents which I mentioned in the foregoing report. \* \* \* The information which was sent to the Soviet intelligence service was somewhat specific concerning the source of information.

B: Can Colonel W., in this special instance, indicate the source for this information?

W: The sources are composed of various contacts in the Pentagon of which I can recall at least one; namely, the chief of the American intelligence service in this case.

B: The next two points in the table, namely \* \* \* will be discussed jointly. \* \* \*

W: In a previous conversation I have given a relatively detailed comment on this point. As I do not feel that I am able now to repeat it in the same manner as I did before, I suggest that my statement be reread.

B: During the preliminary study of this material on January 31, 1964, Colonel W. stated the following concerning these records:

\* \* \* In this case of the description given by Colonel W., he was asked about the motivation resulting in his request to obtain such descriptions for America. Colonel W. replied as follows: "Yes, this was done to try to clarify the intention behind the purchase of such old \* \* \*. Beyond the information given I'd like to ask Colonel W.: Can you recall today which airbase was concerned when Colonel W. saw this description \* \* \*?"

W: Yes, I can recall this. \* \* \*

B: The next two numbers in the table \* \* \* are two communications with No. ---- of 1956. Both communications are concerned with \* \* \* and the information originates from a movie demonstration concerning the air defense system which Colonel W. had seen. It appears that the last communication, which is a supplementary information, was sent after a more thorough study of the movie which Colonel W. managed to arrange. Could Colonel W. give his comment on these two communications?

W: I can recall very little of the developments concerning this point. But I am certain that such a report went to the Soviets. Having my work principles in mind, passages which had been in the newspapers were not reported.

B: In this connection I'd like to ask Colonel W.: Are there data in addition to what had gone out concerning \* \* \*?

W: I cannot recall that this was the case, but it has happened in several other instances. It cannot be ruled out that it was possible also in this case.

B: Finally I'd like to refer to point ---- that the communication had three enclosures. Two of these enclosures are provided here, but enclosure No. 3 could not be procured, and therefore, we are not concerned with it here now.

We now come to another category of records concerning study trips and similar trips which various Swedish parties have made to America and with regards to their reports on these trips in the form of treble reports. We start with points ---- which are connected with \* \* \*. The letter is thus the report proper of the study trip during the stay in America.

W: These are some dispersed data concerning persons within various enterprises and their responsibilities. Such data were mailed in accordance with my basic assignment which I received in Moscow. The report on the trip itself, mentioned on a point \* \* \*, contains many more data of this nature. However, the report was not sent to Washington and I did not obtain it.

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B: With regard to the result of the study we come to point ---- which is left open in the table with reference to the comment to be given during the interrogation.

We come now to point ----. It concerns a record which was drawn up by \* \* \*. Meanwhile, the gentlemen sent a fourth and last copy of this record to Colonel W. in Washington. Therefore, I'd like to ask Colonel W.: Were these data intended to be delivered?

During the preliminary study of this matter on January 31, 1964, the Colonel W. stated the following:

"What is found on page 5 concerning \* \* \* I have mentioned in the orientation to my contact man, the general in Moscow, in a general way of expression. His reaction was that there was nothing of interest because the conditions were known. The only thing which I can recall was that in an orientation given in a compilation it was stated that Sweden, within the framework of the agreements, now attempted to enter the rocket field but that there were great difficulties. Subsequently, the matter developed to such an affair, which for example \* \* \* from Stockholm."

Is there anything in addition to this comment which Colonel W. could state in connection with this point \* \* \*?

W: No.

B: Point ---- concerns a communication addressed to the air attaché in Washington from the air administration in Stockholm designated \* \* \*. The communication announces a study trip \* \* \*. In the communication 10 different companies are given which intended to pay a visit to America and also the purpose of the study visit with regard to the study of \* \* \*. What could such a communication have given an intelligence man, Colonel W.?

W: It is difficult to say now how I judged this point. It depends upon how the companies organized their promotional campaigns. If the promotion did not bring the results described in the communication, certain data were certainly given to the Soviet intelligence service. In such a case the information would have included the fact that this and that plant manufactures this and that product used in the manufacture of missiles.

B: Point ---- concerns a preliminary partial report of the trip of \* \* \*. During the preliminary study, Colonel W. gave a complete comment on this report. He has requested me to read the comment given on January 31, 1964.

"This is a report on a trip which \* \* \* and myself and the deputy air attaché wrote after a visit at \* \* \*. It can be said that this visit is typical for the work in such cases as there is available the \* \* \* inspired report which is based on the Swedish background. However, I wrote myself a similar report which is based on the Soviet background, and this report had quite a different appearance and was much shorter. I cannot recall many of the details except that, among others, the report included data on \* \* \*. The report mentions another type of \* \* \* which is very vague in its format, and is called \* \* \*. It reminds me of the fact that no general interest had been expressed in this field, but in one of my general orientation reports given by way of letter, I mentioned something of \* \* \*. The reply to this was a communication that there was interest for a specific \* \* \* which was also given with a designation. It was said that it was probably very difficult to get such data, and it would probably not pay to devote work to this; but I overcome the difficulties since the cost was of no importance. Through some of my connections with the electronics companies I was able to gradually get this information on \* \* \* and I think I recall that I paid \$1,000 for it. It was sent to the Soviet Union through my contact man on the Soviet side in Washington." As a supplementation I'd like to ask the following: Were there drawings concerning \* \* \* which Colonel W. saw or was there \* \* \* as such?

W: There were \* \* \* as such.

B: Point ---- in the table is taken by a report on a visit in the U.S.A. in October \* \* \*. The communication shows that the entire report was sent to the air attaché in Washington. It consists of a main part and seven enclosures. Both \* \* \* divided the work up among themselves and wrote part of the enclosures separately. Also, in this case, Colonel W. gave a full comment on the previous study of these records. I shall read Colonel W.'s comment.

## 28 VBH - LINO

"This is a very voluminous report on a trip to the U.S.A. \* \* \*. This report is typical with regards to an aspect which I have probably not discussed previously. The American group in Moscow did not appreciate material received in Swedish on account of the fact that there were great difficulties in getting it translated. This resulted in my endeavor to take out from reports written in Swedish important data and to write a brief compilation, usually in English. I can perhaps say that three languages were accepted by the American sector: Russian, English, and German. A report of this type, which contains an abundance of valuable information, has to be photographed and sent as it is because I lacked any possibility of devoting enough time for a research which such report would require. Now I can certainly not directly recall this report but it is entirely clear that it was sent to Washington, and therefore I feel also that it is entirely clear that I must have taken pictures of it. When I sent it out I reported that there was no time for research and therefore you would have to take care of the translation." Are there any additional comments which Colonel W. could give on this report on the trip?

W: No.

B: Now we come to points ---- which shall be treated jointly. Point ---- is an unregistered report on an official trip in the U.S. by \* \* \*. He visited in this instance 20 different companies and institutions. In connection with this visit, a communication was received from Colonel W. addressed to the air administration, in which Colonel W. sent an enclosure which contains a description of a \* \* \*. Colonel W. mentions in the letter that this description shall be given to \* \* \* who, during his visit to Westinghouse installation in Baltimore, expressed interest in this description. The description was given to Colonel W. after the visit, to be forwarded to \* \* \*. Can you give a joint comment on these two records?

W: Here it is clear that both reports and the technical descriptions were photographed for Moscow. The description was entirely within the framework of my assignment. The report contains a great number of data which were of interest to Moscow for the mapping out of the American industry and in connection with the organization of assignments to agents. The report also contains purely technical data of great value. This is another exception where a report was photographed in spite of the fact that it was written in Swedish.

B: By going over to point ---- we have now come to another series of records, namely records concerning work assignments to procure publications for similar material which Colonel W. obtained from authorities in Sweden, mainly from the air administration. This communication is designated \* \* \* 1957. The communication was written in English and contained the request to obtain two copies of descriptions. This request resulted gradually in the fact that Colonel W. got two descriptions. We have now procured them to be studied, and I'd like Colonel W. to look at them and give his comments as to whether they were delivered.

W: Both are within the period indicated by Moscow and therefore I have probably taken pictures of them and sent them to Moscow.

B: The interrogation was terminated at 4:15.

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Since Colonel W. refused to attend the interrogation on February 24 and 25, 1964, the head of the interrogation decided that all interrogations with him should be discontinued until further notice.

If the interrogation with Colonel W. is resumed, it will not concern the period in Washington since certain essential circumstances will be discussed which are of importance to Swedish conditions.

As a result of this, this report must be concluded on the basis of the data which Colonel W. delivered during the preparatory study mentioned previously.

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The records included under points ---- concern cameras for various purposes within the air force.

The camera lists show complete data and to a certain extent the performance of the cameras.

In the study of these records together with Colonel W., it was found among others that the great interest which the Royal Air Force unit showed for cameras at that time is not reflected completely by the records concerned. Colonel W. reported the following:

"I may perhaps say that at a later date, there was very great interest for cameras. \* \* \* I procured great number of different descriptions and sent them to Sweden so they could select and then effect the purchases concerned. Part of these descriptions, that is to say the descriptions of the preceding year, were also sent to the Soviet intelligence service. I got them also by means of bribery and they were also sent to the Soviet Union."

It has also been found with regard to cameras that Colonel W. was able to cover practically the entire field for the Soviets on account of his contacts which he established in his work for Sweden. In this way he was able to provide the Soviet intelligence service with drawings on all modern cameras of the type concerned here.

Point ---- refers to an unregistered handwritten letter of \* \* \*.

The letter is of interest in connection with the following comments which Colonel W. gave.

"I can give as an example the work I performed in connection with the procurement of information, complete descriptions of this motor. I am not sure that this concerned precisely \* \* \* but this was in any case a \* \* \* motor. I was not successful with the help of Swedish methods which confined themselves to official channels. However, I managed to procure these descriptions through bribing the illegal way. But they were only sent to the Soviets since I could not explain from where I had obtained them if I sent them to Stockholm."

Point ---- concerns a letter to Flatt/W of the \* \* \*. In the letter it was suggested that an answer to certain questions concerning among others \* \* \* should be procured. Colonel W. answered the questions by way of letter \* \* \*. His reply is included under point ---- in the table.

Colonel W. gave the following comments on these letters." \* \* \* With regard to \* \* \* I procured, the illegal way, a description of \* \* \* and similar matters which was sent to Moscow."

Concerning point ---- Colonel W. stated that this was information sent in both directions. He meant that the information was given to the Soviet intelligence service also.

Colonel W. gave his comment stating that the aircraft design was relatively old so that there was hardly any interest for the descriptions which W. sent to Sweden, on the part of the Soviet intelligence service. On the other hand, Colonel W. received information through Deputy Flatt, after his visit to \* \* \* concerning \* \* \* number, where it was used, and concerning similar equipment which was partly reported to Stockholm by letter \* \* \*. These data were delivered by Colonel W. to the Soviet Union by way of a special report.

Point ---- The notes in the letter show that the work with the procurement of information for reports extending over several years, and that most of the reports were sent to Sweden immediately.

The letter gives an idea of the great contact opportunities with many different sources of information which this activity provided.

W. gave the following comment on the letter: \* \* \* "It is impossible to go over this and state which parts of this material went to Moscow, but certain publications have undoubtedly been sent there.", W. said.

W. emphasized that a premise for the fact that the reports were procured and delivered to the Soviet intelligence service was that "they had to be of the current year or the year directly preceding."

The reports sent to Sweden have been searched with the air force agency and found to a relatively great extent. A greater part of the reports found, have been sorted out on account of the fact that they were older than the "current or preceding year" when they were sent to the air force agency. The rest which, according to W., may have been delivered to the Soviet Union is indicated in the table by way of annexes to the communications included under points \* \* \*.

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With regard to these annotations, W. stated that it is highly probable that they "were sent to both quarters" since they were materials difficult to obtain and of such nature that they were of interest to the Soviet Union.

Point ---- includes a communication to the chief of the foreign section of the defense staff \* \* \*

The communication gives an idea of the great contact opportunities with a large number of sources of information provided by this position.

Commenting on this communication W. said that the air force agency order was based on data contained in the reports they had picked from such material which was given to the administration by Flatt/W. He also reported that there had been an extensive activity going on in Washington to try to place the orders which was done successfully in perhaps 90 percent of the cases. "It is impossible to go over this now and to state which part of the material went to Moscow, but certain publications have undoubtedly been sent there", W. said. W. emphasized that a premise for the procurement of the reports to be delivered to the Soviet intelligence service was that "they had to be of the current year or the preceding year."

The reports sent to Sweden have been searched with the air force agency and found to a relatively great extent. A greater part of the reports found, have been sorted out on account of the fact that they were older than the "current or preceding year" when they were sent to the air force agency. The rest which, according to W., may have been delivered to the Soviet Union is indicated in the table as annexes to the letters \* \* \*.

Studying the communication, W. said that the three publications were sent to the Soviet intelligence service. \* \* \*

W. stated that it was quite clear that this material was sent to the Soviet intelligence service. Compare W.'s comment during the discussion of point 3 of the table.

The material was procured by W. by means of official request to the American Air Force.

The following communications, included in points ----, show certain of the measures taken in connection with the communications as well as the result in the form of publications sent to Sweden. The result of this activity seems to exceed the original requests in terms of volume.

Meantime, the descriptions sent to Sweden have not been found in every case, and therefore no reference can be made to them in this connection.

Analyzing the communications, W. stated the following:

"If it comes to \* \* \* and old files concerning \* \* \* the same principle applies as previously; namely that they are of the current year or the year directly preceding to be of interest to Moscow. I know that the main part of them are older, but, if my memory serves me right, some of those here met the time requirement. I am inclined to believe that they were designated \* \* \*."

Point ---- included a communication from W. to an official with the American Air Force headquarters requesting certain publications for the Swedish Air Force. The letter bears the number ----. Annotations were found on Flatt's copy in the files showing that the various publications were sent home with different official communications after the publications went through the office of Flatt.

From among the publications which were recovered here in Stockholm points \* \* \* have indicated them and for the table they were sorted out when they met the time requirement. When W. read letter under point \* \* \* he stated the following: "Parts of this letter have also been sent to the Soviet intelligence service".

Points ---- includes communications included in the table for a specific reason. Point ---- requesting certain publications indicated were altogether seven copies. The publications were indicated by certain designations which all start with the letters ---- followed by other letters and figures.

## 31 VBH-LINO

The letter was included under point ---- is a reply to the above communications showing that Flatt obtained six out of the seven publications requested.

After searching for the publications concerned here in Stockholm, the air force unit stated neither an official letter nor publications were registered with its organization. It is questioned whether the publications have been sent to Stockholm at all.

Concerning these two letters \* \* \* W. stated the following: "It is to be noted that precisely of these \* \* \* publications here, a relatively small number was sent to the Soviets."

As an explanation of this point W. said the following: "Yes, there is a special series and they contain proper descriptions in very rare cases, but there are frequently certain details which are specified without giving drawings or other aids."

Colonel W. was subsequently asked whether he requested such publications for the Swedish Air Force unit or whether the requisition had only connection with his illegal intelligence work. He answered: "No, they were certainly requested by the Swedish Air Force agency. Previously the Swedish Air Force agency requested precisely these \* \* \* specifications all along."

At that time it was not known that the publications were not registered by the said agency.

Similar was the situation concerning a letter included under point ---- in the table. This is a letter of \* \* \* with a request to obtain certain reports. In the letter W. says that the reports shall be used by the Swedish Navy, only for military use. There is a note on the prior copy saying "Cleared March 25, 1957," which means that the report was made available \* \* \*.

According to information of February 8, 1964, from the navy, a study of the pertinent journal books of 1957 and 1958 have resulted in the fact that the reports concerned were not recovered which is considered to be a sign that Colonel W. had no instruction from the navy to procure this report.

W. stated about this report that it was sent to both places that is to say to Sweden and the Soviet Union, provided it met the time requirement.

Summarizing these three letters it can be said that the fact that the publications concerned were not recovered by the administrations concerned, in itself cannot be used as a basis for a judgment of the question whether Colonel W., in this case, requested the publications only for his illegal work or not at all. As can be seen from this report, it has been shown in many cases to be impossible to trace even other publications which had been sent to Stockholm as evidenced.

As a last example concerning this matter, which refers to instructions from the administrations in Sweden and at the same time was of importance to W. for his illegal work, is reported here extensively with regard to certain radar equipment for aircraft which are generally called \* \* \*.

The assignment originated from a letter from the chief of the air staff in Stockholm addressed to Flatt/W \* \* \*. The letter was his interest for \* \* \* in general and three specific types in particular. This gave rise to extensive correspondence which gradually resulted in an order from the air force agency of \* \* \* W. was able to advise that the radar equipment concerned could not be obtained either on a long-term basis or by way of purchase.

The letters which were recovered show the development up to the above time, under point ---- in the table.

The matter was resumed by a new letter \* \* \*.

After some more correspondence indicated in the table under point ---- the result was that the equipment concerned was released, purchased, and sent to Sweden.

Point ---- includes a letter \* \* \* by which W. sent the Swedish Air Force agency \* \* \* manuals concerning the purchased equipment.

Point ---- includes a letter \* \* \* which mentions that certain material \* \* \* shall be sent to the Swedish Air Force agency by diplomatic freight whereby the last delivery under the order has been completed.

## 32 VBH - LINO

W. read the letters indicated in the table and the \* \* \* manuals indicated under point ----, where after he said the following: "This is the matter concerning \* \* \*. This had no interest for the Soviet intelligence service. (Concerning the letters.) On the other hand, concerning the latest \* \* \* I went over secret descriptions of them on the occasion of a visit at \* \* \*. In a single folder I got the description of the details of the latest equipment in this field. It was the \* \* \*. It is impossible that in the series of descriptions the \* \* \* was included. However, in any case, with regard to the present point I am not so sure of this."

In this report we have now come to a large group of letters etc. originating from visits which W. made at airbases, training institutes, industrial plants etc. which in one way or other, are connected with the illegal intelligence work.

Point ---- is a highly confidential letter \* \* \*. The letter gives a particularly extensive report \* \* \*. The report contains no less than ---- annexes. Its subject matter can be seen from a note under point ---- in the table. Annex ---- to the report shows that a great number of publications were sent to the Swedish Air Force by separate letter. Examples of such publications, which met the time requirement, are indicated on the point ---- below.

It can be noticed that there are concerned reports which, at that time, drew great attention within the Swedish Air Force and were well received there. This gave many impulses to our own tactics and planning as far as \* \* \* were concerned.

W.'s own comment on this report is as follows: "This is \* \* \*. It is an extensive report with very good content. It concerns what was found on the occasion of a visit to \* \* \*. I can say that practically the entire contents has been communicated to the other side," (to the Soviet intelligence service).

In this connection W. was asked whether these visits resulted in information which was not included in the reports but only reported to the Soviet Union. W. answered as follows: "I do not recall that this was the case during that trip. On the other hand, I know that when I visited \* \* \* next time, this was at least 2 years later; I obtained a description of a \* \* \*. It was only sent to the Soviets. I obtained it with the help of bribing." Compare points ----.

Point ---- includes, as said above, an example of a separate letter to the Swedish Air Force which mentions publications sent in obtained by Colonel W. under the above \* \* \*. Through this letter \* \* \* three publications were sent in concerning \* \* \*. They were found and met the time requirements mentioned. It must be noted here, that a great number of similar letters were found but the publications mentioned in them were not recovered, for example, with the Swedish Air Administration; therefore, they were not included for the evaluation in this report. Concerning these publications sent to Sweden, W. stated: "This is \* \* \* together with some files which are old. Mention was made of a visit to \* \* \* and certain publications which I received. I can only say that those which met the time requirement were sent in" (to the Soviet Union).

Point ---- included a letter \* \* \*. W. explained that this was an example for reporting to both quarters.

The letter reports on a visit to \* \* \*. In addition to the attached instruction \* \* \* the letter contained certain data obtained during the visit.

Points ---- are letters giving data obtained during the study visit with \* \* \*.

Letter \* \* \* is addressed to the chief of the air force staff and comprises \* \* \* annexes. The letter mentions that a certain partial report on special data was sent to \* \* \*. This report is not included in the table. On the other hand, it includes the VPM mentioned in the letter \* \* \*.

Concerning these data W. said briefly that they went to both sides.

Point ---- include a letter \* \* \*. Concerning this report W. said: \* \* \*. Here are many data which we obtained at \* \* \*. Many of them are of such a nature that they went also to the Soviets. Among others a unit is mentioned which was not known at all. It was a unit the responsibility of which was to develop a \* \* \*.

### 33 VBH - LINO

W. was asked whether he paid additional points for the elucidation of the conditions mentioned by him above. He stated: "It was I who gave the final report inasmuch as I compiled different types of information."

Point ---- concerns a letter from the Swedish air administration to Flatt/W \* \* \*. The letter refers to an agreement with Colonel W. and includes a listing of data which the administration possessed and first of all requests of information concerning American \* \* \*. The air administration also wanted data which had already been confirmed by W.

Point ---- gives W.'s reply to this letter.

W. gave the following comment on these two letters: "On the basis of these data it is probable that the selection was sent to Moscow."

Point ---- refers to a letter \* \* \*.

Concerning these letters W. said: "This letter went to both sides. It contains an entirely up-to-date part which was not known at that time."

The data were obtained on the occasion of the above-mentioned visits \* \* \*.

Concerning these letters W. said: "Yes, this bundle of reports went to both sides. It contains new technical developments."

Point ---- refers to a letter from Flatt/W addressed to C Fst/U \* \* \*. In this letter W. reported about his and Deputy Flatt's visit with the Royal Canadian Air Force on \* \* \*. W. reports on the scope of this visit which was considerable, and indicates which partial reports were to be sent in in connection with the visit, altogether \* \* \*.

W. gave the following comment on all these reports:

"I was also accredited in Canada and visited Canada several times a year. It was perhaps four or five times. The first time I was there, I wrote a survey on the entire Canadian Air Force organization which was not known in Sweden. Then came a continuation of a series of reports of various contents which were also based on the fact that I knew what was of interest home in Stockholm. The first report for example deals with a \* \* \*. Such information was sent to both sides.

"The next report deals with \* \* \*. It was interesting to see \* \* \*. This was also sent to both sides. \* \* \* contains also data which were quite new at that time and was sent to both sides.

"\* \* \* concerns pressure suits which were developed at that time and are now standard equipment everywhere. The contents of this report are of no interest. They were not interested at all in pressure suits. They were interested in the material which various parts of the pressure suits were made of, in the U.S.A. I took action on this for Moscow so that I procured evidence with regard to all this equipment and sent it in. It was never requested from Sweden.

"\* \* \* contains a great deal of information which was sent to Moscow. Reviews concerning various parts of equipment held by the chief of the Canadian Air Force was of special interest.

"The report \* \* \* went to both sides. This was probably quite different from this report here. All the aircraft training of the NATO is centralized in Canada. It has also been a special responsibility of the Canadian Air Force to be the training camp for the entire NATO force. This applies to a certain extent also to times of peace. The organization is such that it can be tremendously expanded in the event of war. The entire NATO training is transferred to Canada. A special request from Moscow asked for a description of the organization of training. \* \* \* Gradually result was obtained and the visit was made; this visit was so complete that practically every place in Canada where training was given was visited. \* \* \*

"Report ---- went also to Moscow, although the Soviets were only interested in certain parts of it, for instance in \* \* \*"

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*

Reading this letter W. explained that the information contained in the report was "sent to both sides".

Points ---- concern letters and enclosures \* \* \*

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*

W. stated the following: "This concerns \* \* \*. On the whole, all data were given to both sides."

## 34 VBH - LINO

W. was then asked to comment on the method used to obtain highly qualified data. \* \* \* He stated:

"In this case I knew the chief of the \* \* \* very well and also personally. This information must have come this way, but I don't recall it exactly".

It is noted that these three letters were analyzed jointly on the basis of the assumption that all three were connected with the study trip concerned. In view of the considerable length of time, that is 6 months, which elapsed between the first and the two other reports, this does not appear to be right; this is of no importance as such.

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*

W. explains the data obtained during these discussions, contained in the report. In a series of reports included in the table under points ---- W. supplements his statements with reference to this original report.

\* \* \* \* \*

W. said that part of this material was sent to the Soviet intelligence service.

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*. W. requested now to obtain certain listed "instructions and manuals" of which he learned during his visit. The requisition covers \* \* \* points.

At least \* \* \* of these have subsequently been sent to W. who, in turn, sent them to Stockholm.

It was difficult to find the publications concerned here in Stockholm during the proceedings. However, W.'s comments on the letters are of interest. He stated the following:

"Here we have \* \* \*. There are many publications which were sent to Stockholm. As far as the selection of these publications is concerned which were to be sent to the Soviet intelligence service, they did not deal exclusively with my field of activity, that is to say the technical field, but they contained quite a number of other instructions which I thought were of value because they were new. I can, for example take No. 3 here which is called \* \* \*. Everything new is of interest to any air force when such information is contained in the publication concerned. This applies also to other fields. When a more sensational discovery was made in the field of training and I received the instructions concerned, I forwarded them. Another publication included in the list is a description of training with \* \* \*. It is clear that for instance if \* \* \* were concerned, the information was sent to the Soviet intelligence service. It cannot be said that this also applies to the present report."

Points ---- concern all study trips \* \* \*.

Under point ---- concerns Flatt's request to the air agency, for permission to take part in the study trip. Point ---- concerns the permission by the air agency. Then follows a number of letters \* \* \* in which W. reports on the result of the visits; altogether he supplied \* \* \* descriptions and similar material as annexes. Only the two descriptions included in the table have been recovered. W. commented as follows: \* \* \* concerns study trips \* \* \*. This is the record on top. Then there are a number of files in the back. They contain information and references to a number of more or less variable publications. Their main part was sent to the Soviet Union. The same applied also to the secret descriptions concerning \* \* \* mentioned above.

Concerning this \* \* \* see under point ----.

Point ----. This point includes a letter from Flatt/W, No. ----. W. stated the following in this connection: " \* \* \*, this was one of the better reports at that time since I was able to give precise indications concerning the number of yards \* \* \*. I saw myself how this was done; this I was able to check that this was correct. The material went to both sides."

The information was obtained by W. during a visit to \* \* \*.

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*

## 35 VBH-LINO

W. commented as follows: "This was one of the more interesting items. It could be said that this is a supplementation of the letter we have just discussed concerning \* \* \*. In connection with this I read also the description of the details of \* \* \* but this material was sent only to the Soviet Union because I was unable to explain how I had obtained it.

Point ---- is a report \* \* \*

The report concerns among others \* \* \*

Concerning the visit W. stated the following:

"Of course, this was so new that it was hardly conceivable to report on something newer than this. Naturally, this was sent to both Stockholm and Moscow. The fact that I was given an opportunity to pay such desirable visits, as I may say \* \* \* was explained mainly by my exceedingly good contacts with the leading personnel of the enterprise and the parties who were responsible for granting the requests in the Pentagon."

In the analysis of this report the discussion with W. concerned the extent to which other data concerning \* \* \* were supplied to the Soviet intelligence service, as a result of this visit. W. declared:

"Yes; I was also given a complete description of the design of \* \* \*. They went only to Moscow."

W. was asked how he managed to get these descriptions. He answered as follows:

"I got them more the bribing way on the spot."

In addition to this, W. declared:

"I cannot recall the details directly, but some of these books were not restricted. They were also sent to the air force. They are not mentioned here and thus I cannot describe the background. The restricted books were sent only to Moscow because I could not indicate how I had obtained them."

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*.

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*. W. declared that the publication which includes \* \* \* "went probably in the two directions." \* \* \*

Annex 3 to the letter was not recovered.

Points ---- are \* \* \* reports \* \* \*. Going over this collection of reports W. stated:

"This concerns a visit \* \* \* which was absolutely unusual. From the intelligence point of view, these reports give an example of unusual procedure. From the Swedish point of view this was of lesser interest \* \* \*. But it was of greater interest to the Soviets. These reports were discussed in the final interrogation in relatively great detail. The information concerned here can easily be brought into relationship with the background information given during the interrogation on the Moscow service."

Although a final interrogation concerning these reports was not held, a conversation recorded on tape November 19, 1963, between W. and the undersigned concerned the study trip mentioned.

W. stated the following:

"\* \* \* According to the text before us, we see that we were able to obtain a great deal of information although not the publications proper.

"Meantime the matter developed in such a manner that I managed to obtain a complete description of \* \* \*. This was sent to Moscow. We referred to it previously in connection with the evening meeting in Washington. But I recall clearly that some nonrestricted publications were sent to the air force in Stockholm although this cannot be seen from the papers before us now. It is possible that I err on this point. I recall this material in connection with the evening meeting in Washington.

"I borrowed these descriptions through \* \* \*. If my memory serves me right, that \* \* \* I borrowed a complete list of restricted and nonrestricted publications which I returned to him subsequently. I believe that in a later instance I managed to obtain the nonrestricted parts in the Pentagon the official or semiofficial way, and that they were sent to the air force in a later instance. We will see soon whether this will come up."

No more detailed report on these supplies to Sweden concerning nonrestricted descriptions on \* \* \* were given.

## 36 VBH - LINO

W. says also that we referred to an evening meeting in Washington previously. He points toward an event which was mentioned several times, namely that, once during service in Washington, he met his Soviet contact man during the night and gave him a very important and voluminous material consisting of various descriptions of aircraft. On the same night, W. got the material back by the contact man who had arranged for taking the photographic pictures of it. W. was not able to take these pictures himself in view of the short time the material was at his disposal.

During the conversation on November 19, 1963, between W. and the undersigned the developments during the period in Washington were discussed and the question was raised whether these developments could be considered the most successful or sensational ones under the aspect of his illegal intelligence work. This concerned the delivery of papers concerning \* \* \* and W. reported as follows:

"Yes, this was \* \* \*. The \* \* \* was also under construction in that situation. There were certainly one or two \* \* \* ready but this was at such an early stage that they were not yet ready to draw in a unit. A great deal of equipment of interest was under construction and these data were delivered under these circumstances, at two meetings during the same night."

W. was asked how he managed to get these data which, to judge by all factors concerned, were difficult to obtain. W. answered as follows:

"\* \* \* I managed this; it is certainly strange but I managed in all cases to obtain the complete description of \* \* \* with the exception of that part which concerned the equipment proper. This was not manufactured at the plant itself and it was supposed to be incorporated subsequently. I managed to borrow this information from one of my contacts in the Pentagon. I had obtained the main part of the material but the supplementing data I had only received on a loan basis and this was the actual reason why I was forced to proceed to this nightly maneuver."

Through questioning W. it was found that, with regard to the "supplementary material" he intended to \* \* \*.

Point ---- is a letter \* \* \*.

Parts of this material were also sent to the Soviet intelligence service, W. stated during the analysis of the letters.

The last example of data supplied to the Soviet intelligence service, which are connected with study trips made by W., are reported \* \* \*.

In his capacity as an air attaché, accredited to the Department of the Navy, Colonel W. followed the Chief of the American Navy during an official visit to the above-mentioned enterprise.

During the visit he obtained data concerning two types of aircraft \* \* \*.

W. stated the following:

"The report \* \* \* which we just discussed, was of a nature which caused them to be sent to both sides."

Finally, a small selection of army and navy attaché reports from Washington during W.'s service there were discussed with the Colonel.

The analysis of the Army attaché reports gave rise to only the following recollections of W. concerning illegal work:

"The report as such is of no interest. But I recall that at that time when \* \* \* I saw the assembly plans for this \* \* \*. This was at the beginning when the material was particularly valuable. I can recall that I took pictures of them and sent them in but I cannot recall from where I obtained them."

The report which made W. recall this, is a report on \* \* \*. A, W.'s interest for the reports of the Army attachés were summarized stating that he had neither time nor interest to follow this reporting. He cannot recall any example of such a report which was sent to his employers in Moscow.

Concerning the equally extremely limited selection of Navy attaché reports which were analyzed, only one report was of interest.

Report no. ----. Concerning the manuals, etc., W. stated that it is possible that not all of them were sent to the Soviet intelligence service, but those of value were supplied. See the list of manuals in the table under point ---- concerning the letter under discussion.

## 37 VBH - LINO

In this letter reference is made to \*\*\* manuals. Of these manuals obtained at a later date W. was informed on July 19, 1963, concerning \*\*\*. During the interrogation held previously, W. said that these publications were sent to the Soviet intelligence service. The interrogation protocol is attached to the minutes of the preliminary interrogations.

The last six points in the table concern papers which were analyzed together with W. on Sunday, August 18, 1963. A great preparatory check of records concerning the air force had been arranged by the air management. Although the records concerned referred clearly to W.'s illegal work in the U.S.A. they were sorted out from the report of the air administration to be taken up again in this connection.

Point ---- is a letter \*\*\*

During the analysis made on August 18, 1963, W. declared that the publications concerning \*\*\* were probably sent to the Soviet intelligence service.

Point ---- is a letter \*\*\*. The manuals listed under this point in the table were sent by W. as annex to a letter.

During the analysis made on August 18, 1963, W. declared that the manuals were probably sent to the Soviet Union.

Two of these manuals were not recovered during the proceedings.

Points \*\*\* are all reports \*\*\*

As a rule \*\*\* drew up the concepts at Flatt's office in Washington. The reports were written in Stockholm and sent to \*\*\*; one copy of the report was sent to Flatt/W. In this way W. had an opportunity to read the reports.

During the discussion on August 18, 1963, of the \*\*\* records included under points ---- in the table, W. stated that he took pictures and sent the annexes with the description of equipment and similar material which followed the \*\*\* reports from Washington, to the Soviet intelligence service. Whether the reports contained as such anything which W. knew was of interest to the Soviet employer, is described by him in the reports which he compiled and of which he had also taken pictures.

During the study of the records with W. which were filed at the beginning of 1964, interest was focused again on the \*\*\* reports.

In this instance, W. said in a very general way concerning these reports that he sent a sample of such a report to Moscow. The reaction was that W. was advised that those who \*\*\* felt that they should study in the U.S.A., was usually a gone by stage in the opinion of the great powers and therefore of no interest. Subsequently \*\*\* wrote many reports partly giving data of interest. In such cases W. gave these data in his own reports.

As an example of this method W. was given the report under point ---- in the table. After reading it W. said, chapter \*\*\* be an example of data supplied, and also the following pages. After W.'s statements it was planned to go over with him all \*\*\* reports with annexes at a later date. No such occasion arose and no \*\*\* records were included in the table.

Finally, it is said about the reports that W. stated that they often gave valuable data on industrial and military installations serving as a basis for the recruitment of agents for the Soviet intelligence service.

### DEALINGS WITH THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Col. W. reported previously that the American intelligence service showed great interest for him during the first period of his service in Washington.

During the interrogation on June 22, 1963, and on July 5, 1963, Col. W. reported on the development of his connections with personnel of the American intelligence service. As to the contents, the reports agree with each other to a great extent. Therefore, only data given during the last interrogations are reported here.

"W: My dealings with the American intelligence personnel were continued, but it was clear that their interest diminished as soon as I could no longer give them any information. \*\*\*

Stockholm, March 2, 1964.

RUNE W. BECKMAN.

## 38 VBH - LINO

PROTOCOL RECORDED DURING THE CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF COL.  
STIG WENNERSTROEM, NOVEMBER 14, 1963, STARTING AT 3:15 P.M.

Head of Interrogation: K. I. Steuno. Witness: K. E. Friberg

S: The interrogation is a continuation of the first interrogation held in the morning. We have brought along two pieces of material confiscated at Colonel W.'s residence. One is designated with 10 A3 and the other with 10 A4.

Let us first take 10 A3: I have submitted its contents in the envelope for Colonel W. The contents is a A4 paper on which notes can be found \* \* \*

On this paper you will find an ordinary registration card with various notes taped on. I like to ask Colonel W. whether he can recall from where the paper originated and what the notes entail as such?

W: Yes, the paper was in a folder in which I collected various kinds of notes concerning matters which should be carried out. It appears that the paper was taken out of the folder when I cleaned it up. These are old notes which have been there since 1961, and they were too old to be cleaned up. The fact that they were found again in my safe at home explains that I had taken the folder home to examine whether I should do anything with it before throwing it away; I cannot do this anyway.

S: Can the Colonel recall the background of these notes?

W: I cannot recall the background of these notes but their title reads, "Meeting at the State Department".

S: Yes, that is what is on the registration card. But if we first keep to the other paper, the Colonel may give us a description of the various columns shown there. Let us start with \* \* \*

W: Yes, there are listed various missiles \* \* \*

S: Thus the notes found here on the A4 paper have a direct connection to your intelligence work?

W: Yes, I could not say that they have because these are the same matters with which I dealt when disarmament problems were concerned. The paper points more toward the disarmament problems; I included the \* \* \*; under the aspect of intelligence only \* \* \* was of importance.

S: But in which respect was this of significance in connection with disarmament?

W: Yes, at that time we had just, so to speak, organized our work; we were supposed to work on the disarmament problems; at that time, I made a point of explaining to the other members a great deal of technical problems which it was necessary to be familiar with, in connection with the disarmament problems. Missiles were particularly important.

S: Can the Colonel recall that a report had been made at the State Department in a special instance precisely of these missile types?

W: Yes, this was mentioned casually, perhaps every day when we met at the beginning of our work.

S: Thus both \* \* \* were discussed?

W: Yes, and also many others.

S: Yes, and was this in fall 1961?

W: Yes.

S: Let us now come to the registration card which is fastened with a clip showing the annotation "Meeting at State Department" at the top.

W: Yes.

S: Can the Colonel explain the details?

W: Yes, I can only say that it says "meeting at the State Department"; after this several data are listed. I cannot recall their actual background. They may be relative to disarmament work and intelligence activities, or both.

S: If we keep to the pertinent column, the subdivisions would mean that there were instructions for meetings at the State Department. Is that so, Colonel?

W: Yes that's right.

### 39 VBH - LINO

S: First it says here "November 1961." Was this the time for the various meetings?

W: Yes, that is so.

S: Underneath it says "(1) jets, missiles, electronics, chemicals, bacteria."

W: Yes, chemical and bacterial weapons were concerned.

S: And it also says "Meeting place in Europe, Germany, Berlin".

W: Yes.

S: Does the Colonel mean that this refers to a meeting to discuss the topic mentioned under point 1?

W: Yes, I do not mean anything because I do not recall the matter. It might refer to a meeting or to my intelligence work; this is conceivable.

S: I feel that much of this material is precisely the same as that described by the Colonel previously, matching exactly the Colonel's scope of activity.

W: This is not quite so since I \* \* \*

S: But much of it.

W: I was not concerned with chemical and bacteriological weapons but this topic was important in connection with disarmament.

S: It is strange that, in such case, it was mixed up in this manner. Could all what is mentioned under point 1 have been a topic of discussion at the State Department?

W: Yes.

S: At one and the same meeting?

W: I cannot say: it has been up for discussion many times.

S: I mean, because it was put under one figure.

W: I said that this is a 2-year old record and I cannot recall details in the list; for this reason it should be eliminated from the proceedings.

S: We come to point 2; here it says "Annex to A."

W: A was the abbreviation which I used for Alva Myrdal; this shows that I had to give her supplementary information.

S: Point 3. Here it says \* \* \*

W: I do not recall the background of this point.

S: Has this nothing to do with \* \* \*?

W: I could not say this because I do not recall the number. It is conceivable that this is so, but it can be checked in some way as to what kind of record \* \* \* is.

S: Let us come to point 4. There it says \* \* \*

W: This matter clearly points toward something which could be conceived as \* \* \* and it is equally significant under the intelligence and the disarmaments aspects.

S: Did the Colonel prepare this in any way?

W: No, nothing has been prepared by me to judge by the setup of the annotations.

S: We come to point 5. There it says \* \* \*. Does this also concern missiles?

W: Yes, these are \* \* \* missiles. They have been of current interest under the disarmament and intelligence aspects.

S: Have missiles been discussed in connection with the disarmament?

W: Yes.

S: We come to point 6. There it says \* \* \*. What does this mean?

W: I do not know what this would mean; 1957 is way back from 1961 so that it cannot be interesting from the intelligence point of view.

S: Could it be that if this matter was taken up with the Navy in connection with the meeting in November 1961, they wanted to obtain information which was further back in terms of time? This was the first time that the Navy was concerned at the meeting in November.

W: I do not think this was the purpose. These are old matters, 4 years back.

S: I thought this could refer to some special matter which was so far back in terms in time, precisely for the reason that it fits so well into this meeting in November.

W: Yes, one case has actually been existent, when 1957 was mentioned; this was—. No, this isn't right either. Once I sent in the regulations; but this was later than 1957. It was no assignment; in

## 40 VBH-LINO

November 1961 I had assumed the job of sending in certain Navy publications. I sent in the regulations and then the same thing happened again because Baranowski requested the regulations. This note agrees with another note of 1957.

S: Can the Colonel recall the regulations?

W: Yes, they concerned \* \* \*.

S: Did we discuss this point in another connection?

W: Yes, but this has no relationship because the time was too early for it. Since he did not request them before a much later date, there cannot be any relationship. There must have been another motivation.

S: However, the trend of thought may have been right, the idea that this was a sign pointing back to 1957. Could that be?

W: This is conceivable; but since I cannot recall the notes in detail and since they were filed and no action was taken, I cannot give more exact information.

S: We come to point 7; here it says: "Rp.Spain+Moscow". Can you give any explanation?

W: I had to read several reports on Spain and Moscow. I did not get around to it since the note is still there.

S: I cannot see the connection of all this in the proper manner. I have seen now, and we have discussed this in another connection, that the Colonel read reports about Spain. But how can Spain and Moscow be brought together in this particular instance?

W: I cannot say now, 2 years later. There were several reports in this instance. I thought I should read them carefully: they had come from Spain and Moscow.

S: These two reports have nothing to do with each other?

W: No, nothing at all.

S: Let us come to point 8 on the card: here it says: "Terminal air field under construction." Can the Colonel give any explanation?

W: This may be important from one or the other point of view since the intelligence service only wanted data on airfields still under construction. Under the disarmament aspect there was no intention to consider anything but development and progress. This point could be of importance in connection with disarmament agreements. The matter points in the two directions.

S: Turn the card and look at the back of it. There it says under point 9: "if there are doubts inquire \* \* \* direct advice". What does this entail?

W: This seems to be connected with Geneva.

S: Connected with Geneva?

W: Yes, I was home in Sweden working on disarmament problems. The delegation was in Geneva and its head was Mrs. Myrdal. It appears probably that this annotation had a connection with Geneva. When I had doubts, I should call Geneva or ask or write down and inquire.

S: But they had not started in Geneva in November 1961, had they?

W: When did they start in Geneva?

S: I cannot recall this but it might have been so.

W: It was probably in March 1962. It is possible that this was too early but as I said it is not easy to know, now, after 2 years, whom I was supposed to ask when I was in doubt. Perhaps it was the Secretary of State whom I should ask because I wrote memorandums for him at that time.

S: The matter is included in the points 1-9 as a special point: otherwise the annotation as such is not remarkable.

W: No.

S: A line has been drawn here and it seems to read "Jan :

W: Yes.

S: It starts with "Interavia 4767/61-Missile 6/61". These are two magazines.

W: This is a magazine which is published daily and concerns new developments in the fields of aircraft, missile and neighboring areas. I made great efforts to get the State Department to subscribe to these magazines because they were very valuable. On the other hand, they were very expensive so that one was not willing to take up a subscription.

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S: Do the issues 4767/61- and 6/61 contain something special since only these issues are indicated?

W: Yes. This is the number of a certain magazine.

S: Did these magazines contain anything which the Colonel had to analyze, or was the Colonel just starting his work with these magazines?

W: No, I had probably just picked these issues to show what type of information they gave. I had to persuade the party concerned by showing that they were really very valuable data which would be very useful to me.

S: At the bottom it says \* \* \*

W: This was something which was clearly reported in my issue of Interavia, in the same way as the next article concerning a plant at the Bodensee Lake which was apparently under construction to manufacture American Starfighters of the jet type in Europe. The old annotation shows, as far as I recall, that it belonged to the contents of the 4767 of the Interavia.

S: It should be noted in this connection that the annotations are not listed according to numbers underneath the line under point 9. Does this indicate that they have nothing in common?

W: Yes.

S: All these matters. Thus "Perkin-Elmer & Co." were to manufacture Starfighters and Sidewinders. Is it true that they were also to produce the Sidewinders?

W: I do not recall this now, but it could in any case be checked by inspecting the issue concerned here. Probably the annotations concerned here reflect the contents of the issue in question.

S: Is it completely out of the question that the Colonel made these annotations after the meeting in November in 61 and that they were kept and not destroyed by mistake?

W: Yes this is completely out of question.

S: Why is this out of question?

W: Because I did not make any notes after these meetings.

S: I understand that they have not made \* \* \* but one can always use them to refresh one's memory.

W: I do not need to refresh my memory to know that missiles are of interest, because I worked on them for 10 years. There's no need for me to make a note of that.

S: No, I understand this, but if the Colonel does not need notes in one case then he does not need them in other cases either. The fact is that the Colonel has made annotations.

W: These here, yes.

S: Yes.

W: Yes, but this does not refer to the meeting of November—

S: We go over to the other envelope which was confiscated and showed the number 10 A4. Its contents is a heavy paper, typewritten, in German. It was found at the same place as 10 A3, namely in the safe, in a special compartment. During the analysis of the period of service with the State Department, Colonel W. has himself described the manner in which he obtained this slip which contained certain assignments for the Colonel to perform in Spain. I like to ask the Colonel to report in more detail, how he went about this.

W: The instruction was delivered to me by the contact man in Stockholm. I had never more time than for a brief look at them and then they were left in my safe waiting for the time for me to read them carefully and to proceed to an orderly planning.

S: Can the Colonel recall when this happened and under which circumstances you obtained it?

W: It was clear that they had put the slip into a parcel with money in Moscow. When the parcel was delivered to me, I was given a verbal comment by the contact man in Stockholm, that I should skim over the bills and take the instructions for my next trip. Or, he said, I should just take out the instructions.

S: Can the Colonel recall where he received the money?

W: No.

S: In some instances it has been stated that this could have happened at the office at Fredsgatan 10, is this true?

W: I do not recall this.

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S: If it was not there, where could it have been?

W: It could have been, for example, at a movie performance, or it could have been at the residence of Nikolskij.

S: But the Colonel said that it was a contact man in Stockholm. Was it not Baranowski who handed over the money?

W: Yes.

S: Did he do this at Nikolskij's residence?

W: Yes. Now I cannot recall where. There were so many meetings and once a matter had been clarified, one got it out of one's mind. But the place is not important, is it?

S: No, but when the information itself was concerned, did the Colonel take any steps?

W: I had nothing to do with it.

S: But it had been planned that the Colonel go to Spain on his vacation to execute the assignment?

W: That's right. I was previously asked whether I had an opportunity of taking a vacation in Spain to execute an assignment. I replied that this was probably easy to arrange.

S: This was planned in September if I remember right.

W: I had planned to make the trip at the end of August and September, if possible, so that I could be back when the General Assembly met in New York about September 18-19.

S: Was the Colonel often given assignments of this nature, that is with a paper being smuggled in?

W: No, not very often.

S: But it happened several times.

W: Yes. Before, I had never got such a long assignment as that in Spain: there were only small slips with a few lines.

S: But the system was the same; was it as thin as typing paper?

W: Yes.

S: I asked myself: Why is it written in German?

W: We used several languages: German, English and sometimes Russian.

S: English was the most common language, was it?

W: Yes, it was used most.

S: There was no special reason to use German in the report.

W: No, there was no special reason. The language was changed also in previous instances.

S: Can this be explained by the fact that there were different contact men?

W: Yes. Probably it depended on who wrote the instructions. They wrote instructions in Russian, of course, and then they gave the copy to someone for translation. The point was which language the translator knew best. I had a knowledge of two languages, namely German and English.

S: This is all for today. Before we close I like to ask the following: Do you think, Colonel, this interrogation was tiring and strenuous?

W: Yes, I must say that this applies to every case, but it will probably be better soon.

S: The interrogation was terminated at 4:15 p.m.

Stockholm as above.

K. I. STENMO.

Monday, November 25, 1963, W. participated in the protocol at the special section of the legal psychiatric clinic at Långholmen. After he had read three to four pages of the protocol, he put it on the table and stated that "this is meaningless; in such interrogation one is supposed to try to explain things one cannot recall." During the continued interrogation on the same day, W. gave a partially new version of the developments, but he explained that he could not recall the details concerning the annotations.

Stockholm, November 26, 1963.

K. I. STENMO.

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PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM HELD AT  
LANGHOLMEN, 25 NOVEMBER 1963.

Head of interrogation: K. I. Stenmo. Witness: K. E. Friberg.

S: The interrogation is a direct continuation of the final interrogation on the period of service for the State Department, held on Thursday, November 21, 1963.

During the interrogation on this day, we submitted various annotations to Colonel W., which were found in his safe at his residence and showed the confiscation number 10 A3. In these annotations it read "November 61" and we considered it appropriate to ask Colonel W. whether these annotations have a connection with the meeting which was held on November 26, 1961, and whether the notes can be considered, in any way, as a military assignment beyond the scope of purely political assignments which Colonel W. said he had obtained by the General \* \* \*, during the preceding interrogation. Therefore, I would like Colonel W. to give an explanation of the implications of these notes and the reason why they were made.

W: On these annotations you will find the words "November 61, meeting with the State Department." In reply to the first question, I'd like to state "November 61" does not refer to the meeting of November \* \* \* November 26. The various points given there have nothing to do with the assignment which I assumed \* \* \*. It is a question of notes which I made previously during the month of November. In November 1961, I made quite a number of different notes containing points on which I had planned to work. Several of these points were taken up, but I did this in such a manner that those upon which I did not act, were put together in this way and I burnt the main part of the files. There is a paper A4 with notes concerning various rockets, American and British; the file clearly originates from the command period since it agrees with certain assignments which I had assumed at that time. Concerning the registration card which was fastened to the A4 paper, the nine points do not belong together; they are mixed with various matters which had not been taken up.

S: These points were noted on various slips and among annotations which the Colonel had made previously. Did you list them according to numbers only because it was your way of putting notes down?

W: Yes, that is right. As it is known, I had written several other reports which were discussed during the interrogation.

S: Do any of these notes refer to the work with the State Department?

W: Yes. Some of them must have reference to the work at the State Department.

S: But they are not connected with the assignment \* \* \* are they?

W: This is not connected with the assignment \* \* \* of November 1961, but it is conceivable that some point may have been relevant to a previous assignment. Meanwhile, I cannot recall exactly the background of these new annotations. This is too far back in terms of time. It is more than 2 years ago. They were left in the files since and now the idea was that I should read them over for the last time in order to burn them afterwards. Finally, certain notes concerning the magazine Interavia are found after the nine points, and the background was simply that I worked for the State Department to get the Department to subscribe to the magazine "Interavia," which said in parenthesis, was very expensive, so that approval was not given for financial reasons. Occasionally, I pointed out that there were valuable articles in the magazine and the annotation refers to this. Gradually I succeeded in persuading the Department to subscribe to Interavia.

S: This means that matters included in these points were never taken up, is that right?

W: No. In such cases they should have been deleted.

S: Is it possible that the Colonel forgot about the notes and performed his assignments but on the basis of the assumption that the notes were not there, did he forget to delete them?

W: Yes, this was actually the case. I was supposed to study them before I burned them, which I never did. But in this analysis, I can see now that I did not act on any of these points.

S: We do not go into further detail concerning the nine points since the Colonel points out that they have nothing to do with the State Department. Is it possible that we take up these points in another connection?

W: Yes. I have never said that they have nothing to do with the State Department. They can very well have reference to the State Department.

S: Yes, but they have nothing to do with the Colonel's assignment at the State Department?

W: No, they have nothing to do with the assignment.

S: The interrogation is terminated at 2 p.m.

Stockholm as above.

K. I. STENMO.

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### INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM

#### APPENDIX A 1

#### RECORD OF THE CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM, 22 JUNE 1963

Interrogator: First Clerk B. Linden. Witness: First Clerk Beckman-Fridberg

I returned to Sweden in June 1957. Up until about 1 October, I was on vacation part of the time and the rest of the time I occasionally served with the Air Force Staff. Beginning 1 October, I served with the Defense Command Office (FKE). During the fall, according to plan I visited \* \* \*. The meeting went according to plan, and was a repetition of the previous two meetings. The conversation concerned instructions for the coming period in Stockholm. My contact man, the same general as on the two previous occasions, said that no result comparable to what I had accomplished in Washington was expected of my activity in Stockholm. Next, he gave me instructions for my activity. First, I was to watch Sweden's neutral position. I was to report on any change in this position, or any change that might be expected. If nothing happened in this matter, I was nevertheless to report at regular intervals that nothing had happened. This was to ensure that I had not forgotten the task. Secondly, in the event of situations of crisis arising, I was to do my utmost to obtain information which would enable the Soviet Union to avoid miscalculation.—I was to obtain the most intimate connections possible with personnel, above all, with military personnel in the U.S. Embassy. Here it was desired that I collect bits of information in the same manner I did at the American Embassy in Moscow previously. The most important thing, however, was to follow up on the visits of important American military men or other persons to Stockholm. I was to attempt to gain an impression of the purpose of their visits to Stockholm and their itinerary for possible other travel in Europe and its purpose. Visits by British and French personnel, for example, might also be of interest, if I should be able to procure information about them without expending extra time and effort.

My main task was the same as before; namely to procure American technical publications or other technical information. It was not expected that any great result would come of this in Sweden, but it was surmised that to the extent American, and also British, material was used in Sweden, certain information of value might be obtained. Interest in Swedish conditions was of secondary importance, and it was important that I concentrate on my main task. If special information on Swedish conditions were desired, I would be so informed.

\* \* \* I was informed that a new task was planned for me, which might become important. It was explained to me that the intelligence material from Spain was of extraordinary poor quality. It was known that I had very good contacts and many contacts in the American Air Force. To the extent I was able to do so, I was to determine whether any of my former American acquaintances or contacts had been assigned to more important posts in Spain, preferably in Madrid. It was pointed out to me that the result of my efforts in the matter of

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Spain might be of great importance to my future tasks. General Yushchenko was to be my contact man in Stockholm. The contact was not to be established by me. Yushchenko often visited the Defense Command Office, and he would himself look for a suitable opportunity to visit me and make the first contact.

All material in Stockholm was to be turned over in the form of film.

Concerning meetings in Stockholm, it was thought that they could be arranged in a simple manner. Yushchenko and I were to arrange them as the need arose, taking into consideration the frequency of our meetings in the normal Stockholm social life. It was thought that the amount of material would not be so great as to present any difficulties in turning it over.

As concerns money, I was given 10,000 kronor. For the rest, I was to use the same system of requisition I had used previously.

\* \* \* I was forewarned that it was desired that I obtain a radio, suitable for certain listening, but more information about this would be given me later.

In the following, I shall explain, point by point, what happened in connection with my various tasks. Thus the information carries the same numbers as the points [sic].

As concerns Sweden's neutrality, there were no occasions for reports. At least not to report any change. Therefore, according to instructions, I reported from time to time that the neutrality was unchanged.

Concerning my conduct in crisis situations, this became of current interest during the Berlin crisis. At that time I thought it obvious that the risk of a miscalculation was present on the part of the Soviet Union concerning the willingness of the American side to take military steps if they should be required. Mainly I pointed out that the Americans were rigid in their views and would not give way. This information I took from circulating reports of various kinds, and from listening to conversations at embassies and other places.

\* \* \* This reporting had plainly been observed, for it gave rise to a special memorandum of appreciation.

One of my tasks was to seek good contacts in the American Embassy. Here, I had no difficulties whatever, of course, since I had come directly from America.

Concerning surveillance of visits by Americans, this was facilitated to a very great extent by the fact that I was invited to practically all the social affairs arranged during these visits in the embassy.

Procuring publications on American technical aircraft equipment, etc., was facilitated by the fact that in the Defense Command Office I had certain tasks in just this field. Thus, quite a few such publications came into my hands. Several of them were voluminous. They were photographed and turned over. \* \* \*

Obtaining contacts in Spain proved relatively easy, in part through correspondence with American friends, in part through inquiries among my acquaintances at the American Embassy.

During the spring of 1958 I was able to report that two persons had arrived \* \* \* in Madrid, whom I had known.

\* \* \* I was told that it had been decided that I was to be transferred to Spain, and that I was to prepare for this. However, the problem had not yet been thought through, and it would be brought up later.

The promised contact in Stockholm, for which Yushchenko was to take the initiative, was delayed for quite a long time. Not until almost Christmas time did he come to the Defense Command Office for a routine visit with the chief of the office and to each of the section chiefs, including me. He came in and shook hands with me, and after a while he extended greetings from Nikolay Vasilyevich, thus making the contact.

Concerning our meetings in Stockholm, i.e., my meetings with Yushchenko during my service at the Defense Command Office, things went along as predicted in the Soviet instructions. It was unnecessary to arrange special meetings, since our meetings in the course of normal social affairs proved sufficient.

The method for turning over films, etc., was as follows: Small and few items were exchanged during handshakes.

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I can describe another method as used during a large reception at the Soviet Embassy. One arrives wearing an overcoat. The coat is hung on a numbered hanger far in the rear. Remembering the number, you enter the reception room, acting normally. When you meet your contact, you greet him as usual, and find occasion to tell him the number. You separate, and the contact goes to the coat hangers and gets the material in the pockets. If the exchange is a two-way one, both parties must of course be informed of the other's coat hanger number. Gradually it proved that numbers 24 and 25 were so situated that they were almost never used, and I generally used number 24 and my contact number 25.

Another method was to have in the bathroom of your home a cabinet of some kind, a white one with a mirror, for example. There were two keys for the lock, one of which was given to the contact. Thus he had a key for my bathroom cabinet, and I had a key to his. When we visited each other at home, we went to the bathroom and exchanged materials.

My contact man at the Soviet Embassy on occasion had the opportunity to move his cabinet from one bathroom to another. For example, at one time a large number of parcels were to be exchanged. This was planned to take place in connection with a cocktail party and film showing at No. 20 Katarinavaegen. In this case, my contact had in some manner succeeded in moving his bathroom cabinet to the men's room there. He was not himself present. Thus the intention was, that in the event these meetings and methods proved inadequate, the system was to be supplemented with \* \* \*.

The question of procuring a radio was solved through a meeting in East Berlin. One of my closest American friends was at the time in question chief of the American Air Forces in Germany, with headquarters in Wiesbaden. In connection with Christmas greetings, we had been invited to come and visit them some time in the course of the year and to live at their residence. They hoped we could stay for 5 or 6 days. I reported this to Moscow, inquiring if they had any special desires in connection with such a trip. The reply, by return mail, was "yes." But the time for the visit was kept open, probably because a very special date was desired. After a while, I was given the date. In connection with it, I was told that on my return trip from Frankfurt I should pay a visit to West Berlin, staying at a hotel for a few days, during which time a meeting in East Berlin would be arranged. We flew to Wiesbaden on the date suggested by Moscow. I had been told that it was desired that we keep to the family as much as possible and not go visiting airfields, etc. If we were invited to do so, we were to say that we were not interested. I was to report if anything worthy of note happened in the family during our visit. On the next to the last day of our visit, the general left in a hurry for Turkey. When we left, he had not yet returned. This was when we left Wiesbaden for Berlin. We remained in Berlin for 3 days, staying at Hotel Kempinski. West Berlin was nice for shopping and such things. I was able to arrange for my wife to be shopping while I was in East Berlin. At that time it was possible to move freely between East Berlin and West Berlin. According to my instructions, I was to go by a certain subway train departing from West Berlin at a certain time, get off at a certain station in East Berlin, leave the station and cross a square to a motion picture theater and look at the display pictures. At a distance I saw another person on the other side of the street. When he saw me, he moved toward the theater. The man proved to be the same contact I had met at \* \* \*. We went around the corner where a car was waiting. The car took us to a villa where a meal had been prepared. The general was particularly anxious, and the first things he asked me was "How did things go in Wiesbaden?" I reported that we had stayed with the family and that nothing at all had happened, except that the general—the American general—had taken off by air in a hurry. "Where to, where to? This is of very great importance." "Turkey," I replied. He immediately left the room, obviously to send a telegram to Moscow. Through subsequent incidents I learned that the visit of the American general to Turkey was connected with reconnoitering of airfields for American paratroopers, later committed in connection with the Lebanon crisis.

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After a while the general returned and said that now we would talk about a radio. He began by explaining that the world situation was darker, and that nobody knew whether or not a war would break out by and by. It is necessary, he said, to prepare for the future. But first he asked me, "Are you willing to continue your work, no matter what happens?" I replied that I was willing to go on. He then told me that "If anything of a political nature happens that causes our contact with you to be completely broken, you must do nothing. Even if years pass, you must only wait for a contact. The same contact procedure, with greetings from Ivan—excuse me—Nikolay Vasilyevich, will be used. Further you should buy a radio of the best quality and install it in your home as if you were using it for receiving amateur broadcasts or whatever. We have no plans about the use of this radio. All that matters is that it will be possible for you to receive messages from us."

However, I was told to listen in at certain stated times, when a practice transmission would be sent so that I would be able to practice receiving and taking down messages. In the intervals, they would only send \* \* \* meaning that they did not care to send the practice message. This went on for a relatively long period, and is still taking place. Some hitch must have developed, however, for I have heard nothing at all for several months. I think, however, that this is due to the radio station having other tasks to perform, and that they do not wish to spend more time in training me, and that they have forgotten to tell me about it.

RECORD OF INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM, JULY 23, 1963

Interrogator: First Clerk Rune Beckman. Witness: Clerk Hans Kaellstroem

The interrogation at first deals with the document—that was found during the search of Colonel Wennerstroem's residence, and which has been touched upon in a previous interrogation.

BECKMAN: Can you recall what was contained in the telegram we are concerned with. What information did it contain?

\* \* \* \* \*

WENNERSTROEM: Yes, the occasion \* \* \* was in part that the content was of very great importance, and later, name and place were given; the name of the person, for example, it was mentioned in the telegram.

B: Did he know that this information would be sent to the Russians?

W: No, he did not.

B: Was there any reason for protecting him so especially that \* \* \* in order that his name would not be disclosed?

W: Yes, I considered that the message was of such a character that I chose \* \* \*. It is clear that I did not think about it in particulars. I simply wished to \* \* \* and therefore I took this way out.

B: Well, introducing this new element \* \* \* must certainly have been a decision preceded by a certain amount of reflection. Is there anything that the Russians initiated that may explain this method?

W: No, not directly. They just said that this possibility was available to me if I should wish to use it, but there was no special directive.

B: In a little more detail, what information was it that he gave \* \* \* and how was it given?

W: In the situation I mentioned previously, in the time between the Cuban crisis and the expected Berlin crisis it was the general view in Western Europe that a politically calm situation had arrived. Then a representative from every embassy in Europe, or in any case in Western Europe, was called to a meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State in Washington. \* \* \* During the meeting these representatives were told not to place too much faith in the optimistic view in Europe, because the American leadership had decided to maintain the high state of preparedness of the strategic means of power initiated during the Cuban crisis. The reason for maintaining this high state of preparedness was that a Russian push in Berlin was expected, which would lead to a new crisis over Berlin. This was what was reported.

\* \* \* \* \*

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B: Let us leave this matter of the information and talk about the burned fragments, also found during the search of your home. Can you tell me anything about what papers were burned, and when they were burned?

W: This would be easier if you told me where the fragments were found.

B: That I don't know, but I suppose they were found in the mentioned burning pan, but I don't know for sure.

W: That I find hard to believe, because I always emptied the contents of the burn pan into the toilet and washed them down, but perhaps I burned something of a different kind.

B: Well, let me put the question in another way: Did you burn anything before, immediately before, or after the turning over of the material on the 19th?

W: Yes, this happened, because I did the last photographing on the same morning as the meeting at Katarinavaegen [street in Stockholm]. \* \* \* This paper I photographed in the morning in my office, and afterward I burned this paper. I am not sure whether I burned it in my office and stuffed the fragments into an envelope to take home with me, or whether I possibly burned it at home.

B: It may have been in the evening, late at night on the 19th, or early in the morning of the 18th, or early in the morning of the 19th, after the meeting in Katarinavaegen?

W: Yes. If I burned anything, it was nothing that had to do with intelligence work, for things of that kind I burned immediately.

B: Well, then, if you did the burning in the forenoon or in the morning at the office on the 19th, you took the burn home with you on the evening of the 19th in the form of charred fragments?

W: Yes, that's it.

B: In an envelope or something like that?

W: Yes.

B: And if you did the burning at home, it could have happened that \* \* \*.

W: Yes. It is very unlikely that anything could be left, because, as a matter of principle, I always emptied the contents of my burn pan into the toilet and flushed them down.

B: So that the presence of these flakes indicates that you did the burning in your office?

W: Yes, I suppose so.

B: Then you had no opportunity to wash the burn down at the office?

W: It was inconvenient, because the toilet room was so far away that I usually preferred to take the whole thing home with me instead.

B: I understand. Thus it was a report written by yourself, based upon information you had obtained in part through your work and in part \* \* \*.

W: That is correct.

\* \* \* \* \*

B: Let us now turn to talking about a section headed The Chief Director of Aviation.

In listening to the tapes from the latest interrogations I understood that among the documents described as turned over to you by the Chief Director of Aviation you mentioned that among these were documents of considerably hotter character, which were not included among the \* \* \* points dealt with on that occasion.

W: Yes.

B: Can you tell me what documents these were that were of hotter character, but had not been included?

W: Yes, there were \* \* \*.

B: Publications, would you say?

W: Yes.

B: As we have referred to them previously?

W: Yes, exactly.

B: Containing several pages of descriptions, etc.?

W: Yes. In general they were quite voluminous things.

B: Bound in covers?

W: Yes.

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B: Was it only documents of this kind that the Chief Director of Aviation, or his section, furnished you? Only such bound publications?

W: Yes. What I mean is that what I turned over was of that kind. I don't quite remember how \* \* \* well, in any case they were full descriptions.

B: These four listed volumes, or whatever we call them, they were thus turned over complete?

W: Yes. Well, they could not be called four volumes, because there were so many—if I remember correctly—various.

B: Volumes containing many pages in each volume?

W: Yes.

B: And they were photographed straight through?

W: Yes, unless I skipped something. I don't remember now.

B: No.

W: In principle, that is.

B: If we make an estimate here, quite a few rolls of film must have been used.

W: Yes.

B: Can you make an estimate. About all these \* \* \* projects with their various publications. How much film was used for the \* \* \* projects?

W: What shall I say? How many pages might there be?

B: Perhaps there were hundreds of pages in each volume?

W: To be sure. Not in each volume, but \* \* \* that is—which was the largest, perhaps 1,000 pages.

B: All of the \* \* \* together?

W: No, that is \* \* \*.

B: Only \* \* \* yes.

W: It is clear that \* \* \* let us \* \* \* this is a rough estimate, of course.

B: Of course. And since the other \* \* \* may perhaps have been 1,000 pages, roughly estimated?

W: Yes, let us estimate it at 1,000 altogether, but this is rough, very rough.

B: Then one can say that therefore about \* \* \* rolls were used for this, if there are 36 pictures per roll?

W: Yes.

B: Something like that, yes. And this does not include, perhaps, the even more comprehensive things that were turned over. There were many of similar extent during these years?

W: No, there were not.

B: No?

W: Because subsequently there were smaller things.

B: How were the deliveries made in these cases, when there were so many rolls?

W: Well, for example \* \* \* they were not all delivered at the same time.

B: No.

W: They were delivered successively. At that time, I was occupied with robot [missile] problems \* \* \*.

B: Yes.

W: \* \* \* at the Command Office. Therefore, some of them came without my requesting them, but I was cooperating continuously with those who were occupied with robot questions. And as soon as a publication came in, I learned about it.

B: Yes.

W: So that in this case they were delivered in succession. No great number of rolls were delivered at the same time.

B: I understand.

W: Except as concerns \* \* \* in that case everything was delivered at the same time.

B: How did you arrange it, in this special case?

W: I don't remember.

B: But wasn't this something exceptional, different from the usual routine here in Sweden? And it must have caused certain problems.

W: Probably. I don't remember now how it was; but of course there were; at social functions, it was only a question of a roll or two.

B: Yes.

## 50 VBH - LINO

W: But there were occasions when I had many [rolls], for example, when we used overcoats for the exchange, and the cabinets, the bathroom cabinets.

B: Yes.

W: And just how that delivery, which must have been large, was arranged I don't remember, but I should imagine that a bathroom cabinet was used.

B: That was about 30 rolls?

W: Yes, or perhaps I divided them into two parts, I can't say.

B: Well, that is not too large an amount if you have about 15. Perhaps you could carry them in your pockets in various packages? I don't know if we have touched upon this previously, but during approximately which period of time were the deliveries made?

W: Successively, during my service in the Command Office.

B: During your service in the Command Office?

W: Yes.

B: We have talked about the marking of the film, and by means of a simple calculation we arrived at a figure of a little more than \* \* \* rolls that were turned over here in Sweden. Was that the correct figure?

W: No, that is not so. There were a little over \* \* \* rolls during my service at the Command Office.

B: So.

W: And during the time of my service in the UD, as I remember, the figure was about \* \* \* rolls.

B: Considering the large number accounted for by the \* \* \* project alone, do you still maintain that this number is correct?

W: Yes. The number corresponds well with the facts, because the rest of it consisted of smaller things.

B: So that perhaps only about \* \* \* rolls were used for other documents during your entire service at the Command Office?

W: Yes.

RECORD OF INTERROGATION OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM, FRIDAY,  
2 AUGUST 1963, BEGINNING AT 1315 HOURS

Interrogator: First Clerk Rune Beckman. Witness: Clerk Hans Kaellstroem

### USE OF A MINIATURE CAMERA IN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

B: A so-called Minox camera was found in the search of your home. What kind of a camera is this?

W: This Minox camera is intended for taking pictures at short distances, 30-40 centimeters. I received it from the Soviet intelligence service.

B: When and where did you receive the camera?

W: I received it in Washington.

B: Was this during an early stage in Washington?

W: Yes, it was.

B: Did you at the same time receive instructions in the use of the camera?

W: Yes, I did. I wrote them down in Swedish, and they are with the camera.

B: I will show you a photostat of a document that was found with the camera in your home. Do you recognize the document?

W: Yes, I do.

B: What does this arrangement indicate?

W: The arrangement shows details of the use of the camera. At the top, you can see that the most suitable distance is 30-40 centimeters. To the right information is given for two different films of 17 Din and 21 Din, and to the left various light sources are indicated, one column being for electric light, clear bulb; one for electric light, frosted bulb; and one for daylight.

B: When did you write the document of which this is a photostat?

W: I wrote it a long time ago, and I wrote it in the U.S. But I think it highly unlikely that I wrote it down a second time, after my return home.

## 51 VBH - LINO

B: Did you write down this arrangement on the basis of information given you by the Soviet assigner of your tasks.

W: Yes, it accompanied directions for use of the camera.

B: Written directions?

W: Yes.

B: Directly copied?

W: Yes.

B: Why could you not use the original directions you had?

W: Because it was written on thin paper and in small type.

B: When did you first use this camera?

W: It was first used during an early stage in Washington, and I was told that the result was not good. This caused my contact in Washington to give me a camera of better quality, of American make. I used that camera on several occasions during my time in Washington, but my contact asked for its return before I left for Sweden, so that it is not here.

B: But you were permitted to keep the Minox camera?

W: Yes. He did not ask for its return, and it did not occur to me to return it.

B: Have you used this camera in Sweden?

W: No, I have not used it in Sweden. It has been in its case ever since my return to Sweden.

B: And you have not received a similar camera for use here in Sweden?

W: No. The question of using a miniature camera here in Sweden has never come up.

B: Isn't it obvious that it would have been a good thing to have such a camera, at least in the position you were when you transferred to the UD and did not have the same opportunity to borrow documents from the Air Administration?

W: No. It was not necessary, and if it had been, I could just have bought one. They are for sale in all camera shops.

B: So that detail you could take care of yourself if you had so desired.

W: Of course. I have previously stated that I had the opportunity to requisition funds, so that I could buy whatever I wished.

B: Mrs. Rosen, the chambermaid in your home, has furnished information to the effect that on one occasion, or rather, on several occasions, she has seen you carrying a miniature camera upon your person. She even saw you with it when you left home, dressed in uniform. What do you have to say to that?

W: It is completely false. I don't know what she has in mind.

B: Can you think of any circumstance that may explain her statement, anything that may have occurred in this connection?

W: I can't recall anything now.

B: You were about to buy a camera of the same model, a Minox camera from NK [a Stockholm cooperative]. Could she have seen this camera when you crammed it into your pocket?

W: I never crammed it into my pocket, but it has been laying on my desk and she may have seen it there. But I never carried that camera with me.

B: And you have never used it?

W: No.

B: In your intelligence work?

W: No.

B: Have you ever used it at all?

W: No.

The interrogation ended at 1400 hours.

Stockholm, as above.

RUTH BECKMAN,  
*First Criminal Assistant.*

RECORD OF INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM, AUGUST 14,  
1963.

Interrogation Officer: Bror Linden. Interrogation Witness: Hans  
Kaellstroem.

L: First a question, Colonel Wennerstroem, how are you in general?

W: Fine, thank you.

L: Everything is in good order?

W: Yes.

## 52 VBH - LINO

L: We are here to complement the interrogation and the examination we made at the Intelligence Department of the Defense Staff on Sunday, 4 August 1963. I will now show you a document with the title \* \* \*.

W: It is a document from 1957 and it is completely impossible to recall any details about how I used it. I can only say that at this time my intelligence activities had become more generally directed at NATO than the case had been earlier. It was of special interest that I gathered information about future changes, since I had been told by U.S.S.R. people that they now had a completely clear picture of the current situation. And when I now notice here that there is information about possible future weapons, it seems probable to me that I have made an excerpt here from appendix 1 about these weapons and written it in English in one of my reports. It seems less probable to me that I would have cared for appendix 2.

L: These documents which you deal with, have they all been handed over in a similar manner? Have they thus been photographed and handed over?

W: Yes, it means that all the material that I handed over was handled in that manner.

L: The next document has the designation \* \* \*.

W: I have now examined this document closer which is also from 1957 and I cannot say more than I have said earlier.

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: The whole contents of this document are of interest and it was certainly handed over in case I got hold of it. It is so, is it not, that I normally got all these documents which were channeled to the Defense Command Office; however, it is natural, is it not, that there were exceptions, that I did not get hold of certain documents due to the fact that I was away from some long period for instance.

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: It is difficult so long afterwards to think back to 1957 and form an opinion of what one knew then. When one examines these facts now, there is nothing which is of interest any more, but at that time much of it was new, was it not? It seems to me that most of what is found in the appendices should have been of interest at that time.

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: When one reads through this document one notices that there is little that is of interest. Now it is impossible for me so long afterwards to give any more precise information. If I read through this document carefully at all when I had it at my disposal, it seems probable that I would, for example, have included the matter about \* \* \* which one finds on top of page 5.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: What is of interest in this document concerns atomic weapons. If I had this document at my disposal, it is probable that I included these miscellaneous pieces of information in a report.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document, but if I had it at my disposal, it is likely that I handed over certain parts of it.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document, but it seems probable that if I had it at my disposal, I would have taken an interest in what is written at the bottom of page 6 about nuclear weapons and in such case handed this over.

L: Document \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document but after having read it through, I find the contents such that I would have handed it over in its totality if it had been at my disposal.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: This document is too old for me to have got hold of it at the Defense Command Office. I would like to state, however, that there is a full series of this kind of report \* \* \*. And I know that I handed over one of these reports as an example. I can, however, not tell you which of the reports it is, although I can tell you that it is not just this one.

## 53 VBH - LINO

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: Here is again such a \* \* \*. And I can only repeat that one of these reports was handed over as an example and it could possibly have been this one, but I cannot remember it.

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: This document I think I remember and I conclude that it was handed over in its totality.

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: The contents of this document is on the whole of no interest because it is taken from the press. There are, however, some pieces of information at the end from other sources, which obviously are of interest or obviously were of interest in 1958. I cannot recall this document, but if it had been at my disposal I think that these miscellaneous pieces of information were handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: \* \* \* As a matter of routine I examined these \* \* \* and picked out the information which I considered to be of current value and used these in reports. There is now, afterwards, no way to remember what I picked out in such a comprehensive document.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: Here it is completely clear that I have had the document in my hands because my signature is on it. But regardless of this I remember the document. This is because it is said here at the beginning of the third paragraph that all the 47 ordinary marine attachés except the Soviet Russian had taken part in the trip and this is the reason why I remember the document especially. Since the Russian marine attaché had not participated in the trip, I sent in this document in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: Here is now a question about \* \* \* and I here refer to what I said earlier regarding a \* \* \* which had arrived from Great Britain.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document at all.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document but I judge that I have accounted for the main part of it in one of my reports, all depending on whether I had access to the document.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document, but I think that I have handed over the main part of it if I had it in my hands.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: As for this document the facts given on the other side about \* \* \* is of interest or was at that time of interest. Now I notice my signature on it; thus I know that I have had it and then it is rather sure that these facts were handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I have read through this document and I have no memory of it and the contents do not seem to be of such a character that I would have taken an interest in it and handed it over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document, but if I had it at my disposal, it seems rather sure that I would have picked out facts about the number of planes, for instance, what is mentioned on the first page in the appendix where it is said that one airplane type is being exchanged for another and where the actual situation is given as to airplanes of the various types. Also later in the document there are some pieces of similar information.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: This document is about \* \* \*. Actually it seems to me that this account is not of any especially great interest, but I think that if I had this document, it was handed over in its totality. The reason is that on the Russian side they were in a most special way interested in information about \* \* \*.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document but if I had it it seems probable to me that the facts given on page 3 which describes certain aspects of the future development were handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

## 54 VBH - LINO

W: As for this document which also deals with \* \* \* I would like to refer to what I said in connection with the document \* \* \*.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: This is a document which I remember. It was handed over in its totality.

L: We make a shorter break in the interrogation at 3:00 p.m. The interrogation will be continued at 4:35 p.m.

Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document, but if I had it at my disposal, I think that such information as is found on page 12 which reads \* \* \*. It is one of those typical miscellaneous pieces of information which I think I handed over under conditions which I gave a minute ago.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document but the contents constitutes in my judgment a good representation of a number of statements regarding the character of the future war. If I had access to the document, I think that it is probable that I handed it over in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I have no direct memory of this document, but one can read on the lower part of the first page \* \* \*. Thus if I had access to this document, I think that I would surely have handed over the document in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document, but I judge that if I have had it in my hands the three appendices ought to have been handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I ask permission to refer to what I have said earlier about \* \* \* in general.

L: Document \* \* \*.

W: I have no direct memory of this document, but the contents were surely of very great interest at that time. Thus, if I had access to the document, I judge that it was handed over in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*. The document is not available but Colonel Wennerstroem has at an earlier interrogation declared that it is likely that he handed it over in part.

W: The information is too scarce to enable me to declare whether anything was handed over or not.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I remember this document. It was fully handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I have no memory of this document. If I had access to it, I judge that points 5 and 6 were handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document. I consider the contents to be of little interest and I cannot imagine that I would have handed over anything of it in case I had it at my disposal.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I have no memory of this document, but if I had access to it, I would believe that it was handed over in its totality. And the reason is that a visit \* \* \* must, must it not, from all points of view be of interest to the U.S.S.R. Even though this document more or less only contains known information, it is probably of interest to compare what emanates from different sources.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I remember this document. It was fully handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: This document constitutes a perfect representation of interesting and current questions at that time. I remember this document and I judge that it was handed over in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I do not recall this document, but if I had access to it I judge that it was handed over in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I have no memory of this document and I consider that the contents were not of any great interest.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

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W: This document I remember. It consists of a first secret part and a later open part. The secret part was handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I have no memory of this document, but if I had it in my hands, I have surely picked out what is said about \* \* \* and handed it over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot remember the document but if I had it I judge that I handed over what is said at the end. It begins at the bottom of page 6 and deals with \* \* \* and ends then on the middle of page 7.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: On closer examination I remember this document rather well and I remember moreover that I did not hand it over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot remember this report directly, but if I had it I judge that it was handed over in its totality, due to the great interest in \* \* \* at just that time.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this report, but I think that even if I had it, it was still not handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: Now, this is another of the kind \* \* \*. I refer to what I have said earlier about \* \* \* in general.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this report but if I had it, I judge that it was handed over in its totality. It contains information about \* \* \* which at that time was of special interest.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I remember this document and it was not handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: Here we have again a \* \* \*. Here the situation is that \* \* \* was not subject for delivery.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: This is another \* \* \*. It was not handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: This is also a \* \* \* and what I said earlier still stands.

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: I do not remember the document. If I had access to it, it seems probable that I handed over what is said on page 5.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I remember this document. It was handed over in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: One of the tasks I had charged myself with was to hand over information in crisis situations. The objective of this information was to prevent, if possible, that the Soviet Government make wrong judgments. The Berlin crisis of 1961 is a case in point. Then I studied very carefully all the information that came in about the crisis and passed it on. I cannot now afterwards say what I picked out of various documents. All depended on that very situation, did it not. Very often it happened that a document containing good information about the Berlin crisis arrived too late. Therefore, I cannot say what in this document which deals with the Berlin crisis has been handed over. I can only say that I continuously reported on the Berlin crisis.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: Here is again \* \* \* and I refer to what I have said earlier \* \* \* in general.

L: Document with the designation \* \* \*.

W: I do not recall this document. The contents are not of the kind that I would have handed over.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I cannot recall this document, but if I had access to it, I judge that it was handed over in its totality.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

W: I was myself involved in the negotiations between Sweden and Finland regarding possible purchase of J. 35 Draken (military airplane type) at the Defense Command Office. I have not there handed out any documents but I know that I mentioned it in some of my reports which I handed over to my contact man.

L: Document designated \* \* \*.

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W: I recall this document and it was fully and wholly handed over.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: This document was not handed over.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: This document has not been subject to delivery.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: I do not recall this document and when reading it now I judge that I would not have handed it over if I had had access to it.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: I recall this document but it was not handed over.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*. You have at an interrogation of 4 August declared that it was handed over in its totality. The document is one page long. The document is not available.  
W: I recall the document and it was handed over. I might perhaps add that it was not one page long but contained a number of pages, probably in the form of appendices.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: As regards this document, I should like to refer to what I have said earlier generally about the conditions with regard to the Berlin crisis.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: Here I should also like to refer to what I have said generally about the Berlin crisis.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: I do not recall this document, but since it is such a recent document it must mean that it was not handed over.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: When reading carefully I remember this report and it was handed over in its totality.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: I remember this document and it was handed over in its totality.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: This document I also remember and it was handed over in its totality.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: Here we have another \* \* \* and it was not handed over.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: This document was not handed over.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: From this document I have handed over the information dealing with military measures in connection with the blockade of West Berlin, i.e., what regards the West side.  
L: Document designated \* \* \*.  
W: This document was handed over in its totality.  
L: We have received an additional list which contains a few other reports I would like to ask you about. I will then start with a \* \* \*. Colonel Wennerstroem has had an opportunity to examine other reports except the just mentioned one and declares that he did not recognize any one which he surely or probably had handed over to his Soviet Russian employers. I will here repeat the reports we have examined and wish to remark that the reports are not here but only titles and designations \* \* \*. Is there anything that you would like to add with regard to this examination?  
W: No, I have nothing to add.  
L: The interrogation ended at 5:30 p.m.  
Stockholm, as above

BROR LINDEN.

RECORD OF INTERROGATION OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM,  
2 SEPTEMBER 1963.

Interrogation Officer: I. Stenmo, First Clerk. Interrogation Witness: Friberg, Clerk.

### THE DEFENSE COMMAND OFFICE

S: During a long period we have together with Colonel Wennerstroem been examining documents and publications, which you have been in possession of while serving at the Defense Command Office. These documents and publications have been listed and numbered

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and we will follow the list which will be attached to this record as an appendix. Before we begin to follow the list, I shall ask you to give an account of his service at the Defense Command Office. I should then like to ask you when it was first proposed that you should serve at the Defense Command Office. I surmise that this happened during the time when you served as an air attaché to Washington and that then other suitable posts were also mentioned.

W: I finished in Washington in June 1957. Quite some time before that the air force staff in Stockholm had informed me of what posts were available after my return. There were three of them, an air attaché post in London, a post at the air force staff where I would serve as chief of the intelligence section, and a post at the Defense Command Office where I would serve as chief of the air section. I was informed at the same time that the most suitable post was the post as air attaché to London. They wished to have my opinion in the matter. I answered that I was reluctant to accept the post in London for family reasons. That would have meant that my children would never attend a Swedish school. I had first, as you know, served at a post in Moscow and then at one in Washington. However, I also said that I was willing to accept the post in London if the personnel situation was difficult at the air force. I further answered that among the two other posts I preferred the post at the Defense Command Office. As you know, the decision by the air force went in the same direction. In the choice between the post as chief of the intelligence section of the air force staff and the post as chief of the air section of the Defense Command Office it was my personal views which prevailed, in other words, no views from Soviet quarters. I preferred the Defense Command Office because it was a considerably quieter post than the post at the air force staff. The fact is that the air force staff was known to be a very busy place, and I thought that I should not need to expose myself to that at my age.

S: Before you turn to describing the service as chief of the air section, I should very much like to hear a little about how the service is, in general, organized at the Defense Command Office.

\* \* \* \* \*

[Following his explanation, the interrogation was resumed.]

S: You were not in charge of any special committee assignment during this period?

W: No, I was not.

S: We shall then turn to and examine the different documents and publications which you in your service at the Defense Command Office had access to and which are wholly or partly handed over. It ought to be stressed already now that such documents that you required during your time at the Defense Command Office, for instance, from the Book and Form Supply or from the Air Force Staff or from the Air Over-Director are listed in respective sections and are thus not going to be touch upon in the examination which follows. Here are only given the documents which have in one way or another been channelled through the Defense Command Office. If we then turn to the appendix and the points there, we have first \* \* \*

W: At that time Swedish atomic weapons were discussed, i.e., whether in the future decisions should be made about the acquirement of such or not, and it was at that time among other things a political question. The Defense Minister and the Supreme Commander spoke about a decision as soon as possible about acquirement of atomic weapons, while the Defense Minister considered that it was a political decision which could not be made until farther off in the future. In this connection, General Aarmann had been charged by the Defense Minister to see to it that nothing unsuitable came into the press, i.e., in the form of military orders. When the \* \* \* edition came, General Aarmann noticed that there were a couple of pages which dealt with atomic weapons. He then gave the order to me and asked that I should make a closer scrutiny of the contents of these pages and afterwards report on the matter to him. He might also ask himself why he gave me the assignment and why he did not give the assignment to the Chief of the Army Section when it now was a document which was issued by the Chief of the Army. As far as I remember it was due to the fact that I was his closest man and that we had earlier

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discussed these questions about atomic weapons. I found then that the publication contained regulations and instructions on how Swedish military chiefs should use atomic weapons in various situations in case such weapons were available. On my report General Aarmann felt obliged to speak to the Defense Minister who was much aggrieved at the fact that it had been printed. The result was also that the whole edition—was stopped and burnt, and later it was reprinted and then these regulations were not there or were at least modified in some way. As for my intelligence activities for the U.S.S.R., they asked me especially to pay attention to whether Sweden's attitude to the atomic weapon question would change or if something else of interest would take place. For that reason I photographed the section about atomic weapons which I have spoken about and it was handed over in connection with a report. The rest of the book was on the other hand not handed over. Later I had to write a new report and tell them that the first edition was stopped and replaced with a new edition.

S: We then turn to point \*\*\* with the title "Stipulations for measures with the objective of increasing air security in Swedish-Norwegian-Danish waters as well as in the frontier area between Sweden and Norway through cooperation between the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Air Forces. (General stipulations)." Would you comment on how you were in touch with this document?

W: These stipulations thus deal with measures in order to increase air security. To start with I did not pay any attention to this document and the conditions described therein. I did not consider that it was of interest to Soviet intelligence. It was, however, so that at this time they had become convinced in Moscow that the Swedish air defense was being incorporated with the NATO air defense of Europe. At my meetings with Soviet intelligence personnel I had pointed out that this opinion in Moscow was essentially exaggerated. On one occasion, however, they told me that they had information from Norway that Swedish fighter planes were seen at Norwegian airbases and that they had similar information from Denmark. They told me then that here we have now full and clear evidence that it is completely incorporated. It was this that caused me to hand over these stipulations.

S: Can you tell us in what manner you handed this over?

W: Yes, this document was photographed on special film and it was thus in this manner that I did it during my whole period at the Defense Command Office.

S: This means, then, that the documents in this list which we shall go on examining—to the extent that it is stated that they were fully handed over—were photographed on special film and handed over on film?

W: Yes.

S: And in the cases where it is stated that they were partly handed over and the number of pages given, it means that those pages were photographed and handed over?

W: Yes, either the pages were photographed and handed over or it was done in such a manner that certain pieces of information were picked from these pages and inserted in combined reports which then in turn were photographed and handed over.

\* \* \* \* \*

RECORD OF CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF COL. STIG WENNERSTROEM,  
5 SEPTEMBER 1963

Interrogation Officer: K. L. Stenmo, First Clerk. Interrogation Witness: Friberg, Clerk

THE DEFENSE COMMAND OFFICE (continuation)

S: \*\*\* We shall then turn to point \*\*\* which concerns \*\*\* and I would like you to tell us what the reports contain and to what extent you have picked facts from these reports to be handed over.

W: To send war material from Sweden one has to have an export license. These are issued by the Department of Commerce and within the Department of Commerce by the War Materiel Inspection. Issued licenses are usually combined in, among other things, monthly reports.

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The monthly reports are distributed in a manner so that they come to the Defense Command Office, among other places. They were usually kept by the Chief of the Defense Command Office himself. In my intelligence work I did not pay much attention to these lists and did not check them continuously. However, when I now and then was the Acting Chief they came into my hands. I think it happened at long intervals that I picked a piece of information from them for my reports, and in such cases it was about some big delivery to West Germany. Unfortunately, I cannot recall this too well.

S: I think I remember that on some earlier occasion you said that it was of certain interest that this matter was watched because the Russians were of the opinion that Sweden help West Germany to rearm.

W: This is correct insofar as the Soviet intelligence had as its very special objective to follow the rearmament of West Germany, which by them was considered the greatest danger. However, I had myself no special assignment to follow the deliveries from Sweden to West Germany. If I now included any such piece of information, it was because I knew about their interest in West Germany.

S: The interrogation interrupted at 4:15 p.m.

(The interrogation continued on 9 September 1963 with the same interrogation officer and interrogation witness, beginning at 1:15 p.m.)

\* \* \* \* \*  
S: We then turn to the points \* \* \*. Point \* \* \* has the designation \* \* \*. All these documents concern American visits; may I ask you to comment on these documents?

W: This delivery of information is connected with one of the special assignments I had through my whole period in Sweden. According to the information I received from my contact man in Moscow, it was the opinion of leading people in Moscow that there was growing \* \* \*. They had asked that I keep a watch on visits by American personnel, not any personnel, but high-ranking personnel. They wished that I report on what people visited Sweden and for what reason they were here. The objective was that these pieces of information which emanated from the very place they visited and which they could consider correct would be compared with the information they obtained in other countries. I did it in the manner that I collated information, which was handed over either in a special report or in another, broader, combined report. The reports which are mentioned here deal with such visits which I have now commented upon.

S: We then turn to point \* \* \* with the designation \* \* \*. May I ask you to describe in what manner you came in touch with these publications at the Defense Command Office; to what extent you got hold of them at the Defense Command Office; and how you got hold of them otherwise at other places, for instance at the Air Board or at the office of the Air Over-Director.

W: I already told you that at the Defense Command Office there were a number of tasks which concerned all military branches and which therefore did not directly belong to anyone of the Air, Navy, and Army Sections. They therefore had to be divided up among these by means of a special order from the Chief of the Office. One of these matters was the guided missiles weapons and there it was decided by the Chief of the Office that the Chief of the Air Section should be responsible for these matters, that he should follow their development and study them on a suitable scale. And since I was the Chief of the Air Section, the task became mine. In this activity I had to do with several different systems of guided missiles and one among these systems was the one mentioned here. \* \* \* First of all, certain documents and descriptions concerning \* \* \* came in in normal order to the Defense Command Officer or at times to the Defense Department and from there to the Defense Command Office. However, the number of documents which reached me in this manner were not complete and therefore I acquired what I lacked by loans from the Air Board and there from the Air Over-Director. It was in the first place the Air Over-Director in the Air Board who handled guided missiles business and due to my special assignment I thus had an intimate, running contact with him. I can thus say that I had at my disposal a complete supply of documents concerning \* \* \*.

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S: May I throw in a question. Was it not so that these documents came in over a long period of time and were handed over at the same rate as they came in, so that you did not gather together the whole material and hand it over at one time?

W: No, they were handed over as they came in and it was not all documents that were handed over, but only those which were of value in my judgment. To explain this better I have to go back somewhat or rather quite a bit back in time. Already at the end of my Moscow period people in the Soviet intelligence told me that it was of the utmost importance that the U.S.S.R. as soon as possible reached the level of the U.S.A. in the military-technical respect. Before that time no satisfying balance existed. I was then asked to attempt to assist in the acquirement of information which would hasten the development, i.e., to save time in the development from the Soviet point of view. It was to be done in the manner that they acquired very modern information, such things as drawings, charts, and the like, i.e., detailed information which could be used by their designers in order, perhaps, to solve problems quickly which they were sweating over, or to get new ideas. My activities in this field thus began already at the end of my Moscow time, and then it was first of all about bombsights of strategic bombers. Later, during my time in the U.S., this work developed more and more and in the middle and at the end of my American period it was practically the only thing I did from the Soviet point of view. They regarded this as so important that all other activities were discontinued. Upon my return to Sweden, the people in the Soviet intelligence wished that, to the extent that it was possible, I should continue with this and that, as before, I should first of all aim at American material, but also, if I had access to it, British material. All the time it was understood that it had to be things of the very latest type, preferably things which had not yet been used. It turned out at the Defense Command Office that with this objective in mind I could hand over information about several different projects. \* \* \* was one which I have mentioned here. \* \* \* which, however, was somewhat too old to be of any real value. However, it was thus \* \* \* various projects which occurred. We will in other contexts meet with \* \* \* and then I intend to refer back to what I have said now.

S: We then turn to point \* \* \* with the designation \* \* \*. At the review at the Defense Staff this document was shown to you and you could then not remember for sure whether the document had been handed over, but was of the opinion that, in case you had had access to it, it would have been handed over in full. I, therefore, ask you whether you can now remember the document and what happened?

Y: You mentioned that the document had been discussed at the Defense Staff. This is, however, not the case, because it was at the Air Board that it took place. As for some documents, I do not remember them, although I must say they were not that many. This document belongs among them. The content of this document is a technical arrangement which belongs to \* \* \* and for that reason it is of interest and if I have had access to it I have surely photographed it. However, since I cannot recall it, I cannot give any other answer than that either I have had it and do not remember it and in such a case it was handed over, or I have never had it and then, naturally, it was not handed over. Unfortunately, there must be a few documents where I must give such an answer.

S: We have not either succeeded in finding out whether you took part of this by means of the dispatch list, but we have established that the document has been available at the Defense Command Office. We then turn to point ---- with the designation \* \* \*.

W: \* \* \* now exists also in Sweden and in a number of the European NATO countries. At the time that we are discussing \* \* \* was not yet introduced into Europe, this was in 1959. It was then discussed whether we should buy \* \* \* directly from the American enterprise where \* \* \* was made or whether we should build a branch factory in Europe. Here the possibilities of a Swedish-Norwegian-Danish cooperation in order to jointly produce \* \* \* were discussed. Now it did never take place and this is only part of the picture because the same reasoning took place in other countries in Western Europe. Regarding these circumstances I have reported by including pieces of information in one of my reports. And then I did not only touch upon the problem which is mentioned in this message, but also upon the whole problem.

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S: We will then turn to point ---- a document with the designation \* \* \*. Here we know that you have verified with your signature that you have read the document and now I would like to have your comments.

W: This document was, as is mentioned in the minutes here, fully handed over. It was a memorandum which was made up by the Chief at that time of the Defense Academy, General Westring, in connection with \* \* \*. The report has no decided content, but contains information from various fields—political, military, technical—which is combined.

S: We then turn to point ---- with the designation \* \* \*. Regarding this document we know also that you have verified with your signature that you have read the document. May I ask you to comment.

W: This document was, as is stated in the record, fully handed over. I would like in this case to comment on the matter in a somewhat more penetrating manner. People in the Soviet intelligence had told me that regarding NATO in Europe they knew everything about the organization of the air forces, the location of the bases, what was at the bases, equipment as it was at the present, and similar conditions. They had, in other words, a very good intelligence organization vis-à-vis NATO in Europe. Therefore, they did not wish to get information of that nature from me. On the other hand, they were interested in all information pertaining to future changes. And they also said that they were interested in all military maneuvers and most of all in the results of military maneuvers. This report is an account \* \* \* of experiences from an air defense maneuver, and it was thus within the sphere in which I had taken upon myself to cooperate.

S: We turn then to point ---- with the designation \* \* \*. I hope you recognize this document and want to comment on it.

W: One can read in the record that it is probable that it was mentioned in a special report, and I want to point out here that this document which has the number ---- is connected with an earlier document which we have dealt with, No. ----. In the document \* \* \* our military attaché in Helsinki has made a report regarding acquirement of the Draken [military-type plane], and the Finnish military attaché handed in a message regarding purchase of the Draken. It is thus these facts together which are perhaps mentioned in one of my combined reports. Any real recollection of it I do not have, however.

S: We then turn to point \* \* \* with the designation \* \* \*. About that document we do know that you have got it according to the dispatch list, and I ask that you comment on it.

W: This document does not contain any facts of essential nature, but it is possible that a few miscellaneous facts were included in one of my reports at that time.

S: We then turn to point ---- with the designation \* \* \*. This document you have mentioned earlier and it is clear that it was handed over. It is now also established that this document was sent by mail on 16 August 1961 to you via the office of the defense staff. May I ask you to comment on it?

W: \* \* \*.

S: We then turn to point ---- with the designation \* \* \*. At an earlier review you have said that this document was reported in the main. Do you have further comments to make with regard to this document?

W: The only thing I can say is that the document is tied to what I have said in detail earlier in connection with the document \* \* \*.

S: We continue with point ---- which does not have any special designation but has the title "Travel Notifications," and at an earlier review you have said that these travel notifications only caused delivery or reports when the travel was undertaken by VIP's. I may perhaps ask you to account a little more in detail for these VIP's; it was a limited number of people, was it not, and we have spoken about the matter in various contexts, but we shall do it over now.

We make a temporary break in the interrogation at 3:10 p.m.

S: The interrogation continued at 3:50 p.m.

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W: I shall first refer to the documents \* \* \* which concerned American visits to Sweden. I refer particularly to the general declaration which I then made. When we now deal with point ---- "Travel notifications," we are dealing with travel the other way, i.e., from Sweden to the U.S. On the part of the Soviet intelligence there was a similar need for reports from me in this respect. They thus received reports from the U.S. in which it was mentioned that Swedish personnel had made certain visits and then there were speculations about what these visits meant. They therefore wished me to inform them—and preferably in advance—when Swedish personnel were to go to the U.S. and for what reason. The objection was to get correct information from me which could be compared with what they obtained from the U.S. I mentioned that it concerned certain important persons, and it was so that there were 10 people named by the Soviet people and I shall here—for what interest it may have—enumerate them. It was the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Supreme Commander, the Chief of the Staff of Defense, the Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Navy, the Chief of the Air Force, the Chief of the Coast Artillery, and the Chief of Section 2 of the Defense Staff, i.e., the person who is considered to be the intelligence chief in Sweden. Together this makes 10 persons. \* \* \*

S: In what way was this reporting done; was it only a short message that such and such a person had gone to the U.S., or did you base your reporting on any special documents which arrived at the Defense Command Office?

W: The preparations of all these trips took place at the Defense Command Office, and there could be a rather long preparatory period. I very often knew the details about such a trip some 6 weeks before it was really undertaken. And all the details in the case were available at the Defense Command Office.

S: Was it of any importance when you reported; thus, could it be of interest to your employer to know well in advance about the trip?

W: Yes, so it was.

S: So the reporting was done before the trip was undertaken?

W: Yes.

S: We then turn to the points ---- with the designation \* \* \* and with the title "Monthly Orientations" for the different \* \* \*. Regarding these documents we have established that you have verified with your signature that you have received the documents \* \* \* and regarding the rest \* \* \* it is clear that you have, according to the dispatch list, read the documents. At the review you have also verified that this is the case, and I am grateful if you would tell us in a little more detail what these monthly orientations contained in the main and why they were subject to interest.

W: The monthly orientations come from the air board. At the air board the materiel and equipment problems of the air force are handled. The development in this field is reported upon in these monthly orientations and they are distributed according to a special dispatch list. The objective was that the receivers should be generally oriented about what was taking place, or that they should be able to get detailed orientation in some area in which they had reason to be interested. These monthly orientations came as a rule to the Defense Command Office and were kept at the air section in a folder in a safe. To start with, I did not pay any attention to these orientations because my intelligence activities did not at the beginning touch upon Swedish conditions. As I have stated, I began, however, to hand over these monthly orientations from January 1960. The reason was in the first place a meeting which took place \* \* \* in the fall of 1959. I then met with my contact man in Moscow. At that meeting they made clear to me that in Moscow it was considered \* \* \*. I had also then taken upon myself to widen my intelligence activities so that they would also incorporate the Swedish air defense. \* \* \*. There was naturally also other information of interest here, for example, about what kind of materiel was received from the U.S. and Great Britain. That which from my own point of view was most decisive, however \* \* \* which it was difficult to get a grasp of in other ways than by paying attention continuously to these monthly orientations.

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S: You can thus verify that these notes which are made here to the effect that the monthly orientations were fully handed over during this period are correct?

W: Yes, I can.

S: The interrogation interrupted at 4:10 p.m.  
Stockholm, as above.

K. I. STENMO.

RECORD OF INTERROGATION OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM, 11 SEPTEMBER 1963.

Interrogation Officer: K. I. Stenmo, First Clerk. Interrogation Witness: K. E. Friberg, First Clerk.

### THE DEFENSE COMMAND OFFICE

S: The interrogation is a continuation of the section which concerns the Defense Command Office. We shall turn to point ---- which does not have any special designation but does have the title "Detailed Information Regarding American and British Materiel." At an earlier review when we dealt with the Defense Command Office you mentioned—it was recorded on tape 7—that acquirement of publications regarding American technical air equipment and similar things was facilitated by the fact you had certain special assignments at the Defense Command Office precisely within this field. I will ask you to dwell a little again on the form of this activity.

W: What I then meant to say was just what I touched upon in detail when I gave an answer with regard to point ----. I there accounted for the whole background of the Soviet interest in detailed information about modern American and, by the way, also British materiel. I then also mentioned that my assignment to handle guided missile questions at the Command Office was a fact which enabled me to be in touch with just such modern materiel as the Soviet people wished me to. This was the essential part of what I did at the Command Office concerning this materiel question. I ought perhaps to mention that I also acquired certain books from the Book Supply which contained materiel descriptions. One has perhaps to consider that that activity was rather unimportant in comparison with that which had to do with guided missiles.

S: We then turn to point ---- where we also have no designation; however, we have given it the title "Reporting in Crisis Situations." In the appendix we have divided the matter up in a-, b-, c-, and d-groups and we shall deal with each of them in turn. The reason we concern ourselves with this is that you at an earlier interrogation touched upon these circumstances at various times; here we have them collected under one title. I should perhaps start with asking you to comment a little on the main title.

W: We are here concerned with one of the assignments which I took upon myself \* \* \* 1957. This assignment remained during my whole period of activity in Stockholm. In this capacity I should in crisis situations hand over such information which would help the Soviet Government to avoid misjudgments. As you know, it was considered in Soviet quarters as it is in other places that the greatest risk in the so-called cold war is misjudgments in crisis situations. I then took upon myself to judge when a crisis situation was at hand and then to try to acquire information of this nature. I did this and as a result in four different cases I delivered information, which can be found here under the titles a, b, c, and d.

S: We can perhaps then directly turn to subtitle a \* \* \*. This was, was it not, a piece of information that you handed over in connection with your visit to Leningrad.

W: The Laos crisis took place in 1960 and 1961. The conditions in that area naturally seemed very peripheral from the point of view of the Stockholm horizon, but due to my agreement I still followed up what happened. In this case, I was directly told by my contact man in Moscow that regarding the conditions in Laos they were especially anxious to get knowledge about \* \* \*. Through my connections \* \* \* in Stockholm I was successful in obtaining these pieces of information. It should be added that at this time the relations \* \* \* had started to

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be rather intimate due to preparations for acquirement of \* \* \* which then took place. The information which I obtained was of a considerably wider scope than Moscow had actually asked for. I wrote a report on the matter as usual. This report happened to be ready when I was to go to Moscow on 1 September 1960. For this reason I preferred not to photograph the report—which I usually did—but I proposed through my contact man in Stockholm that we should meet in Leningrad. This was also hastily arranged and there was also a meeting in Leningrad. I had then memorized the report and destroyed it, and therefore I delivered the contents orally in Leningrad. I have in the earlier preliminary interrogation said that these facts were picked from reports which were processed through the Defense Command Office. However, when we later very carefully reviewed the intelligence reports at the Office, I found out that there was no information in this matter there. And after I have thought it over more carefully, I remember that it was not through the reports at the Defense Command Office that I got the information but in the manner which I have earlier described \* \* \*.

S: One can still say, can one not, that it was precisely your special assignment at the Office that facilitated the acquirement of this information from the British?

W: Yes, naturally, if it had not been for this, I would not have had the intimate relations that I had.

S: We then turn to section b, which deals with the Berlin crisis; it is thus two Berlin crises which I would like you to comment on.

W: During my time at the office there were three great crises in connection with Berlin, and this was in the fall of 1958, in the spring of 1961, and in the fall of 1961. Due to the agreement, I followed these very carefully and this caused me to report in the fall of '58 and in the spring of '61. This was, was it not, an arch-example of how misjudgments could cause a catastrophe. As you know, in this case, the Soviets had to make the judgment how far the United States would go in the defense of their rights in Berlin. My whole reporting thus had the objective to deliver information about just that matter. In this case, I thus had to make pure judgments, and in order to pass these judgments I acquired all possible information about the American reaction in the question, and I did this by studying all available reports at the Foreign Department and all available intelligence reports that were to be found here in Stockholm, and by associating as closely as possible with members of the American Embassy. The result was a judgment that the U.S. was ready to go to war over Berlin. \* \* \*.

S: We then turn to point c, "the Laos Crisis."

W: The Laos crisis I already dealt with in connection with point a, and therefore there is nothing more to say about it.

S: Then point d, "the Lebanon Crisis." Now, the Lebanon crisis was perhaps not of the same character as the others and the reporting regarding it was perhaps not similar to the reporting that has taken place in the earlier points, but I still ask you to touch upon it.

W: It is completely correct that the circumstances in the Lebanon crisis differ from those in the other crises. For the fact is that the work I did took place before the time people in Sweden knew that there was going to be a Lebanon crisis. I had become informed by the Soviets in advance that they had information from the U.S. regarding a coming American landing in the Eastern Mediterranean. And the work I undertook was that I made a trip for the Soviets \* \* \* when it was found out where the American parachuted troops were to land. And as I said to start with, this happened before we in Sweden knew that there was going to be a Lebanon crisis. This will be more closely described in connection with a detailed review of certain trips that I made.

S: We then turn to point ---- where we also have no special designation, but we have a title: "Reporting on Swedish Neutrality." May I ask you to describe a little more in detail how this reporting took place.

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W: We are here touching upon yet another task which I undertook \* \* \* 1957. And this task I was charged with during my whole Stockholm period. The fact is that they wished me to report continuously on the political side of Swedish neutrality. They considered it especially important that they learn of signs if Sweden was in this respect about to change her position. They did not expect that there would be any changes and therefore anticipated that I would never submit any messages. However, in order to be sure that I had not forgotten the assignment, they wished me to report on the matter from time to time, change or no change. So I did. On some occasions I then sent over the records, established at the Foreign Minister meetings of the Nordic States; just as written proof that no change had taken place in our neutrality position.

S: Did you get access to these records from the Nordic Foreign Minister meetings during your time at the Defense Command Office or was it during your time at the Foreign Department?

W: Yes, we had access to them at the Defense Command Office and it happened once during my time there that I proceeded in this manner. The fact is that these records—I cannot say that all of them did it, but I know in any case that a few did—were circulated at the Defense Command Office among other documents we received from the Foreign Department.

S: We then turn to point ----. Here we have again no designation but the title "Reporting on Possible Nuclear Weapons in Sweden." May I ask you to develop your points of view more in detail?

W: We are also here dealing with one of the special assignments which I undertook \* \* \* 1957. They then declared that it was of utmost importance for the Soviet military command to know whether Sweden had nuclear weapons at her disposal. In that situation they certainly knew that we did not have any atomic weapons. And they declared that from the Russian military point of view Sweden is of no danger as long as she does not possess atomic weapons. But if a change would occur in this situation, completely new dispositions and preparations must be undertaken on the Soviet side. They thus

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### NATO'S NUCLEAR WEAPON STRENGTH

REPORT OF THE INTERROGATION OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM ON  
NOVEMBER 29, 1963

Conductor of Interrogation: Rune Beckman. Witness to  
Interrogation: Gosta Brannemo

S: We have reached the point in the hearing where we are to deal with the topic of NATO's nuclear weapon strength.

Might I ask you first, Colonel Wennerstroem, to give us a general account of how you implemented that assignment?

W: Since my reporting concerning NATO was not supposed to comprehend the actual situation, but only concerned coming changes, it was quite limited for obvious reasons. During the time I was working at the FO (Foreign Office) preparations were made for several changes of various kinds in the organization of NATO. And it happened that all of these concerned the field of nuclear weapons. In other fields the tendency to change was thus insignificant. When it came to changes and planned changes concerning nuclear weapon strengths, why it is obvious that the military interest was great, but one might say that the political interest was still greater. And for that reason my appointment in the FO came to stand out as especially valuable when it came to fulfilling that assignment in my intelligence activity. Because I was concerned with disarmament questions within the FO, all reports and documents touching on NATO's nuclear forces came to me to look at. If I had been in any other position it would not have been possible to get as complete an overall view as I did. As to information from military quarters, that came to the FO on the same scale as for example to DHQ (Defense headquarters). On the basis of the general agreement concerning reporting that was reached in November 1961 \* \* \* I decided to report on certain relationships within NATO. I shall now give a point by point account of that.

S: But what was it that you could report? Was it developmental work, what was happening, or what?

W: What I reported was supplementary to the reports and accounts that were official, e.g., McMillan's and others. At best one was quite poorly informed if one did not have access to the accompanying secret information. This reporting, I believe, was not of the most valuable kind, but it did throw a certain light on the problem as it appeared just then.

S: When we were going over the matter of NATO's nuclear forces before, Colonel, you indicated that your principal in Moscow was interested in two different kinds of nuclear forces; if I understood that right it was (1) forces that would be mounted on merchant ships, and (2) an international force on land. Might I ask you to develop this line of thought a little further and at the same time to tell what opportunities you had to report on that field?

W: It is true that there are two different kinds of nuclear forces. And it might be said that those two projects have been the most important thing in the way of development in NATO during the past 2 years. In the one case it was a matter of already existing nuclear forces in Europe from various countries which were to be brought together into a single entity. That project in due course became a reality. The other project, to have Polaris rockets on commercial ships, on the other hand has not become a reality. As to nuclear weapons in the form of Polaris rockets on commercial ships, that had its quite special interest for the reason that those vessels were to have mixed crews and the idea was that 40 percent of those crews were to be from West Germany.

S: How did you learn of that, Colonel?

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W: Well, what I have said so far is quite official information that was in the press, and there were quite a lot of details in the press. At the same time it was true in this matter as it was concerning \* \* \* that parallel with the various official pieces of information there was reporting on the confidential level that gave a better illumination of the whole problem than could be gained by merely reading the newspapers.

S: Was this reporting in the form of embassy reports?

W: Yes. That is, to a very large extent it was embassy reports. Because here we are in the realm of high-level political decisions. The military decision in this case was quite simple, for the proposal was based on military considerations and from the military standpoint was the most practical solution. After that there were a multitude of extremely difficult political problems, which became the main thing.

S: Was a solution found?

W: Well, as I mentioned before, there is the question of bringing the existing nuclear forces in Europe together into one entity; that question is solved and there is a special commanding officer provided, etc. But as for the other question, concerning commercial ships with Polaris rockets, that question is still far from being solved, but on the other hand it still has not been written off. I can therefore say that when my activity ceased at the FO on 19 June of this year my reporting concerning nuclear forces on land had already ceased, because they had already become a reality, while it continued concerning Polaris rockets on commercial ships and would still be going on now if I had remained at the FO.

S: When we were going through earlier, Colonel, you also mentioned that your principal wanted you to report views e.g. about the nuclear forces that were being set up, and now I should like to ask whether the forces you have just described are the ones you were referring to before?

W: Yes, they are. And what I had in mind was an explanation that I got from the Russian general in Moscow. He said that when it comes e.g. to NATO's nuclear forces, the Soviet Foreign Ministry of course has access to all its own ambassadors' reports. But that reporting is naturally one-sided, and it is considered of great value if for example the report of the Soviet Ambassador to Washington can be laid on the table when he reports re e.g. NATO's nuclear forces—there is some special occasion for his reporting, perhaps something that has appeared in the press or some speech that has been made—but then they would like, if they could, to lay side by side with that report reports that other ambassadors in Washington wrote on the same matter, so that the gentleman who are to appraise the situation in Moscow can do it from all sides better than if they had only their own ambassador's report. That was the thing I was referring to.

### BRITISH POLARIS SUBMARINES

W: I also reported concerning British Polaris submarines, which involved a change in the NATO situation. In brief the situation was that the British decided to build their own Polaris submarines, and they were then to get certain help from the Americans with respect to rockets. At the beginning it was of very great interest to find out how many submarines might be involved and when they could be expected to be completed; in other words what significance they would attain in the NATO organization.

### AMERICAN ROBOT WEAPONS

Another reporting field was the development of American robot weapons. Reporting had been going on in that field for several years, including my time at DHQ. The reporting that came to take place from the FO, however, was of limited scope. Only two cases came up. \* \* \*. From that document one could thus get the real and truthful background.

S: How did you come by that document, Colonel?

W: Well, it was a report \* \* \* and I borrowed it once when I visited Foreign Affairs Councillor Åstroem.

S: Did you borrow it in such a way that you had an opportunity to photograph it?

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W: No, I never took it from his office, since I had a chance to take notes and that sufficed for my purpose.

S: Then it was in connection with an ordinary business visit to Foreign Affairs Councillor Åstroem that you got hold of it. Was that a part of the job you had at the FO, or was it accident that brought that about?

W: I was told that a report had come in that I should read in my capacity of disarmament expert. Afterwards that report, if I remember aright, was circulated on a later occasion.

S: Did you write out the whole report, or just this table of figures?

W: I wrote out the table of figures as you see it here and then I took a few brief notes on the text.

S: The hearing closed at 3:50 p.m.

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(The hearing resumed Saturday 30 November, beginning at 9:30 a.m., with the same examiner and witness.)

### REPORTING IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

S: Let me, for a start, ask you to describe the background of that assignment of yours, colonel Wennerstroem, to report in crisis situations, quite generally.

W: Reporting in crisis situations began to take place first back when I was in Washington. Afterwards it occurred during the time I was at DHQ and finally in the FO period, too. As I mentioned earlier, the Soviet intelligence service wanted me to follow the political developments and judge for myself when a crisis situation arose. I was then to try to get such information as might be thought to contribute to keeping the Soviet foreign affairs leadership or state leadership from making any false appraisal. The thinking on the Soviet side, like that in most other quarters, was that the risk of war really consisted in the making of a wrong appraisal of crisis situations. Since it might happen that it would become necessary to report very quickly in such a situation, a system of letter writing had been arranged for that purpose. \* \* \* During my time at the FO only one crisis of great significance occurred, and that was the Cuban crisis. \* \* \* That was, of course, in the fall of 1962. \* \* \* There was no doubt about how serious the situation was and how serious the developments might be expected to be later, so I devoted a great deal of time and energy to following up developments and getting all conceivable information. The information that was to be had was partly from various channels within the FO and partly through my connections, then especially active, \* \* \*

S: Did you notice any reaction from the Russians your self, Colonel, when you had furnished that information \* \* \*? Did you have any contact with your principal?

W: I had no personal contact with the general in Moscow. That had been broken off for quite a long time due to the fact that he was the one picked out to direct the intelligence service in Cuba, so that he was in Cuba during that crisis. But on the other hand I did get, about a month, I suppose it was, after the crisis, a message through the contact man in Stockholm, stating that the chief of the intelligence service, whom I had met in 1960 in Moscow, conveyed his special thanks for the information, and particularly for the information about \* \* \*

S: Was it Baranovskiy that brought that?

W: Yes. When the Cuban crisis ended with the Soviet Union pulling back its rocket forces in Cuba, the American Armed Forces and particularly the Strategic Air Force were in full readiness. In that situation it was thought in the West that a number of signs pointed toward a new Berlin crisis in the offing. And politically there was a clear impression that a Berlin crisis would so to speak draw a part of the attention away from Cuba—attention that was not so fortunate from the Soviet standpoint. What was of special interest was that the American readiness was aimed at Berlin. At that time

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optimism in West Europe was very high because the Cuban crisis had passed so advantageously. Of course the optimism did not correspond to the American war preparations. Readiness was needed in order to be fully armed for a possible Berlin crisis. \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

S: The hearing closed at 11:50 a.m.

(The hearing was resumed Monday 2 December 1963, starting at 1:35 p.m., with the same examiner and witness.)

S: This hearing is a direct continuation of the hearings on the FO part held 30 November 1963.

Colonel Wennerstroem, we should like to try to complete the hearing concerning the FO part today, and we have now arrived at the circumstances surrounding your attempt to get accredited as Air attaché in Spain and the circumstances surrounding your intended move to Spain. I would appreciate it if you would give us an account of the background of that move to Spain and how the circumstances developed, strictly speaking, from 1958 to the present time.

W: As I have already stated during this final hearing, the Soviet Union's intelligence activity with respect to NATO in Europe was in general very well developed and gave adequate results. There was one exception, however, and that was Spain. \* \* \* It may therefore be said that from 1958 on they were pushing on the Soviet side with increased force to accomplish their objectives. In principle I agreed to the proposal. It was for that reason that in the earlier part of 1960 I put in a request to try to be accredited as Air attaché in Madrid, and the accreditation would have taken place after I reached retirement in 1961. There was a special background to that request. It happened that the Spanish had officially proposed that Sweden and Spain exchange defense attachés. \* \* \* That was what suggested my action in the matter. I figured that if I was going to live in Madrid, I would get a much better position and get into the diplomatic corps if that project should be realized. It should be observed that there was no prompting from the Soviet side in this, nor did they find out about my attempt after it came to nothing. In fact I wrote a memorandum giving my ideas and suggested an exchange of notes between Sweden and Spain. I gave that memorandum to Foreign Affairs Councillor Astrom. \* \* \*

S: If I have grasped that situation correctly, Colonel, you were offering to be accredited as Air attaché in Spain without cost to the treasury. How were you thinking of financing the situation?

W: Yes, that is quite right and that was the way I had taken, and my official motivation was that as a retired officer I intended to settle in Spain. That is a very common situation nowadays, as you know. And that when I was living in Spain I wanted that as a nice way of passing the time. And as for what can be gotten out of it when you are not paid, it's the status you get by having a diplomatic passport. And a diplomatic passport does carry certain advantages, such as that you escape taxation, for example. Then there was of course the real motivation of the whole thing, namely that I would be working for the Soviet intelligence service, and finances played no part whatever in that. Later, in 1960, it was fully agreed between me and the Soviet intelligence service that I would work in Spain, although the exact time was not yet fixed. That led to my being asked to go to Madrid in the fall of 1960 to reconnoiter a lot of circumstances, including suitable dwelling quarters. That did take place in the fall of 1960, and I wrote reports containing the required information. The next thing that happened concerning Spain was definite agreement with respect to the date, and that was fixed as 1 June 1964. If my work had been allowed to continue undisturbed at the FO, I would in fact have resigned a good while before 1 June 1964. Early this year an inquiry came from Moscow through my contact man in Stockholm whether I could undertake another trip to Spain, and if so then at any time I chose during 1963. I answered yes to the inquiry and said I would combine that with my vacation, which would probably be in September, the first half of September, filled out with a certain amount

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of time at the end of July. For well known reasons the trip didn't take place, but I did get started with certain preparations. First of all I got word through the contact man in Stockholm what they wanted to find out. Those written instructions are still extant and are included in the material seized. My intention was to decide on the basis of the instructions what places in Spain I would visit and what American contacts I would make in advance. I had never had so much time for preparations. It is mostly for that reason that the paper is still there and has not been destroyed. Besides that I oriented myself a little bit at the FO about the situation in Madrid by going to the archives and looking through the reports that had come in from there during the last 2 years. That, by the way, is preparatory work that had nothing to do with any reporting. And then I collected a batch of documents that had automatically come to me, for the same purpose.

S: Well, we can leave Spain with that and we have a few things left to take up before leaving the FO part altogether. I remember that on some occasion you spoke of your principal's having wanted to see a copy of UFL, which probably means Underrättelser från Flyledningen (News from the Air Command). Can you remember that and tell us a little more about the circumstances?

W: Yes. UFL is what you might call an orientation paper that comes out in the air force and is distributed within the air force and to reservists. In and of itself it is very nice and useful, but it has no significance from the intelligence standpoint. It struck me as a little strange when right in the midst of a lot of things that seemed to be of quite great importance to the Soviet intelligence service I suddenly got an inquiry that ran, "What is UFL?" I answered and told them what it was. Then I got a message thanking me for the answer, but saying that although I said it was worthless they still would like to have a couple of numbers and take a look at it. So I sent it in once or twice, I don't remember exactly, but at least once for sure. That is one of the little things from my Sweden period that make you wonder what they are. I could of course have asked next time I saw my contact man in Moscow, but as it turned out I never got a chance to see him. \* \* \*

S: There is one other question that we touched on when we were going through earlier. That is that when you came to the FO you were engaged as a lecturer at the defense college. Will you tell us a little bit about that engagement and whether the engagement as such had any significance from the intelligence point of view?

W: There is an agreement between the FO and the defense college that the FO will be responsible for lectures on the United Nations and the disarmament question, among other matters. When I came to the FO it was one of the FO's ordinary employees that was giving lectures on the disarmament question, but it seemed natural that I, who was to work solely in the disarmament field, had to take over those lectures. In practice it was Bureau Chief Wachtmeister and I that lectured, he on the United Nations as a general rule and I on the disarmament question. These lectures had no significance whatever from the intelligence point of view. As a lecturer at the college I could also listen to other lecturers. I did that when the more outstanding lecturers spoke at the college. The purpose of that was, as in many other connections, that I wanted to keep myself as generally and currently informed as possible. It may be said that that had an indirect effect on intelligence work, of course, since it contributed to keeping my knowledge at a high level. But it had no direct significance for the intelligence work, such as e.g. that I sent out whole lectures, which we sometimes were given in printed form, or that I took certain information from the lectures and sent it off.

S: Isn't it conceivable that the lectures furnished indications of publications and the like that you didn't know of, Colonel, but that actually did exist and so could be sent off to the Russians?

W: No, that didn't happen. Obviously many such things were mentioned, but I knew about them beforehand, generally.

S: In an earlier hearing you mentioned a speech that Police Superintendent Andermark gave at the FO, and now I should just like to ask whether you have any views on that speech that you didn't tell us about earlier.

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W: No, I have nothing to say about that except to refer to the special hearing we had on that point.

S: Before we close this FO chapter there are a few questions we ought to cover. I should like to ask you, Colonel Wennerstroem—you have a very wide acquaintance, haven't you, with embassy personnel from various foreign embassies? \* \* \* Does that have anything to do with your intelligence activity, or does it have an entirely different background? Would you give us a little account of that before we close, and also of anything about this that we may have forgotten about that we have never heard?

W: Yes, it is quite true that I have had a wide acquaintance with foreign diplomats. That was already so at the time when I was at the DHQ and it continued to be so during my period at the FO. As to the question of whether that has any significance for my intelligence activity, I will only say that like all diplomats and all FO employees, that whole crowd is there to get the best possible information, primarily in the political field but also of course in the military and other fields. And one can only say as a general rule that the wider circle of acquaintances one has and the better one chooses one's acquaintances the more information one gets. And it is plain that all that had a certain effect on my intelligence work. On the other hand it cannot be said that I had any special continuous contacts with any particular person. \* \* \*

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The hearing closed at 3:30 p.m.

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OFFICIAL RECORD OF HEARING OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM,  
3 DECEMBER 1963, BEGINNING AT 1:15 P.M.

Examiner: Rune Beckman. Witness: G. Brännemo

### THE AIR FORCE COMMAND

#### SCOPE OF THE HEARING

B: The hearing is intended to make clear to what extent the air force command, i.e. the air staff (AS) and the air administration (AA), served as direct sources of information for Colonel Wennerstroem in his illegal intelligence activity. For purely investigative and technical working purposes, the information furnished by Colonel Wennerstroem to a foreign power and emanating from the air force command has been divided into

(1) Information obtained by Colonel Wennerstroem through his own efforts of one kind or another, and by personal visits at the air force command, and

(2) Information that was turned over to Colonel Wennerstroem by the air force command on the basis of his official position e.g. at DHQ [defense headquarters].

It is the first type of information that will be dealt with at this hearing. The other type will be dealt with at hearings concerning e.g. DHQ. Certain exceptions to this general rule do occur because of circumstances which could not be foreseen at an earlier stage in the investigation.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### BACKGROUND OF THE AIR FORCE COMMAND'S SIGNIFICANCE AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION

##### 1. Final period in Washington

B: When and how did you learn, Colonel Wennerstroem, that you were to have the post of air section head at DHQ?

W: That happened by correspondence with the chief of the air staff in Stockholm. He first sent a letter, and that was as near as I can remember about a year beforehand, in which he informed me that I was to terminate my employment in Washington in June 1957. He said in the same letter that it was not yet clear what my next post was to be. Meanwhile there were certain alternatives, which were given

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in the letter. The posts were (1) chief of the training division in the air staff, (2) air attaché at London, and (3) chief of the air section at DHQ. It was also indicated in the letter that they would be glad to learn my personal preferences as to those three posts.

B: Did you have a chance or a possibility of discussing these various posts with your principal, the general, before you yourself gave your views on the various alternatives?

W: No, such discussion took place.

B: Did you yourself try to choose the alternative that you, with your knowledge of the general's wishes, might find to be suitable for your intelligence activity?

W: No, I did not, for I went wholly and entirely by my personal preferences. We had never talked about what I was to do after the Washington period, so that I had no idea of their attitude toward the whole thing, or whether I was to continue at all or not.

B: Can you state in a few words, Colonel Wennerstroem, what the personal considerations were that caused you to choose the post as air section head at DHQ?

W: Yes, I can. What seemed most attractive at first glance was to become Air attaché in London. It would have been quite an interesting sequence of attaché positions in Moscow, Washington, and London. But I had to consider that I had 4 years left until I reached retirement, in other words at age 55, and if I took London that would mean that 4 years later I would go home and go directly into retirement. I considered that awkward in that I would then have no opportunities to prepare for what I was to do when I was pensioned off, or at least not such good opportunities. Moreover it would not have been altogether suitable for my children, who in that case would never have had any Swedish schooling at all. And so my answer to the chief of the Air Staff was that as for London I didn't want it for the reasons that I have given. Then as to the two posts in Stockholm, why the Air Staff is known as an outfit where there is a lot of bustle and excitement in the work, while DHQ is known as an outfit where it is relatively quiet. And the general personal reflection came to me that for my last 4 years I would rather sit in a more or less quiet and pleasant job than a job with pressure and bustle. And then at DHQ I could keep up my acquaintance with the diplomatic corps, which both my wife and I greatly enjoyed. Thus it was entirely personal considerations that led to my choice of that post. The answer from the Chief of the Air Staff was that he was extraordinarily glad to have finally found someone that wanted to go to Headquarters, for all that he had asked had fought back tooth and nail; and so my wish was immediately granted.

B: Can you remember, Colonel Wennerstroem, when you last had a personal meeting with your principal, the general, before you left Washington?

W: The last meeting with my contact man in Moscow took place \* \* \* in the summer of 1955. I was home with my family in Sweden that summer on a so-called long leave.

B: To round out this part of the chapter, I should like to ask you whether you remember when you came home from Washington for good?

W: Yes, I remember; it was 20 June 1957 that I arrived at Goeteborg on the *Kungsholm*.

### 2. The time in Stockholm before 1 October 1957

B: Then the duties at DHQ were not to begin before 1 October 1957 and your vacation ended at the end of July of that year. What was it that actually happened with respect to your duties during the time before 1 October 1957?

W: The chief of the Air Staff had decided that the time I am now asked about should be used to orient me in the situation in the Air Force. I had not been home, you know, since 1948, and it was then 1957. There had been more or less a revolution in the Air Force during that time. In order that I might be oriented in the most effective way possible, I was to serve for short periods with various squadrons and wings and in the Air Staff.

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B: In that connection I should like to call attention to Air Force order B No. 61/1957, which in point 1 enumerates the various positions and times for Colonel Wennerstroem's preparation for service with the DHQ. What do you consider, Colonel Wennerstroem, can be called for in the way of pure knowledge for a chief of the air section at DHQ over and above what is required for an Air attaché in Washington?

W: Well, there is an enormous difference, since the man that is sitting at the Headquarters must be fully oriented concerning the whole situation in the Air Force, while for one who is abroad as Air attaché that knowledge has a certain significance but by no means equally great significance.

### 3. The early period with DHQ

B: We know from General Peyron's testimony among other things that he considered that there was a need of a closer bond between the Air Force Command and the Defense Department at the very time when you entered upon your duties at DHQ. General Peyron himself took the post of chief of the Air Staff on 1 April 1957. Did you take advantage of that situation to gain advantages with reference to your illegal intelligence activity? I am thinking particularly of the Friday meetings at the Air Staff and the directives handed down to division chiefs and the access to the daily lists and all that sort of thing, which was greatly facilitated by General Peyron's attitude.

W: It didn't come to the point where I was so to speak depending on a certain organization that furthered my intelligence work. The fact is that, with the situation as it was, I didn't think much about the matter, since I had had no meeting with my contact man in Moscow. That didn't take place until later. But it was quite simply that I was informed that it was necessary for cooperation to be established between the Headquarters and the Air Force Command in quite a different way from what had been the case previously. And it was quite simply stated that I quite simply was to sit in on e.g. those Friday meetings, and I was also to sit in on the briefings and analyses that were held for the so-called Group 1 among the personnel of the Air Force Command. In other words it was desired that I be to that extent in the know, so that they could ring me up and count on my being *en courant* when they took up Air Force Command problems.

B: When did you meet your contact man, the general, after you returned to Sweden after your service in Washington?

W: That was in the fall of 1957 after I had begun my work at the Headquarters. I believe it was—well, I won't say any definite time now, but at any rate some time went by before we met. I wonder whether it didn't run all the way to December.

B: Were you quite clear in your own mind, Colonel Wennerstroem, on what sort of opportunities the new job would offer from the intelligence point of view?

W: No, I was not. But by the time we met \* \* \* I was quite clear on that matter.

B: So that together with the general at that meeting in December 1957 you went through what sort of opportunities your new post might offer from the intelligence point of view?

W: Yes, we did.

B: And at that time you knew in a general way what it would involve and what the scope would be, etc.?

W: Yes.

B: Can we try to get straight on what the program was, so to speak, that you agreed on with the general at that time, or in other words what sort of standing assignments you received on that occasion from the general to look after?

W: It should first be observed that when we met \* \* \* the general in Moscow knew nothing about what sort of opportunities I had. The assignments that I took it on myself to carry out were therefore what we so to speak got together on \* \* \*. In other words he had nothing with him that had been said at Moscow.

The first thing we realized was that my opportunities for intimate contact with Americans at the embassy in Stockholm and with Americans that came on visits were very good. I therefore undertook to continue with those contacts and also as far as possible to maintain contacts with Americans which could be considered worthwhile whom I already knew in the U.S.A. or in other parts of the world. \* \* \*

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What next came up for discussion was the agreement reached between Sweden and the U.S.A. in 1952 concerning shipments of war material. That is the agreement that I also talked about in the final hearing on the FO. The agreement is called in English "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and Sweden." I gave a description of that agreement in the final hearing concerning the FO, and therefore I shall not repeat it here. What was important in that connection was that that agreement did exist and that the Swedish Armed Forces' possibilities had been growing the whole time that I was in Washington when it came to getting modern war material in America, or certain types of war material. At the time of that meeting \* \* \*, i.e. late in 1957, it was quite clear that excellent results could be expected from that agreement. And one consequence of that was that I undertook \* \* \* to follow up negotiations with the U.S.A. and try to get technical descriptions of a similar nature to what I had done with considerable success in the U.S.A. It might be said that these \* \* \* assignments were a direct continuation of what I had done earlier. In Moscow e.g. I had been on intimate terms with the American Ambassador, which had led to considerable results. In the U.S.A. I had obtained technical descriptions.

Then the conversation got around to matters that are more typical for Stockholm itself. Earlier they had not wanted to split up my work in such a way that I would do some general observation of NATO's military circumstances. They wanted me to concentrate e.g. in the U.S.A. on technical questions. Here in Stockholm, on the other hand, they wanted me to follow up as well as I could the intelligence material that came in concerning NATO. It was then that I received the instructions, which by the way are also related in the final hearing concerning the FO, which said that the intelligence activity vis-a-vis NATO was so well established and so good that they were in general acquainted with the whole situation, that is with respect to what bases there were, what military forces were at those bases, how those forces were armed and organized, etc. But they wanted me to concentrate on what came in concerning changes, proposed changes, in the situation, and also information about maneuvers. \* \* \* came to include an undertaking on my part to report what visits of the more prominent military and political officials took place between Sweden and the U.S.A., i.e. what Swedes visited the U.S.A. and what Americans visited Sweden. I had the same assignment during my time at the FO. In the final hearing concerning the FO I reported in great detail on a chain of events beginning as early as about 1950 that caused the Soviet state leadership to become suspicious of Sweden. I shall not report all that again here, but those were the circumstances that lay behind that assignment. To be brief, it was that Sweden officially had a neutrality line, but at the same time it was believed that quite close, secret, purely military relations existed between Sweden and the U.S.A. that were not consistent with the official policy of neutrality.

\* \* \* was to keep an eye on Sweden's official policy of neutrality. The background of that was what I have just mentioned. A certain contradiction was observed between Sweden's official policy of neutrality and certain other factors. They wanted me to report on whether any change was planned and whether there was any sign of possible change in Sweden's official policy of neutrality. I talked about that in more detail at the final hearing on the FO and won't repeat it here.

\* \* \* was to keep an eye on the development of atomic weapons in Sweden. It was considered to be in the Soviet interest that Sweden not develop her own atomic weapons and not accept such weapons from other countries. I had the same assignment while I was at the FO, and in the final hearing on the FO I developed the views on that matter in some detail. In this final hearing concerning the air force command it is obviously of interest to mention whether any part of this assignment took on special significance in that I got information from the air force command. I will therefore mention that assignment No. \* \* \*, namely to continue to get technical descriptions primarily of American but also of English material, was worked on in that way.

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The agreement of 1952, as I have mentioned, had the effect among others that we got specifications here in Sweden of modern American rocket and robot material.

B: Did the general at that 1957 meeting take up any questions concerning Swedish matters that he wanted you to investigate as one or more special assignments apart from the general operating line in view of the fact that you had now come back to Sweden and that possibilities were opened up for a new field that the general had had no opportunity to look into earlier?

W: No, nothing of that sort came up at that meeting \* \* \*. In explanation of that I must remind you that the general worked in the American sector and that I had consequently been teamed up with him during the whole of my Moscow and Washington periods and in that respect there was no change. That being the case he had no interest in Swedish matters and was probably only sketchily informed about them. To understand what happened later it is necessary to have clearly in mind that in all probability my contact man in Moscow was watching me quite jealously to see that my capacity was not laid claim to by anybody else. He, therefore, didn't want there to be any activity that concerned me that was not of direct significance for his sector that he was working with namely the U.S.A. and NATO. \* \* \*

B: I remember that we talked together earlier about a matter that also affected the significance of the air force command as a source of information; namely the fact that you kept your contact man, the general, informed about the development of your work at DHQ through personal reporting to him. Will you talk a little bit, Colonel Wennerstroem, about what sort of information might come up in that personal reporting?

W: Back during my Washington period I had begun to write letters, and perhaps sometimes letters that looked like summaries, to the general in Moscow, and I continued to do that all the time I was in Stockholm. Perhaps the letters actually became more frequent and full of information here in Stockholm. The purpose was to give a more personal description of my activity and also of my opportunities. I therefore talked freely about what different contacts I made one after another, both in Sweden and in the diplomatic corps and even, when I had any, a new contact or two abroad. And I also reported on how my day was spent in various aspects; I reported on various meetings I was in on, and perhaps I should say that I did this in order to let him know to some extent what relatively great opportunities I had. He in his turn got an advantage out of it, when he reported to the head of the intelligence service on the basis of it. Perhaps there was a little consideration of prestige that came into it, too.

### 4. Meetings with the general during the time after 1 October 1957

B: To facilitate our further discussion of the actual problem, Colonel Wennerstroem, I believe it would be a good idea for us first to go through when and where you met the general after you returned to Sweden from Washington. We have already touched on the first meeting, which probably took place in December 1957. \* \* \*

W: The next meeting was in March 1958 in East Berlin. The next meeting was in the spring of 1959 \* \* \*. After that another meeting in 1959 \* \* \*, in the fall. The next was in the fall of 1960, and it was divided up into three separate meetings, one in Leningrad and two in Moscow. The next meeting was in June 1961 \* \* \*, and later the same year there was another meeting \* \* \*, 26 November. The 1962 meeting was planned for June in Vienna. That meeting was canceled, however, and I later learned that my contact man in Moscow had been occupied with the first preparations for the Cuban affair and later moved to Cuba. The meeting was to take place in 1963 instead, still at Vienna. The time was not precisely fixed, but would have followed a suitable time after a trip that I was to take in Spain. Because of my arrest, of course, that trip never took place. What I have just said means that the last meeting I had with the general was in November 1961 \* \* \*.

B: Now that we have gone through these meetings with the general I should like to ask you, Colonel Wennerstroem, how and when your activity in general was affected by these meetings.

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W: The development took place quite clearly by stages, so that it is easy to answer the question. In the fall of 1959 \* \* \* purely Swedish matters came into the picture for the first time. \* \* \* I undertook at that meeting to furnish information about Swedish antiaircraft defense matters.

The next stage in the development was the \* \* \* meeting in June and that in November 1961. \* \* \* On this point, too, I have reported in the final hearing concerning the FO.

B: Did any of the other meetings come to affect the air staff in a similar way or to a slighter extent as a source of information?

W: No, the other meetings had no effect of that kind. By that of course I mean significance in principle. I don't believe there were any inquiries on matters of detail either, but I am not altogether sure on that point.

### *5. The time immediately after the meeting with the General in the fall of 1959*

B: Now when the general wanted to have information about our antiaircraft defenses, was it only necessary for him to give orders and did he then all at once get a good picture of the Swedish antiaircraft defenses as of the time in question? I ask the question in view of the fact that you in your work at DHQ had had a thorough runthrough on the Swedish antiaircraft defenses, and that you had at that time spent a couple of years at DHQ and among other things had had a course in February 1959 that served to inform you further for purposes of your assignment as chief of the air section at DHQ. Was it true, then, that he could get all at one time the knowledge that you had of the Swedish antiaircraft defenses, and that the picture was fairly complete?

W: It is quite obvious that I had no difficulties in quickly giving him a picture of the current situation. The picture was later completed little by little in various ways. You must bear in mind that in my work with the Russian general I filled a certain function. On the basis of that there were certain specific data that I could get and that him a picture of the current situation. The picture was later completed. My situation accordingly was not one where I sent in lock, stock, and barrel everything that might be thought to be of interest for anybody, but one where I just supplied what was connected with that function. And when it turned out that Swedish antiaircraft defenses had become of current interest, why then I could furnish information on that point. There were obviously masses of other matters that I was acquainted with, but that were not of current interest and therefore were never furnished.

B: Before we go on to talk about what it was that began to flow out in connection with that agreement in the fall of 1959, I should like to ask you, Colonel Wennerstroem, \* \* \* was it hard for the general to persuade you to take that step of supplying Swedish information?

W: It might easily be thought that at that meeting I was faced with a new problem and a big one, and that it would be particularly hard to make up my mind. That was not the case, however. At that time I had worked for 10 years in the Soviet intelligence service and at the same time had been engaged on a somewhat smaller scale in the American intelligence service. The problem as I saw it after those 10 years was exclusively the U.S.A. against the Soviet Union and NATO against the Warsaw Pact. I had begun my activity in 1948 and 1949 considering myself as an agent in the American intelligence system, and as incidentally an undercover agent in the Soviet intelligence system. The development later came to be such that my sympathies for the efforts of the one side and the other shifted so that after a certain time I considered myself instead as firmly engaged in the Soviet intelligence system and as an undercover agent in the American. The occasion for the shift in sympathies was that it became quite clear in my mind that the Soviet intelligence service was purely defensively oriented, while the American one was offensively oriented.

The Soviet state leadership had in 1949 and 1950 taken a very decisive and very bold decision. They had decided to stake everything on a rocket weapon with such great range that they could bring e.g. the U.S.A. under fire, and that rocket weapon was to be provided with nuclear warheads. To move toward that very high goal they

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were forced to delay development in a number of other military fields, military-technological fields perhaps I should have said. They thus consciously entered a period of weakness lasting through the fifties, and consciously took the risk so that in the sixties, if they survived the fifties, they would really be sure to get in a position where a real balance of power would prevail. The whole of the fifties, therefore, came to be characterized by a constant striving on the Soviet side to get hold by all means of technical information, so that by means of espionage they could get hold of what they were not capable of inventing and discovering themselves in the Soviet Union.

Politically that situation had the effect that they were constantly uneasy in the Soviet state leadership, foreign affairs leadership, and military leadership lest the U.S.A. make use of that position of weakness to make a preventive attack on the Soviet Union before the latter had succeeded in getting its intercontinental rockets and nuclear weapons ready and establishing a balance.

I came to feel myself a trusted member, I should like to say, of a very large team that was working to get through the fifties without a war, so that the sixties would come in and the balance of power would be a fact. The red thread in the Soviet thinking, one might say, was that the quicker they could achieve a balance of power, the quicker they would be able to get ahead with insuring world peace. What I have just said is neither particularly well thought out nor particularly well expressed, but I hope it will throw light on the attitude I had at the time of that meeting \* \* \*. I should like, perhaps in a somewhat slap-dash way, to outline my attitude as follows:

I brought out earlier that the Russian general in his capacity as a worker in the American sector had as good as no interest in Swedish matters. It is obvious that his attitude in that respect changed when \* \* \*. That of course changed nothing in the organization; he was still in the American sector and I was still working together with the general. That because e.g. of his interest in Swedish anti-aircraft defense he came to have a certain connection with the Nordic sector. I could of course understand. It was not that there were any inquiries of any importance, but that later every now and then a stray inquiry of very little consequence came through that obviously must have come from the Nordic sector, where they had asked the general to ask about a certain thing. If we take e.g. the report of the 1963 defense survey, which I did not send in, the general referred it to \* \* \*.

\* \* \* \* \*

### GENERAL

B: During the investigation you have indicated several times that you were compelled to make a selection of the material that was available. Will you explain once and for all why there had to be such a limitation?

W: It is quite obvious that any organization, whatever it is, has a certain limited working capacity. Even if the organization is large there is always a limit, and the Soviet intelligence service is no exception. Accordingly the main part of the resources there are put into the U.S.A. and a number of other important matters. Only a very small part of the resources are expended on e.g. Sweden. As a typical example of that let me take my reporting on Swedish anti-aircraft defenses. They wanted to have exactly the factual information they needed. They did not want e.g. studies of future conditions which would take endless time to read through and translate. There was no manpower for that. And as far as I was concerned, they wanted the sifting to be done by me and not by them, and that involved e.g. such measures in practice on my part, as let us say choosing 3 chapters out of 20—and then I sent along the table of contents. That way they could see what sort of selection I had made, and if they wanted more they could ask. And I was told many times that it was much better not to send in a document if I was not sure. It was better to ask first whether it was of interest, so as to save them the trouble of studying it.

B: The hearing is broken off at 5:10 p.m.

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(The hearing is resumed at the same place with the same examiner and witness December 4, 1963, at 9:50 a.m.)

B: It has been mentioned that it took a little training to pass rolls of film while shaking hands. Did some special training take place in that line?

W: Yes, we did that the first time in Moscow and the first time I met my contact man in Washington we went on and practiced a while. But that was more because he couldn't do it than because I couldn't.

B: So that no very advanced training lies back of that?

W: No, I can't say that it does, but I think two persons that have never tried it can't do that, since it is necessary to be able to do it even when other persons are standing around and they must not be able to observe anything. I know e.g. in Washington the delivery took place right in the middle of a room right before the noses of high-ranking American officers. And that can't be done without practice. There is a little technique of taking hold of it with the little finger and the ring finger.

\* \* \* \* \*

B: It has come out during the investigation that in Sweden before 1958 a whole lot of different robot projects were being worked on that were expected to be completed quite far in the future. In January and February 1958 the present commander in chief, General Rapp, together with a number of others, went to America and there opened negotiations concerning robot questions. The idea was obviously to try to buy into the American robot market, which up to that time had been impossible. According to the reports made by the delegation, what happened was that in the midst of the negotiations on that occasion the situation suddenly loosened up and the prospect was opened up that Sweden would be able to buy practically anything at all of the more conventional types of robot weapons in America. What first came up for discussion was apparently \* \* \*, but I don't believe they got any results with respect to that on the first visit.

Do you remember that first visit that General Rapp made to America? How do you look upon that development?

W: One might say that that development began back in 1952 with the signing of the agreement between the U.S.A. and Sweden, i.e. the agreement called a mutual defense assistance agreement between the United States of America and Sweden. That agreement was given the same title in the U.S.A. as the U.S.A.'s similar agreements with the NATO countries and some other countries, e.g. India and Japan. The purpose of the agreement was from the American standpoint to legalize the selling of war material to Sweden. The result, however, was meager in the beginning because it was hard to come to an agreement between the American Defense Department and State Department on how far to go in selling material classified secret. Those discussions went on the whole time \* \* \*. And what they hung up on most was precisely the robot field. Afterwards it was quite clear, one might say, \* \* \* that the Defense Department had declared that it was in the American military interest for Sweden's antiaircraft defenses to be strengthened, and therefore first-class antiaircraft defense material ought to be supplied to Sweden. The State Department on the other hand was more hesitant, and it took until 1958 before the two Departments got together, and that was what happened during General Rapp's trip.

B: Did you report that phase of development which occurred while General Rapp was over there to the Russians?

W: As concerns trip reports on the rocket field, what I did was to send in either the reports as they were, i.e. photographed, or else make excerpts from them. And that applies at any rate to the report we are speaking of. But I cannot remember now what sort of comments I made apart from the report, but in any case it is quite clear that my Soviet contact man in Moscow got the whole situation clear in his mind.

B: Now if we just consider your position in that particular robot development, it was, if I have understood correctly, of a very central nature, as you were to keep the department informed of developments. You were in on all the big briefings and all discussions on that subject after the various delegations came home to Sweden, were you not?

## 79 VBH - LINO

W: Yes. I am not sure that I was in on all the meetings, but in any case I got hold of all the documents in question.

B: If I have understood it correctly, it happened on several occasions that you talked with General Rapp about his visit in America and also with Flodin about what had been discussed and what the result was and what the hopes were for the future, etc.

W: Yes, I was so to speak in on the discussions the whole time.

B: If we follow that development, there was later a trip to the U.S.A. in the beginning of 1959, when General Rapp was there again, and at that time an agreement was written about the purchase of \* \* \*. My understanding was that the purchase took place on the basis of certain diplomatic, political considerations and agreements. Do you know about that?

W: Yes, I know about that; American law required that a certain codicil be added to the 1952 agreement, or else the material in question could not be supplied.

B: Did you report your observations concerning that political activity?

W: No, I didn't; I considered it unimportant, since the important thing was the 1952 agreement. I didn't want to report anything anyway until there was something they had asked for, and that was the pure technical information.

B: Now if we consider the later development, there was early in 1960 another and final trip, I believe, that General Rapp made, and at that time there was talk about \* \* \*. I believe they had the same difficulties then, too, and that there was also a certain political activity to make possible the purchase \* \* \*. How do you regard that situation? Did you report anything then?

W: No, nothing happened then, either.

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### OFFICIAL RECORD OF HEARING OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM, WEDNESDAY 8 JANUARY 1964

Examiner: Rune Beckman. Witness: G. Brännemo.

#### THE AIR FORCE COMMAND (SUPPLEMENT NO. 2)

B: In the hearing designated as "Air Force Command, supplement No. 1," held Tuesday 10 December 1963, we took up a great many different points for discussion. Point 2 was headed "Robots, etc." Under that point we discussed among other things trips to America made by the present commander in chief, General Rapp, and others for negotiations with the Americans on robot matters. There were three trips in question, and among other things you told us at that time, Colonel Wennerstroem, that the trip reports or other working documents drawn up after those trips had been the subject of transmission to your principal and that it is possible that those documents were supplemented by certain comments, which you sent along with those reports. Since on that occasion we had no access to any basic material which would tell us to what extent trip reports were made on those trips, we shall now take that matter up once more in order to get it clarified a bit more. As a background for what we are about to take up, you have had an opportunity to read through Air Director Sten Flodin's hearing of 7 December 1963 in which he discusses these very trips of General Rapp's to America, on which Air Director Flodin went along.

Colonel Wennerstroem, will you, against the background provided in the record of Air Director Flodin's hearing, give a somewhat more detailed account of what information and reports were sent off that are connected with these trips to America concerning robot questions?

W: To begin with I will say that Air Director Flodin sees this problem from a somewhat different standpoint than mine. We looked at it exclusively from the Swedish point of view; namely, that there is a progressing series of negotiations and it goes forward step by step. I in my intelligence activity didn't see it exactly that way. It was of no interest to see how the negotiations progressed. As I have said earlier in many connections, I never reported such matters before they were facts, i.e. the contract was known to have to have been

## 80 VBH - LINO

written. Then it was time to report. What I was watching in the current reporting, whether it was written reports or oral information, was quite other matters. In the first place it was of interest to see what enterprises in America had been visited and what was produced in those enterprises. In the second place it was of interest what officials of those enterprises they had met and what their quality was, so to speak, from the intelligence standpoint. These circumstances were reported, and were used by the Soviet intelligence service as supplementary information to the other, larger compilations that they had. As fast as anything new came in from me, their intelligence system in America was informed and they had a chance to go perhaps to some of the persons I had named. Then successive pieces of technical information, of less scope, were brought out, having to do with various robot systems, and they were reported, although the objective of course was to get hold of a regular detailed technical description. And that came later, toward the end of that series of negotiations.

B: \* \* \*.

Colonel Wennerstroem, you have now been in a position to study the content of these \* \* \* publications, and I will now ask you to comment on whether it can be these publications that were transmitted.

W: It is quite clear that the main content of these publications is the same as what I got at DHQ and sent off. As to quantities I can say that it approximately corresponds to what I seem to remember that I had before me then. What had come in to DHQ at that time was what I contemplated sending off to \* \* \*. Of course what came in to the headquarters at that time was fixed up in covers in a more handsome way than what we have here. I therefore can't go through these \* \* \* publications and say that this was there then and this perhaps wasn't there, because I haven't got that detailed a memory of it, for one thing because it was made up in a different format.

B: The hearing is closed at 3:15 p.m.

Stockholm as above.

RUNE W. BECKMAN.

### HEARING ON DECEMBER 23, 1963

MINUTES OF THE HEARING OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM,  
DECEMBER 23, 1963

Leader of the hearing: Rune Beckman. Witness of the hearing:  
K. E. Friberg.

(17 pages omitted)

B: It was, as we had mentioned earlier, a \* \* \* kind of flights, that Colonel Wennerstroem had come into contact with during the "FKE" (Defense Command Office)-time and that were those certain foreign air attachés in Stockholm, that had their own airplanes and who, when they wanted to use them, had to ask for permission through "FKE" in order to be able to carry out their flights.

Was Colonel Wennerstroem in contact with any of those flights?

W: Yes, with all of them in general.

B: Was this a condition which became the subject for a report?

W: No.

B: It has been of certain interest to learn how such a flight takes place as far as the Swedish point of view of control is concerned. When Colonel Wennerstroem learned that a similar flight was to take place and the permission for the flight was little by little granted, how was the flight checked, that it took place within the permissible territory? Were times and the air route, taken by the airplane, checked to see that it does not go astray, so to say?

W: Yes, there was no control on the part of the expedition command, but it was checked through the chief of the air force.

B: Does Colonel Wennerstroem know how the control was carried out?

W: Well, yes, there is of course a safety flight administration and a traffic administration in the building for the flight administration at Gaerdet, and there these things are checked in detail.

B: Is this done by leaving radio information at control stations on the way so as to enable them to watch and to follow the route of the plane?

## 81 VBH - LINO

W: Well, I have not studied these details closely, but—as it concerns all flights—I know that, when they start, they are to state and check their air route ahead of time, and then a statement is made to the effect, where they are to land and the calculated time for landing. And then, information is also received from the airfield where they land, when the landing has actually taken place. However, whether or not it is being checked that the plane, during its flight, is following the specified route by air, is something that I have not studied closely.

B: There is, finally, one more category of flights which may be of interest in this connection. That are the flights taking place within the frame of "Sve-Nor-Da" (Sweden-Norway-Denmark) organization. There is supposed to be an agreement between Sweden, Norway, and Denmark to cooperate within the aerial safety territory. This was the reason for various flights from these three northern countries on each others territories. Have you, Colonel Wennerstroem, had any contact with this aerial activity during the time you worked at FKE?

W: Yes, I have, because in case of a Swedish flight to Norway or Denmark, the airplane asked for permission for such flights, and that was received by the expedition command. We, then, in turn had a consultation with UD (Foreign Office) and after that consultation we gave our answer to the chief of the air force. However, when flights from Norway and Denmark to Sweden were concerned, the requests were made by the respective ambassadors directly to the foreign office. And they, in turn, then checked with the expedition command, and we checked with the chief of the air force.

B: Well, we know from what you, Colonel Wennerstroem, have told us earlier, that the Moscow party which gave you orders, had learned about this agreement, which existed between Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. We also know, that you personally, Colonel Wennerstroem, to start with, did not see any reason for casting suspicion on this organization and its purpose, while the Moscow party, giving orders, was rather suspicious of this activity.

How did this, later on, develop for you, Colonel Wennerstroem, as far as your contact with the general in Moscow was concerned?

W: As far as these flights are concerned, it should first of all be noted, that I transmitted the fundamental regulations drawn up for them. And the regulations drawn up were the same for all three countries. Thus, I personally had the feeling that it wasn't anything of any special peculiarity, but I had, consequently, stated what the conditions actually were. \* \* \*

B: Is there otherwise anything that you, Colonel Wennerstroem, wish to add prior to our finishing this hearing?

W: I can't see that there should be anything else.

B: Then we will terminate this hearing at 14.35 o'clock.  
Stockholm as above.

RUNE BECKMAN.

### MINUTES OF THE HEARING OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM ON THURSDAY, JANUARY 9, 1964

Leader of the hearing: Rune Beckman    Witness of the hearing:  
G. Braennemo

#### RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE (FOA)

B. This investigation is intended to clarify to what extent FOA has served as a direct source of information for you, Colonel Wennerstroem, in your activity of transmitting information to foreign powers. Can you, Colonel Wennerstroem, make a brief statement as to the way in which FOA has been of significance to you in this respect.

W: FOA has been of no significance at all, inasmuch as I have not received from that office documents, which would have been delivered in their entirety or partly.

B: Has it possibly been of significance in such a way, that you, Colonel Wennerstroem, through conversation with officials of the FOA, have received such information, which you then delivered in personal reports on your part?

W: No, that has not taken place either.

## 02 VBN - LNU

B: Has the party giving you orders at any time given you an instruction in some way connected with FOA, and which you, Colonel Wennerstroem, did not succeed in carrying out?

W: No, that has not happened either.

B: Before leaving this part, we shall discuss a number of circumstances, which transpired during the investigation and which would indicate that you, Colonel Wennerstroem, have been interested in information from FOA, but which, perhaps can be explained by you, Colonel Wennerstroem, in a different way. To obtain a more clear picture, I believe that we shall divide these circumstances according to different periods of time and talk about such things that have occurred during the Moscow period, during the Washington period, during the FKE period and finally during the foreign office period.

### *Moscow period*

If we start with the Moscow period, it has transpired that you, Colonel Wennerstroem, at that time made certain calls at FOA, and among others called on the present Division Chief Lundqvist and received information about \* \* \*.

### *Washington period*

If we turn to the Washington period, Division Chief Lundqvist states, that in the summer of 1955, you, Colonel Wennerstroem, once called on him at FOA. In connection with this call Lundqvist told Colonel Wennerstroem about certain conditions, which concerned a plan for the radar system of our air defense. He had at that time a document with the heading \* \* \*. He says that when Colonel Wennerstroem was ready to leave after this meeting, you, Colonel Wennerstroem, wanted to take the document with you. In the situation, in which we find ourselves now it would seem natural that Division Chief Lundqvist connects this event with a possibly illegal interest in information on the part of Colonel Wennerstroem.

Do you, Colonel Wennerstroem, remember these facts?

W: No, that I do not remember. But nothing illegal took place under my vacation in Sweden. In 1955, I was home for a so-called long vacation from U.S.A.

B: In other words, this incident has no connection with any illegal information activity?

W: No, it probably was so that I wanted certain information for my personal knowledge \* \* \*.

B: This extraordinary cooperation, which Lundqvist has emphasized, did it continue between Colonel Wennerstroem and FOA also during the Washington period?

W: That is something that I do not recall for the moment, since the order for \* \* \* came from the air force and not from FOA. But, on the other hand, I now remember, after some consideration, that I secured a great number of publications in the U.S.A. for FOA.

### *FKE period*

B: Well, then Colonel Wennerstroem came home again and we now reach the FKE period.

Did you, Colonel Wennerstroem, make any calls at FOA during the FKE period?

W: I cannot remember that I should have been there at any time during the FKE period.

B: It seems that the circumstances, connected with FOA during the FKE period do not, as a matter of an account, belong into this investigation. What, however, has been proven is that certain information has, as a matter of routine, been sent from FOA to FKE, and that should consequently be accounted for during the FKE investigation.

W: Yes, that is correct.

B: By the way, we can name a few examples of such things. It has been stated, among others, that Colonel Wennerstroem or possibly FKE has been sent a report written by Messrs. \* \* \*.

Was that a territory of interest that, you Colonel Wennerstroem, were to watch at that time for the party from which you got your orders?

## 83 VBH - LINO

W: No, during all these 14 years no orders concerned \* \* \* territories.

B: It has also been stated that FOA's 5-year plans were sent to FKE as a matter of routine. These 5-year plans explained everything of interest at FOA during the next 5-year period. These 5-year plans came out annually.

Have you, Colonel Wennerstroem, kept your party in Moscow informed of FOA's plans by giving them those 5-year plans?

W: As far as I remember, these 5-year plans were never sent to FKE, but they probably went directly to the division of the secretary of state. I have no recollection of having seen them, in general.

B: Finally, there is an incident which, to a greater extent, belongs into this investigation. Analyst ("Laborator") Moore at FOA keeps tract of all secret reports written there. He is in charge of some library or archives of such reports. He has stated that some time in the fall of 1961, he was visited by Colonel Wennerstroem, who asked for a qualified secret report, which discusses certain comparisons \* \* \*. That is the report which we have accounted for as handed out under the flight administration ("Flygledning").

He wants to assert that Colonel Wennerstroem called on him and asked for the report, but that he couldn't get hold of it, which Colonel Wennerstroem had been displeased with, and it was thus understood, that Colonel Wennerstroem instead went to look for the report at the office of the flight administration.

Do you, Colonel Wennerstroem, remember this incident?

W: I remember the report but I do not remember this incident at FOA.

### *The foreign office period*

B: If we now, finally, get to the foreign office period, then that period is dominated—as far as the work with FOA is concerned—by the fact that Colonel Wennerstroem now had a legal interest in FOA by your becoming a disarmament expert in the foreign office. This brought about a certain necessary cooperation with FOA. Director General Fehrm says that, while at a dinner given by the American naval attaché, a few days before Colonel Wennerstroem officially terminated his work at FKE, you, Colonel Wennerstroem, had proposed to Fehrm that you should work for some time at FOA, a month, for instance, in order to get an idea as to what FOA was, and what they were doing.

Do you remember this, Colonel Wennerstroem?

W: No, that I do not remember, but it is closely connected with my conversation with the minister of defense, since the question of all my work with FOA was not raised by me but was raised by the minister of defense and this was accounted for in the final investigation concerning the foreign office.

B: In case a proposal like this was made on your part, Colonel Wennerstroem, then it was based on a line of thoughts conveyed by the minister of defense?

W: Yes, just so.

B: What was the attitude of Director General Fehrm with regard to \* \* \*. Do you remember it at all, Colonel Wennerstroem?

W: Yes, I may say that the issue of a general order was intended, according to which my relations to FOA would be regulated. It is possible that this general order contained just what has been said here; namely 1 month's work at FOA. That I cannot now remember. But then the director general had said to the minister of defense that he preferred not to have any official papers concerning such appointments but that it should be arranged according to agreement instead. And that is just what I was later on told by the minister of defense.

B: It was mentioned, that this idea was to be carried out later on?

W: No.

B: Director General Fehrm also mentions a visit by General Westring, together with Colonel Wennerstroem, concerning the disarmament conference in Geneva. This call on him was supposed to have taken place on February 16, 1962. This visit gradually resulted in the decision that a special man from FOA should be appointed to keep up with the negotiations in Geneva.

Do you, Colonel Wennerstroem, remember any of the circumstances?

## 84 VBH - LINO

W: Yes, I do remember. As a matter of fact, when General Westring began occupying himself with the disarmament question, it was completely beyond his scope. I was then, for some time, occupied with giving him information. This call at FOA did also enter into that chain of events.

B: Who was the man, who gradually was appointed, from FOA, to keep up with the negotiations in Geneva?

W: Well, there were two of them. One of them was Research Engineer Prawitz and the other Analyst Eriksson. They were permanently assigned to the disarmament delegation.

B: Director General Fehrm also stated that in May 1962, Colonel Wennerstroem demanded to receive information from FOA, such as concerns the testing of nuclear weapons in America and the Soviet Union. This resulted in Fehrm sending over a report, it was an open report, which he sent directly to the foreign office.

What was your legal need, Colonel Wennerstroem, to be able to participate in the knowledge contained in this information?

W: Prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons was the principal question in Geneva. Practically everything circulated around this sole question. Of special importance was the significance of underground testing. What we, consequently, tried to find out from FOA was, what the points of view were that made this question so extremely precarious. But we never received any more or less worthwhile information concerning this matter.

B: Have we now entered a territory, which could have interested the party in Moscow giving you orders?

W: No. The only ones who know something about this, that are but the (sic) Russians and the Americans.

B: Fehrm stated that in August 1962, Colonel Wennerstroem expressed the desire to have his own contact man within FOA.

Was anybody like that appointed?

W: I do not understand what he means, since we already had two, Prawitz and Eriksson, at quite an early stage.

B: It seems that Colonel Wennerstroem wished to have a contact man for the activities at FOA in another direction than that of the two who were keeping up with the negotiations, and who, perhaps, were not always easy to approach at FOA?

W: Well, this is not correct. I do not remember this representation, but it must have concerned the fact that I was to telephone to a certain person, when Prawitz and Eriksson were in Geneva.

B: Was a person like that appointed? Do you, Colonel Wennerstroem, remember?

W: No, nobody was appointed.

B: Fehrm says, that some time thereafter Colonel Wennerstroem telephoned him and renewed his request for a contact man. Fehrm had asked Colonel Wennerstroem to define what it was you wished, and you, Colonel Wennerstroem were supposed to have answered that you wanted reports on the testing of nuclear weapons and on chemical means of combat.

W: Yes, this is true, because toward the end of my activity re the disarmament question, there arose the question concerning chemical and biological means of combat, but there was never even a chance for a start before I was arrested in June of last year.

B: There are no further circumstances that I would want to mention for your comment, Colonel Wennerstroem. Is there anything that you, Colonel Wennerstroem, remember, that could be of importance in this connection?

W: No.

B: The investigation is completed at 13.15 o'clock.  
Stockholm, as above.

RUNE BECKMAN.

## 85 VBH - LINO

RECORD OF THE INTERROGATION OF COLONEL STIG WENNERSTROEM  
14 JANUARY 1964

CONDUCTOR OF INTERROGATION : K. I. STENMO. WITNESS TO INTERRO-  
GATION : K. E. FRIBERG.

### FINAL INTERROGATION REGARDING MOSCOW PORTION

S: Colonel Wennerstroem, we have now reached the point where we think we are ready for a final interrogation regarding the so-called Moscow portion, which is regarded as comprising the period 1930-52 and as including the assignment to Moscow in 1940, the interim period 1942-48, and the second assignment to Moscow in 1949-52. At the start of the investigation you furnished a number of accounts in the main of similar character, which were entirely based upon the recollections which you were able to adduce upon the occasion of the interrogations. In the meanwhile, continuing investigation has contributed to endowing these recollections with further clarity, for which reason we shall try once more to run through the entire succession of events in detail.

At the basis of the final interrogation there lie on the one hand data earlier furnished by Wennerstroem, on the other interrogations of military and foreign office personnel, plus a number of reviews and conversations with Colonel Wennerstroem. During earlier interrogations Colonel Wennerstroem has declared that he was willing to furnish all information that might contribute to facilitating restitution of the damage which he had occasioned the national defense of the nation in general through his activity. At the same time he deliberately avoided furnishing information and data regarding persons or authorities who in his view are not relevant, on the ground that such data could not contribute to the work of restitution. Wennerstroem has, however, now been admonished not to maintain silence with regard to anything which can serve to throw light upon the entire evolution of the occurrences which led toward Wennerstroem's activity as an intelligence operative.

There has also been prepared for the final interrogation a special questionnaire form. If, however, the colonel's own avowals cover the questions posed, I shall not interrupt. We shall try to maintain consecutive narratives over the longest possible stretches. This final interrogation has been arranged in such fashion as to offer the colonel an opportunity to present a consecutive narrative for the entire period of activity defined by the delimitations laid down in advance. After that it is our purpose to shift to a more detailed treatment of diverse missions and episodes under the following headings:

1. Collaboration with the Germans.
2. Collaboration with the Americans.
3. Collaboration with the Russians.

In order to obtain adequate background for the colonel's first assignment in Moscow perhaps I may ask you, Colonel, to describe how you hit upon the idea of commencing to study the Russian language, and how events subsequently developed up to the assignment to Moscow in 1940.

W: The initial origin of the narrative which is to be set forth here may unquestionably be set so far back in time as the winter of 1930-31. At that time I was an ensign in the royal navy and had applied for pilot training at Ljungbyhed. This application was approved, and my training at Ljungbyhed was to commence in the spring of 1931. By reason of appointment conditions in the navy I was set ashore at the Karlskrona Naval Station during the winter of 1930-31. I was an instructor at the enlisted men's school there and I had several hours of instruction weekly. There were a great many unassigned hours, which invited study of some sort to fill up the time. That winter the officers at Karlskrona were offered language studies of various sorts. These were language courses arranged by the navy that you could sign up for officially. There were a number of different languages offered, and one of these was Russian. My choice turned out to be Russian. There was no particular motive for this choice. As I have said, it was for the most part a feeling that I ought to use my time in a sensible fashion that was back of it. At the same time I had an uncle, a brother of my father, who had a great deal of knowledge of Russian and interest in it, and he

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had on many occasions told me that, as a young officer, I ought to learn Russian, because I would presumably benefit by it in the future. It is possible that this was a contributory cause, but the upshot was in any case that I signed up for the Russian language course. There were many that signed up, but relatively few that completed the course.

As I have said, by reason of my unassigned hours I had plenty of time to study, and thus so far as I was concerned the outcome of the language course was decidedly good.

After the winter in Karlskrona and in accordance with plan came to the aviation school in Ljungbyhed and went through this, too, according to plan. After this there followed a series of various assignments in the air force, where I served as a pilot.

In the autumn of 1933 I was with the aviation wing [or flotilla] at Vasteras. The winter of 1933-34 was a winter when conscripts were called up only to a limited extent, and this brought it about that throughout the entire defense forces there were a whole lot of officers who had a great deal of free time, and on this account courses of various sorts were arranged. For my part I remembered the language course at Karlskrona and the fact that I had got a good mark out of it. Another part of the picture is the fact that that winter scholarships were being granted for language study abroad. So I sought such a scholarship, one that was granted under the auspices of the defense department and was to cover Russian language study in the Baltic States, and in my application I proposed that I should be allowed to study in connection with the University at Riga. My application was accepted, and this had the result that I spent the winter and furthermore a bit of the spring over the 1933-34 period. Thus I was in Riga exclusively for language study, but administratively I was attached to the Swedish mission in the city.

The way language study took place was that I lived in Russian-speaking families and sought contacts; for example, I was a member of a bridge club where Russian was spoken exclusively. The first family I lived with—this was in Riga—was arranged for through the offices of the mission. Later on I moved to another family that lived in Libau. So far as the language studies are concerned I need only note that they were naturally very effective and that the result could presumably be regarded as satisfactory.

My attachment to the mission in Riga, which was thus of an administrative character, came to have what I believe to be a considerable importance for my future.

In the first place it involved my coming to know the personnel at the mission: this, in turn, involved my being invited to visit, both by these persons privately and at large receptions at the embassy. This in turn, led to my coming to know other members of the diplomatic corps, and this again to my being invited by other ambassadors and members of other embassy staffs. In this way I entered the life of diplomatic society, and this was my first experience in the field. It is enough to say that I got along exceptionally well in this peculiarly individual form of social life.

In the second place I came into contact with the Swedish military men in the mission, and this led to my getting a glimpse of what I shall call legitimate intelligence service. This was the first time that I had a glimpse of this form of activity at all. And perhaps it will be enough if I say that it immediately aroused great interest in me. Perhaps I should add that the two representatives who were at the mission, i.e., the military attaché and his assistant, were jolly good fellows and very inspiring.

In the third place circumstances led to my getting a certain insight into illegal intelligence activity; for there was an American in the city, an American officer, who was studying Russian the same way I was. But he was actually an intelligence agent and very conversant with the Russian language, for which reason his language studies served mostly as camouflage for the illegal activity.

Even then, of course, they were trying in the West to get glimpses into the Soviet Union, something that was associated with considerable difficulties at that time, too. In Latvia there were certain setups which could perhaps be regarded as a peephole in the Iron Curtain. The frontier state of affairs between the independent Latvia of that

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day and the Soviet Union was complicated. On this account there took place frequent visits by military delegations, now Latvian ones that traveled across the border to Russian places, and now Russian ones that came over the border to Latvian places. At these meeting places there took place negotiations that dealt with border conditions in the overall sense, mostly border passes. Members of these delegations were military personnel from the border guard troops.

As for this American, he was in the British intelligence service, which may perhaps sound a mite peculiar. But one must bear in mind the fact that at that time there existed, practically speaking, no American intelligence service, whereas the British one was very active and had indeed been so for hundreds of years. Regarding this British intelligence agent I came to learn that, for 2 years, he had stayed in a secret boarding house on the French Riviera to be drilled in Russian and in Soviet conditions. After that he had become a special agent on Russian affairs, and as his first assignment he had received this assignment in Latvia.

His mission was to keep track of the delegation activity at the border and to try and get all the information that could be obtained in that way. Among other matters, through his good relations with the Latvians he was able to put on Latvian uniform and to accompany the delegation into the Soviet Union. I am telling about this in relatively circumstantial detail because I want to emphasize that these matters aroused great interest on my part, which is perhaps not so remarkable. In any event, it was the first time that I got the least idea, I can say, that such things as this really existed. Yet it was not only this British agent who had good contacts with the Latvians—as time went on it came to be true of myself. And it actually came to their offering me, if I cared to, to do the same as this British agent: namely put on Latvian uniform and go along on a trip into Soviet territory. It is of course perfectly obvious that this could have an adventurously seductive effect upon an officer about 25, but for my part I abstained anyway. I have wished to set forth these matters because I myself consider that it was here that my subsequently great interest in intelligence service was awakened.

S: The interrogation is interrupted at 11:30 o'clock for lunch.

The interrogation resumes at 13:20 o'clock.

Perhaps I might ask you, Colonel, to describe the 1934-40 period briefly. It was during this time that you transferred from the navy to the air force, and I think I recall that during this period there was also talk of your eventually being assigned as military attaché in London.

W: Yes it is right that during this period I transferred from the navy to the air force. The great development of the air force did in fact commence at that time, and all that were trained pilots were transferred over to the air force's rolls. In other respects this period is characterized principally by my having gone through the [service] academies then. I qualified there for so-called higher staff training, where I was in fact fortunate enough to matriculate with the best grades.

After the service academies I was assigned for service in the air staff. Upon the outbreak of war in 1939, and the state of readiness which was instituted then, I went into an air force unit, being transferred subsequently to the defense staff. It was there that I was asked whether I would like to be military attaché to London. Now we are up to 1940. There were various discussions concerning the post in London, and these dealt with various administrative affairs. Before these conversations were brought to an end it was decided that, for the first time an air attaché, should be assigned to Moscow. When they checked in the air force to see who knew Russian, it turned out that in that respect I was the best off, and I was then asked if I would like to take Moscow in place of London. And after further discussions, of administrative character as before, I said yes, thanks, to this last-mentioned offer.

S: Now perhaps we can turn to the assignment to Moscow, and I shall be grateful, Colonel, if you will start by describing how things were when you were assigned there, whether you were given any special tasks of legitimate character to execute, when you were assigned to Moscow, and what expectations in general were associated with the setting up an air attaché post in Moscow.

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W: It should be noted that at this time, i.e., the fall of 1940, the first Finnish-Russian winter war was over. The World War was started but the German-Russian nonaggression pact was still in effect. Thus Germany was at war in the West but continued to have peace in the East. This has its special significance, because there was accordingly in Moscow at this time a German Embassy with numerous and very active personnel. When I went out there were some special matters that were of particular interest for the Swedish intelligence service. First, at that time we knew very little about the Soviet Air Force. So they desired that so far as possible I should get what I could on its size and organization, etc. Further, they were very much interested in the border regions between the Soviet Union and Finland, regarding which they had poor map materials and poor reference books. So I was to get these things if it worked out. I may add that map material and reference books were of particular interest because they wanted to determine where a whole lot of newly built airfields were.

In addition they wanted to have a map base for a new Swedish mapping office that was then in process of being worked out.

S: Perhaps I may ask you to describe how matters were in Moscow when you arrived there—whether you had your family with you, how your service started, and how the course of events developed in general during the Moscow period.

W: Perhaps I should begin by remarking that I had just got married and brought my wife out with me. Thus I may say that we lived the normal diplomatic life of a family. I have been asked to specify what senior personnel were at the Swedish Embassy during this period. At that time he was not yet an Ambassador but a Minister, and it was Assarsson. His next man was the then Counselor of Embassy Nylander. The military attaché was Colonel Flodstrom. Then there was an attaché, and this was Ambassador Astrom as he now is, and finally there was a Mr. Reinius, who took care of administrative matters at the Embassy.

At this time the diplomatic corps in Moscow offered a very peculiar picture. In the first place there were the belligerents, which were divided into two blocs that did not associate with each other; namely the Axis powers and the Allies. Then there were the neutral powers, among which at this time the United States and Japan were also included. Regarding Japan one may say that they had very close connections with Germany and actually could almost be classified with the Axis powers. The United States occupied, as is always customarily the case, a more or less dominant position, and at that time the Americans kept a great deal to themselves, although there was a certain linkage with England. The Russians, for their part, had the non-aggression pact with the Germans, but it had come to the knowledge of the Russians that there was being prepared in Germany the so-called Barbarossa plan, i.e., the plan of aggression against the Soviet Union. So the relations between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union were nervous.

As a general characteristic of the state of affairs conditioned by what I have just described, one may say that a nervous threshold-of-war mood prevailed in Moscow. Things were further tangled because when there were large official receptions, the Russians invited both the belligerent blocs at the same time, together with the neutrals. If you consider the whole thing from the intelligence standpoint, as I shall of course do in this connection, it is obvious that it became extraordinarily muddled. In the first place the Germans, with various sorts of help from a number of other states, were picking up all the background they could that would be of value in working out the Barbarossa plan. In the second place the Russians were trying through the ambassadors to get hold of information dealing with what the German political leadership really had in view. In the third place there were two belligerent blocs, which of course were each trying to get information about the other so far as they could. In the fourth place there was the United States, which, with great resources as always, was trying to keep informed on everything, by

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and large. The whole set a very hectic stamp upon the life of the defense attachés. One may say that everybody asked us all about everything. There was a sort of information competition among the defense attachés. If you were attentive you could also see how some information items went round and round in circles.

For my personal part, it soon proved that this exchange of information items produced the best results with the German defense attachés in Moscow. Perhaps a little of the reason for this lies in the fact that since my youth I have spoken German fluently, and that consequently from the German point of view it may have been pleasanter to be with me than with a lot of others who were not masters of the language. In this way I got certain information from the Germans; they in turn got certain information from me. And from things that happened later I understand that some of this information was reported to Berlin with specification of my name.

During this period I tried to carry out my Swedish tasks as well as I could under the prevailing circumstances. Among other matters, this led to a trip to Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean. The main purpose for the trip was that I wanted to try to accumulate map material and reference books on the stretch that started in Leningrad and ended in Murmansk. As a more official-sounding task I proposed to visit a Swedish ship which was in Murmansk harbor at this time. The map material and the reference books that I got hold of were of a very valuable character, for the time. They were subsequently dispatched to Sweden and were used as the basis for the new mapping office that I spoke of above. But this also proved to be of importance vis-a-vis my German colleagues, because I had got hold of material which they had never managed to secure.

As a link in the exchange of information I let my German colleagues go through the material before I sent it home. As a consequence of this (quite obviously) valuable information I got in on the ruble procurement of the German military attachés; for at that time it was the case that in general there was no one in the whole diplomatic corps that bought rubles at the official rate; instead they were bought on the black market at various considerably lower rates of exchange, and there was all the time a constant hunt for ways of getting rubles as advantageously as possible. One may say that this was nothing noteworthy at that time—instead it was part of the atmosphere in Moscow, and it was tolerated by the Russians.

The Germans got exceptionally cheap rubles, but not through their own efforts—through the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, which in turn had a connection in Iran. And the Japanese had a courier who traveled to Iran at regular intervals and got rubles for the use of the Japanese and the Germans, and toward the end of this period for me as well. I mention this because I have been asked whether my activity out there at this period brought with it any special advantages.

S: May I put in a question here? Did you not develop any Russian or American contacts whatever during this period?

W: Naturally I had contacts both with Russians and with all sorts of defense attachés, but nothing of a lasting character of that had any significance for the future. I also want to recall what I said earlier about the Riga period, namely that my interest in intelligence service was awakened then. The description I have now given regarding things in Moscow at the beginning of the 1940's may perhaps afford an indication of how fascinating a drama of intelligence service one was then observing. For my part personally I may say that this contributed very powerfully to heightening my interest in this activity.

S: One may well say that your collaboration with the Germans was perhaps really a start on pure intelligence service?

W: Yes, one must of course make a distinction between legal and illegal intelligence activity. What I did during the Moscow period was of course, we may say, legitimate intelligence service, because what was involved was an exchange of information that everybody did. Yet one can put the matter by saying that there was—as in Riga—a tinge of the illegal intelligence activity which was to develop later.

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S: Your first period of service in Moscow came to an end, if I am correctly informed, on 10 March 1943, and you returned at that time to Sweden. May I ask you to describe where you were assigned upon your return to Sweden, and how things developed in Sweden upon your return here? In the rundowns we have had you have in fact said that the contacts with the legations that you had established in Moscow were resumed to a certain extent here in Sweden, although not with the same persons. But there were some contacts that were a sequel to the activity in Moscow.

W: When I returned to Stockholm in March 1941, it was naturally with the idea that I should stay at home for some time and then return to the mission in Moscow. But in the meanwhile international relationships developed in such a way that people thought it was undesirable to have more than one officer in Moscow. Therefore until further notice I was to remain at home, but it should be noted that I preserved my posting as air attaché. This, however, involved my again being brought for service into the division in the defense staff where I had been previously, one which at that time was called the flight operations division. Subsequently war broke out between the Soviet Union and Germany, and the question of any return for me became not at all realistic. In the division where I served I was busy with intelligence service, thus continuing. But here there was no longer involved the acquisition of information, which had been my task as an air attaché. Here, instead, there was the processing of incoming information. Thus here I came into contact with another side of the intelligence service which, under the war and preparedness circumstances of that time, was particularly interesting. I mention this in order to indicate that my intelligence interests once more got a considerable shove forward.

As regards my contacts with the diplomatic corps in Stockholm at this time, one should recall that I continued to be accredited to the Soviet Union as an air attaché. This automatically involved my being on the invitation list of the Soviet mission in Stockholm. On these occasions, then, I met a whole series of other members of the diplomatic corps, and this very rapidly involved invitations to other missions. And as is ordinarily the case if one is interested in participating, I too came very quickly into the swing of things. Perhaps it is worth emphasizing in this connection that there were personnel belonging to the Soviet Armed Forces that were interned in Sweden. They were assembled in various camps, and it sometimes happened that the Soviet Minister in Stockholm at that time, the very well-known Madame Kollontay, would visit these camps. I was on these occasions among the officers who had the assignment of accompanying Madame Kollontay on these visits. So that was still another link with the Soviet Embassy.

As regards my contacts with other missions than the Soviet one, I should point out that the liveliest association came to be that with the Germans and the Americans. Here the association with the German defense attachés in Stockholm is of particular interest. It was naturally the case that upon the outbreak of war the personnel at the German mission in Moscow had left the country and returned to Germany. But evidently some information had been passed from these former defense attachés in Moscow to the German defense attachés in Stockholm, because they got in touch with me very eagerly to try and get worthwhile information from the Soviet Union, and this was particularly the case in the early phase. It should be noted that during this period no activity that you could really call illegal came up, my being installed as an agent by the Germans or anything like that. There was lively association with both Germans and Russians, and indeed in my regular service I was engaged with intelligence, and among other matters, with intelligence from Russia. This brought it about that in my conversations and my association with the Germans I passed on certain information which were not of such importance that I can even remember today what it was. But part of this was evidently reported to Germany with specification of my name. So far as I can now recall, it must have been some information which I got through my knowing Madame Kollontay pretty well that brought people to take note of my name in Germany.

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Now we come to an organization which was called by the name of Gehlen and which is of active interest in a later connection as well: for when the war with the Soviet Union started there was organized in Germany a special organization to bring out intelligence from the Soviet Union and to process it. The leader of the organization was a German general of the name of Gehlen, and that is where the organization also got its name, the Gehlen organization. It is obvious that they took over all the intelligence material that the former mission in Moscow had accumulated, and that the intelligence system they had existing in the Soviet Union at that time had gathered. Evidently my name came up there, and this led, as I have said above, to the name's being pointed out to the German personnel in Stockholm. The final result of this was that my name came up in the names lists of the Gehlen organization, not as an agent, but as what they called a "valuable contact."

S: Was it not at this point in time that you also started working as a military aviation contributor to the newspaper Stockholms Tidningen?

W: Yes, that's right; it started in 1940 and continued on till January 1949, before my second Moscow period commenced.

S: Did not this sort of military collaboration during the war involve a certain intelligence acquisition activity as well, in that for example you utilized your contacts at the missions in order to secure further information that was of interest when writing in the newspaper?

W: Yes, that is altogether right. As a collaborator in a newspaper one was concerned to bring forth the completest and most interesting possible material which could be published. And it is altogether plain that my active contacts with the diplomatic corps also had this background.

S: The circumstance that you had a certain need to ask questions in order to secure information presumably involved, in turn, your having to furnish information yourself. May this not have contributed to the boundaries between what was legal and illegal gradually being blotted out?

W: Yes, first as regards my collaboration in the press, one can hardly say that it was of any special significance. It only meant being present as often as possible, talking with as many as possible, and hearing as many conversations as possible, in order to get better and better bases for what one wrote. And as regards the activity in general, it is quite plain that it might on many occasions be difficult to distinguish between what was really confidential and what was not confidential. One can naturally say that the boundaries were blurred in a whole lot of cases, but I shall return to what I said earlier, namely that in any event there did not occur any conscious illegal activity during this period.

S: You have now described the contacts that you secured upon your return from Moscow, and from the investigation we have undertaken it has transpired that you had a great many contacts with the Germans Grassmann and Liebenau, among others, and that your acquaintanceship at the Russian Embassy included Nikitushev, among others. There is perhaps no reason for us to go into these matters in further detail, but you can, I am sure, confirm the correctness of these contacts—there were surely associations both of private nature and of official nature.

W: Yes, that is quite right. These are three names that came up among perhaps a hundred others for this time.

S: Perhaps I may ask: How long did the collaboration with the Germans continue? Presumably they gradually faded from the picture by reason of the evolution of the war.

W: Yes, the relationships which I have described just now held up until the fall of 1943, when I left Stockholm and there was a break in these various sorts of connections.

S: When you left Stockholm, that was when you were assigned to Satenas.

W: Yes, that is right. I was assigned to the wing at Satenas in West Gottland on 1 October 1943.

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S: Now we have come as far as 1943, when you were assigned to F 7 [Aviation unit 7] in Satenas. In the earlier discussions you have told us, Colonel, that you then came into contact with the Americans in a certain measure by reason of certain circumstances. Won't you develop these in this connection in a little more detail?

W: I served with the flight wing at Satenas from the fall of 1943 to the fall of 1945. The thing that was noteworthy during this period was that Satenas was the place of assembly for the American bombers which had made forced landings in Sweden. At that time the bombing raids over Germany were going on, and the American air arm had signalized Bulltofta as the forced landing field in neutral territory for the bombers which were damaged over Germany and could not as a consequence return home, i.e., to England. Under Swedish military auspices there was created a special organization at Bulltofta, which received these planes and took care of the crews. Subsequently what happened was that the planes were put in shape and were flown from there by American crews to Satenas. When this happened there was an observer officer from Satenas along in the plane. I served on many occasions as this sort of observer officer. At Satenas the American crews were kept, in order to put the plane in shape so that it could be parked and protected from the effects of weather and wind, and then the crews left Satenas. The ones that flew these planes were American air officers who were stationed in Stockholm. I of course came to be acquainted with these men at this time. This is perhaps not of so much interest for its own sake, but it produced a reaction later when I came to Stockholm, because these officers that I knew were there.

S: Then perhaps we can pass over to the return to Stockholm in the fall of 1945. You were then placed in the Defense Staff, or perhaps it was the Air Staff, and you also became a member of a number of committees in connection therewith. May I ask you to tell us about the time immediately after 1945 in a little more detail?

W: Yes, it is right that I returned to Stockholm in the fall of 1945, and I was placed in the Air Staff and had the duty of taking part in three different committees. The most important was the Defense Committee that was sitting at that time, and then there were two lesser committees. My task in the Defense Committee was twofold. One part was to accumulate intelligence material from abroad which had importance in throwing light upon certain matters. So here it was intelligence service which came into the picture once more. The other part of my task related, for example, to contact with the press and a whole series of other publicity matters. As regards the diplomatic corps in Stockholm, the association came very rapidly into operation in the same fashion as earlier. It was the American and the Soviet Embassies which, so to speak, constituted the entrance gates. The American one came into the picture in that I knew officers there from the Satenas time, and as regards the Russians I continued, when I came up, to be the accredited air attaché, so that invitations thither continued. To be sure, after a certain time my attachéship to Moscow lapsed officially, after having actually come to an end in practice earlier. But this made no difference, for I was then already in diplomatic life, and the invitations to the Russian Embassy continued as before. It was just as when I was describing the 1941-1943 period, that these associations, which commenced at the American and Soviet Embassies, quickly spread over the majority of the other embassies.

Shortly after my arrival at Stockholm I was also given another task, namely that of accompanying foreign defense attachés on the trips which were arranged for them. A lot of visits of this sort took place in the Air Force. Officers who could be regarded as suitable by reason of their language knowledge, among other matters, were chosen. I was selected primarily for my knowledge of Russian, and my principal task was to take care of the Russian defense attachés, although this applied also to the Americans to a certain extent. Thanks to this I came into very active contact not only with the Americans, whom I had known before, but also with the Russian defense attachés. They got used to its being me that always took care of them when they were out, and this naturally increased the association with the Embassy in general.

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On the occasions when the Soviet attachés visited the air command—this was not so often, but it did happen—it was again I who had to accompany them and to serve as interpreter insofar as might be necessary. The Soviet air attaché in Stockholm was on a visit to General Nordenskiöld on one such occasion, and accordingly I was present. During the visit General Nordenskiöld asked whether the Soviet air attaché did not believe it was possible that a Swedish air officer might be present at some major air review in Moscow. And the reason for this was that we had no air attaché in Moscow. And it would not have been of equal value to send an army or naval officer in to such an exhibition. It would be more valuable if one could send an air officer across specially.

S: May I put in a question here? The Soviet air attaché you have spoken of, Colonel, it was Rybachenkov?

W: Yes, it was. And further General Nordenskiöld remarked on this occasion that Rybachenkov was to be invited to an exhibition at Bromma, when we should show our new jet planes for the first time. In consequence of this conversation the Soviet air attaché got in touch with Moscow, and as time went on the upshot was that there arrived an official invitation through the Soviet air attaché, in which it was said that a Swedish air officer was welcome at a great aviation show outside Moscow, where they for their part should show their jet planes for the first time. It was then decided in the air command that I should be the air officer who should be designated.

In any event, at that time it was something that drew a great deal of attention that a Swedish air officer should manage to come across to Moscow in this way, and it was very quickly known among all those who were interested, and thus naturally also among the American defense attachés as well. This was indeed all known long before the show took place.

As I have said earlier, my association with the Americans was active, and on one occasion when I was in company with—presumably invited in by—the American air attaché, he had in his company a person dressed in civilian clothes who did not belong to the American Embassy in Stockholm. It turned out that this person was employed in the American intelligence service.

Now there entered the picture once more the German Gehlen organization, which I have spoken about earlier. After the war, quite naturally, the German Gehlen organization was dissolved, but through the general's seeing to it there was accumulated and hidden away a great deal of written material, so that it might be possible to set up the organization again. From General Gehlen's point of view this proved to be a fine prospect, for the following reason.

During the war it had proved to be the case that the American intelligence service by no means measured up to the requirements which were set it, and this came about through the circumstance that before the Second World War they had no real intelligence service in being, which worked year after year in time of peace. When war comes it is too late to gather information. On this account the United States resolved to organize an intelligence service which was to meet the requirements on which they had fallen short during the Second World War. This intelligence organization was on an extraordinarily large scale, and naturally enough it came to be directed in large part against the Soviet Union. So for a starter they called in General Gehlen, who was to be a counselor when the organization was built up from the ground. And subsequently events developed in such fashion that the Gehlen organization was in certain respects reconstituted in Germany, and the old records were brought out and followed as guides. As I said earlier, my name was among those on some of these lists or records, and I had been set down as a "valuable contact." All these facts were known to the American that I had been brought into contact with in Stockholm, and he gave an account of everything that I have just told you about. Naturally it was decidedly uncomfortable to learn in this way that one's name had been rambling around and wandered into Germany, and then drifted across the Atlantic, and then strayed back into Europe and most recently to Stockholm. He thus presented the case in the sense that I had in this way become known as more or less of a Russian expert, and among other matters he was acquainted with the upshot of my trip to Murmansk.

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He further pointed out that I had hitherto worked, so to speak, against the Soviet Union and in favor of Germany, and on that account it would surely be quite natural that I should now do the same thing for America. He had also a special mission that he brought up and wondered whether I would care to help him with. He had received information about my upcoming trip to Moscow, and I was entirely neutral and might consequently be reckoned to have great opportunities for moving about freely. \* \* \*

He also referred to my friendly connections with the Americans, which had indeed commenced at Satenas and had been developed in Stockholm, and he also referred to the intimate association that prevailed between the occupants of the higher posts in the air command and the American air attaché of that period.

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Then the trip to Moscow went off in regular fashion, I traveled via Helsinki and Leningrad to Moscow and later on back by the same route. I was not shadowed, at least not during the whole time in Leningrad, \* \* \*. In Moscow I took part in the show and at that time I was placed among the defense attachés in the diplomatic corps in Moscow along with a couple of other foreigners who had been invited in the same fashion as I had.

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The show was very interesting, and the promised jet planes were shown too. During the Moscow stay nothing of note occurred. The days that I was there I lived at the Embassy and had no particular contacts other than that I chanced to be invited twice to the American Embassy along with Swedes. But no other contacts took place. Then I returned to Stockholm and delivered a lecture before the air command on what had been shown.

So I have mentioned here how I had a contact with the American intelligence establishment. I should like to emphasize that this was a one-time occurrence in Stockholm and that it was not repeated before 1948, immediately before my departure on my second assignment as attaché in Moscow.

S: It was at this point that you received the assignment, from someone, of writing a memorandum on Russian legal intelligence service. Can you recall this memorandum, Colonel, and can you recall who it was that issued the order that it should be written, and generally speaking furnish a little information on what lay back of this and how you had secured the unquestionably good information which is found in this memorandum?

W: I remember this memorandum very well, since I have had the opportunity to see it. I drew it up at the bidding of some one of the top men in the air command, but I cannot recall which one of them it was. Nor can I recall where the memorandum went, but I take it for granted that it went to the defense staff. At this time, of course, I was—at any rate, within the air force—a specialist on Russian matters, which arose from my assignments in Moscow, among other matters. But the attaché trips, and my frequently long-lasting association with the attachés that arose from them, also contributed to this. It was regarded as desirable that I should try to assemble my impressions which bore upon the subject matter referred to.

Finally, the question as to how I could get the material for this memorandum. I should like to remark that if one is subjected for many, many hours to questions, one can surely, if one concentrates upon it, gradually work out why it is that these various questions are being posed. You can't do this in a day or a week—it does take a considerably longer time. One must try to recall, when a question is asked, what they have asked of a similar character perhaps a week or perhaps a month ago. And if you keep on conscientiously in this way, you form a very decent picture. This is particularly the case if one is sitting in boredom hour after hour in a train and the time must be passed in conversation. During the winter of 1947-48 I was assigned to a language course which had been set up in the air force. This, then, was an assignment which went on concurrently with all my other duties.

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S: Was this a purely military assignment, and if that was the case, were there others besides yourself that were assigned there?

W: Yes, it was a purely military assignment, and the intrusion took place in the air command in Stockholm. I was not alone, but we were very few. I do not recall exactly but the question is whether we were more than two or three. I don't believe so.

S: The interrogation is broken off at 19:25 o'clock.

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(The interrogation was resumed on Thursday, 16 January 1964, at 13:25 o'clock at the same place with the same conductor and the same witness.)

S: When we last broke off the interrogation you had said, Colonel, that there had been no further contact with this American contact man who had given you an assignment in connection with the Moscow trip, and that there was no further contact with the Americans before 1948. Does this imply that you had no contact with the American attachés either, or was the state of affairs such that these attaché duties continued in the same fashion, so that you had contact both with the Russian and with the American military attachés?

W: My ties with the American and the Soviet Embassies in Stockholm continued in the same fashion as hitherto. So the contact that I had on the American side with a special intelligence man that visited Stockholm had nothing to do with my relations with the American Embassy in other respects.

As regards the Soviet Embassy, I remarked in an earlier connection that I had come to know Madame Kollontay, i.e., the Russian lady Ambassador, very well indeed. Toward the end of this period, thus at the end of 1947 and in 1948, in analogous fashion I came to know the Russian Ambassador who came after Madame Kollontay; namely, a man whose name was Chernyshev.

S: From our earlier conversations and the discussions we have had, I have received the impression that several times around this period there arose a need for developing closer contact with Rybachenkov for some reasons that I should like you, Colonel, to go into further detail about now.

W: Yes, that's right. At the beginning of 1948 there was discussion of my going out for a second time as air attaché in Moscow. Now by the way it is by no means certain that what is proposed will be accepted by the Russians. We have examples of the contrary. For my part, I had been there once earlier, and I had also been in the Baltic area earlier, and I had been in Moscow in 1946. But of course it was not known what the Russians might have as indices, so to speak, regarding me as a person arising from these visits. Perhaps they were of such a sort that they would not want to have me as air attaché for a second time. On this account I was encouraged to make use of my good relations with Rybachenkov, i.e., the Soviet air attaché, so far as possible, in order that he might build a bridge for me in Moscow, if I may put it that way, so that when the inquiry was made, it should actually be the subject of a favorable reply.

S: Who was it that encouraged you to do this?

W: It was General Nordenskiöld, who was chief of the Air Force at that time. The upshot of this was that when the inquiry came to Moscow I was accepted as air attaché for the second time. And it is quite believable that the fact that Rybachenkov had presumably spoken of this had been of some significance, likewise that I had had good relations with Ambassadors Kollontay and Chernyshev.

My appointment as air attaché, the official one I mean, came very late indeed, as is of course always the way in cases like this. In the meanwhile, however, it was quite generally known that I was on my way to Moscow. And in any event it was of course known in the Air Command and in the Defense Staff. I was also urged to prepare myself in good time for the discharge of the tasks I might be given, and in general to make ready in all respects that were pertinent. Among other matters, this involved my commencing to inquire in the Aviation Administration what technical information was desired from Moscow. I should add that all this was hedged about with extremely

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great interest, because now we were to have a permanent air attaché in Moscow, along with the two others that existed, i.e., in Washington and in London.

It was then that my contacts with the Aviation Administration commenced, and there gradually grew from them certain missions for which I was to prepare through preliminary technical studies. Among other matters, I had repeated talks regarding these questions with a colonel who was then serving in the Aviation Administration. I should now like to hark back to the encounter I had in 1946 with a representative for the American intelligence service. He had revealed certain things which among other matters related to lists of names from the Gehlen organization. And I said there in conclusion that this contact with illegal American activity was a one-time phenomenon for the Stockholm period, with the exception of one thing that happened in 1948. Bearing in mind what happened in 1946, it was natural that I should believe there would now be some similar contact. For it was well known that I was going to the Soviet Union again, that is to say 2 years later. \* \* \*

[A major omission here.]

When we had run through all questions of technical nature in our conversation, and by that I mean for one thing this \* \* \* and for another what I needed for my activity on Swedish account, the conversation then entered into other matters as well. It then came up that to all appearances he had likewise other interests in this field than \* \* \*, for he brought up a question which has to do with major international espionage, so to speak. The things that go on in this field between the great powers and out in the world were then very little known, and I believe that they continue to be very little known here in Sweden, with the exception of one specialist or another. What we have here is gigantic intelligence organizations that are fighting each other. We mentioned the Gehlen organization earlier, and how it had been absorbed into the American one, and merely as an illustration one may remark that as of today the Soviet intelligence service comprises a minimum of 150,000 persons and the American one about 100,000 persons. It is possible that the figures in 1948 were not so great as that, but the organizations were very large in any event, even though they may have grown since then.

Then there are of course a swarm of other organizations that it would take too long to go into.

In the fight between these organizations a lot of different methods were used to secure the information one wanted, or to get at the antagonist. One of the things that came up was the so-called double agents, and it is perhaps a little better known, at least by now, that this is something that exists on a decidedly large scale. Among the category of double agents there is also a special form of double agent, where one side has an agent whom they try deliberately to place as an agent on the contrary side, naturally without the contrary side knowing anything about it. And this is regarded, now that we are moving within the intelligence world, as the most advanced and most dangerous form of agent work both for the agent himself and for the two parties.

It was this last relationship that \* \* \* brought up in our conversation. It took the form of his wondering whether I had developed any ideas or information on how the Russians behaved when they sought to recruit agents. In this field, with the experience I then had, I had naturally heard a great deal. And I told him about what I then knew.

So it ought to be noted that there was never any question here of his wanting me to try this, but instead his aims with regard to me were concerned exclusively with help on \* \* \*. I myself do not know what he wanted to have this information for. The great importance of this set of circumstances lies, however, in the fact that there was awakened in me the idea of trying something of this sort myself. In my special situation and with my special interest in this field, which has been very plainly documented in what has gone before, it is perhaps not so remarkable that my interest in trying something of this sort on my own was aroused. In my own thoughts it was a strong contributing cause that I realized I stood very well with the Russians,

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thanks particularly to my connections with Madame Kollontay and with the then Ambassador Chernyshev, and when the opportunity then came for my posting to Moscow I realized that in any event so far as they were concerned they had nothing against me as a person.

S: In what way were these plans now converted into reality? The interest that was aroused through this discussion surely assumed shape in one fashion or another?

W: Yes, gradually I made up my mind to make a try in this direction, and it came off in Stockholm before I set out for my service in Moscow. And it was with the above-mentioned Rybachenkov that I made this contact, and it took place in the fall of 1948. I think it was probably in October. The way things were at that time was that people were already uneasy about base building in various quarters as a harbinger of future American activity. Also part of the picture is the fact that all airfield building, that is the building of new airfields, was something that was suspect from the Soviet point of view. Another thing is that airfields were being expanded, and new airfields were being built, in Sweden at this time. In my earlier association with Rybachenkov he had of course been accustomed to ask me questions over a number of years, and through his doing so it had just very recently become apparent that he was interested in a certain airfield that was under construction at that time, in 1948.

S: Can you remember what sort of an airfield was involved here?

W: No, I can't recall that now, but I have a faint recollection that it was one of the airfields in Uppland, but my memory is very vague on that point. I took advantage of this situation and gradually brought the conversation around in such a way that he asked me about this airfield again. I had determined to give him an answer which would appear to be a jesting shrugging-off of the question, but which might also be regarded as an invitation. And it was on this occasion that I answered, as I have said in earlier interrogation, "Well, if this about that airfield is so important I will tell you what I know for 5,000 crowns." I recall that Rybachenkov evidently did not know how he should take my remark, but finally he did come to himself and said something to the effect that "well, I'll find out about it." The immediate upshot of the conversation was that Rybachenkov suddenly went home to Moscow. I did not attach much importance to his going home to Moscow, and I almost forgot the whole story more or less.

Several weeks passed, meanwhile, and then Rybachenkov came back. We then met for the first time at one of the big cocktail parties that were given in the diplomatic corps, and on this occasion he came up to me and said, "The thing is OK." The next time we met was a lunch. It was a men's lunch, because I was alone and he was alone. After lunch it worked out that Rybachenkov offered to drive me home to Lidingö where I lived. I accepted, and so we drove off as we had said. When we came to my house in Lidingö, I got out of the car and said goodbye and thanks for the lift. At the moment the car was driving off, Rybachenkov pressed into my hand a packet, and disappeared without comment. This packet proved, upon investigation, to contain 5,000 crowns. I recall that when I came up into my apartment and then checked the contents of the packet, highly conflicting feelings arose within me. In a fashion it was satisfying that I had succeeded in my purpose and got at least a foot, so to speak, into their organization. But on the other hand it was entirely clear for me that I was setting out on the most dangerous thing that one could in any wise imagine within [the field of] intelligence service.

W: The final upshot, however, was that I decided to continue on the way in which I had started.

S: Surely here it is of very great interest to learn how this developed. Rybachenkov naturally was now in the clear as to your being willing to collaborate, but this was not followed on the one hand naturally by a delivery of the map, but of course also by some instructions as to how the cooperation was to continue?

W: Well, nothing much of that sort happened in Stockholm. The next phase in these developments was that I delivered a map, which was of a very sketchy character with just a dot where the airfield in question lay, and no further explanations.

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In addition we reached an agreement regarding a meeting in Moscow after my arrival. I didn't get clear as to who I was to meet, but instead the conversation took the form that Rybachenkov asked me whether I was willing to meet one of my old acquaintances after my arrival in Moscow, and when I declared I was willing, the details were settled upon.

S: In earlier interrogations there has been talk on a couple of occasions about a code of instructions to soldiers or the like, which was supposed to have been delivered at this time, but when you have examined the records of the interrogations you have made the comment each time that there was evidently a mistake in recollection here. On that account I should like to pose the question to Colonel Wennerstroem again here, whether you can remember that this actually took place or whether it is actually a mistake in memory?

W: Yes, it is right insofar as I did on some occasion give Rybachenkov a code of instructions for soldiers or some similar simple publication. The situation was that this publication had been distributed to the defense attachés, but Rybachenkov had not received one, so I promised to get him one, which I did. But I cannot recall the time this happened.

My last encounter with Rybachenkov before my departure for Moscow was at the consulate of the Soviet Union in connection with my having to pick up my passport, which had been handed in for a visa. In order to make things simple I had delivered the passport to Rybachenkov earlier so he could take care of the formalities. And when the passport was ready at last, it was he who delivered it to me at the consulate.

S: The interrogation is interrupted at 16:00 o'clock.

(The interrogation was resumed on Friday, 17 January 1964, at 13:50 o'clock with the same conductor and the same witness.)

S: We have now reached the period which covers your return to Moscow in 1949, and perhaps I may now ask you to describe how events went forward there.

W: It is to be noted that I had of course been in Moscow earlier and therefore there was no need for any running-in period as regards becoming acquainted with the city and the state of affairs there. This brought it about that practically speaking I could start out with \* \* \* in the first few days. Through the acquisition and study of certain specialized literature and through visits to various bookstores and libraries, and through various encounters with people, I very soon came to understand clearly that the sole possibility of getting the information lay in getting hold of certain official publications which were gotten up and published by one of the ministries in Moscow. In Moscow, of course, there are a great number of ministries, part of which are the highest leadership organs for given industry groups. My inquiries further showed that the sole possibility of laying hands upon just these publications was at some special libraries where there was a wide selection of \* \* \*. It also transpired from my inquiries that the closest at hand of these special libraries was indeed in Moscow, but on the other hand it proved to be hardly possible, in the character of a member of the diplomatic corps and with the surveillance that existed, to enter that library. In any event, it would not be possible, once in the library, to get at what one wanted. Aside from this one, the nearest suitable one was in Leningrad.

So the upshot was that I made an unofficial trip, from the Swedish point of view I mean, to Leningrad. To go to Leningrad was nothing extraordinary in Moscow. It very often occurred that the members of the diplomatic corps went there, just for sightseeing purposes. From the Russian official point of view nothing extraordinary was associated with this, it was merely a matter of announcing that one was going there for 2 days, for example. Then one had to order one's tickets and if the authorities for any reason did not want one to go, they were accustomed to make trouble with the tickets, but at any rate that did not happen in this case.

The library in question—I cannot now recall exactly what its name was, but it is located on a side street off the Nevsky Prospect. If you go where the street starts, that is to say by the Admiralty, and from there up, it is one of the first side streets you come to on the right.

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I checked to see that I was not being shadowed before I visited the library. Inside the library the arrangement was as it presumably is in most other libraries, namely with a large card index in sliding drawers and the contents indicated on these drawers, and there you could run through what books there were. It was not so long before I found just these publications from the ministry, and these in their turn were divided into various groups, and there one gradually comes across the group which dealt with \* \* \*, and under this heading there was a quantity of literature one could draw out. Among these latter there was a pamphlet that apparently had something particular about it. Evidently its distribution was restricted, for the copy bore a number. In the pamphlet, though, there were tables and a text which gave the answer to the problem.

Perhaps I ought to say something about how access to the library was secured: for this was a specialized library that was attached to the university and consequently it was students who visited the library. But there were many of these who were older men, and for this reason my appearance aroused no curiosity so far as age was concerned. As regards my Nordic appearance, this aroused no particular curiosity either, because there are a great many of this type in Ingermanland, for example, which lies west of Leningrad. There were also some foreigners, and from the point of view of Leningrad one may speak of two sorts of foreigners or outlanders, those from the Soviet Union, i.e., from remote parts which lie so far away that they convey the impression of foreigners, and on the other hand foreigners coming from countries outside the Soviet Union. So there was no difficulty about getting in.

Inside the library there were tables with reading lamps, there were small rooms and there were halls, and generally speaking in the halls there were books around the walls that those who were in the hall could make use of. It was evidently intended that in the smaller rooms those who had—at a special delivery desk—charged out books might be able to sit in peace and quiet and study. I went into one of these little rooms and found myself alone there, because it was the time of day when there were very few people in general. I could study the material in peace and quiet and seek out that which I spoke of earlier. On this occasion I had brought with me a miniature camera, and with the help of the reading lamp I photographed what was of importance, and this consisted of some annexes to this publication. It was not so many pages, so it went off very quickly. After that it was merely a question of handing the book in again and departing; for I had made sure of the material through the film.

S: Was this a military camera that you had with you then, or was it private property?

W: Oh, it was a private miniature camera that had been bought in the Soviet Union. \* \* \*

After that there was nothing left but to return to Moscow and send the film home by courier.

S: Was this film sent to \* \* \*?

W: Yes. In accordance with the agreement we had reached in Stockholm.

This \* \* \* had likewise certain consequences at a later time that it would probably be simplest to take up now in the same connection.

After the conclusion of the first period of service in Moscow, and the period was relatively short, I came back to Stockholm for a few weeks. During this time I met \* \* \* and received word that he had received the film and that it had been sent onward, had been developed. In the first place they had determined that the film was usable, and further they had determined that the contents was just about what they had wanted. In this connection they in the West had asked \* \* \*, how had it been possible for me to lay hands on the publication that had been photographed, and the aim of the question was quite plain. He wanted to know what chance there was of making use of it in another connection. But I had determined not to tell anyone about how I had handled this. I of course realized that if I did this the outcome would be that others would try the same thing in order to get hold of probably quite different books, and then this particular hole in the security curtain would be discovered and patched.

\* \* \* \* \*

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This in turn had its reaction, for when I came back to Moscow after these weeks in Stockholm, I was contacted the very first day I was there by the American Embassy, where they said that they had received word I had a good source. So here I was able to identify one of these peculiar circlings of information which I was often to observe in the future and which I had likewise observed earlier. Thus what I had done in this case had gone from Stockholm to the United States and from the United States to the Embassy in Moscow. I did not, however, let myself be persuaded, but continued to keep my source of information private to myself, and I did not tell anyone about it before I left Moscow.

S: Here the interrogation is temporarily broken off at 14:30 o'clock. (The interrogation is resumed at 15 o'clock.)

W: On a later occasion in 1951 I again was given an assignment \* \* \*. At that time my \* \* \* connections, which had to do with the American intelligence service, had been broken off. So I had got myself another contact line which ran direct from Moscow.

\* \* \*

S: Perhaps we can leave the so-called \* \* \* here and shift over to your first contacts with the Russian principals in Moscow. This coincides more or less in time?

W: Yes, \* \* \*.

S: Perhaps you will tell us how this first contact took place.

W: I did not know who it was I was to meet. \* \* \* The one I met turned out to be a person named Nikitushev, who had been military attaché in Stockholm at the Soviet Union Embassy during the war, and I had met him during the 1941-1943 period. Among other matters it was he and I that accompanied Madame Kollontay on her visits in the camps where the persons belonging to the Soviet Armed Forces were interned.

The place for the meeting was set on one of the promenade stretches in Moscow, namely by the Pushkin statue on Gorki Street. As the day of the meeting a Sunday at the start of my period of service in Moscow had been indicated, and in addition there had been indicated a reserve day for the event that the meeting should fail to take place the first day. The meeting was set for 14 o'clock both days. In practice things fell out so that I did not contact anyone the Sunday in question, so the reserve day had to be used, and then the above-named Nikitushev was on the spot. As old acquaintances, we naturally recognized each other at once and shook hands, and chatted about as upon a normal meeting on a walk. After some minutes conversation Nikitushev proposed that we should go to a detached house in the suburbs, where he had arranged for tea. He had a car standing in a side street in the neighborhood, and in this car we went out of town and did in fact come to a house, where a tea had indeed been arranged.

\* \* \* it was naturally enough very easy to get the conversation going. He rapidly launched into an explanation of his own position in Moscow. \* \* \* he explained that he had secured a relatively high post in their intelligence service, and that it was of secret character so he always wore civilian clothes. Then he gradually hinted at my encounter with Rybachenkov, and similarly he referred to his immediate chief, who had told him that I had delivered valuable information from Stockholm. With this, so to speak, we had entered upon the actual substance.

He started with an exposition regarding the emergence of NATO, which at this time was in fact relatively new. He further declared that by reason of this the Soviet Union had been faced with altogether new strategic problems, which made necessary a complete reorganization of military strategy and likewise required great alterations within the armed forces. What was particularly uncomfortable from the Soviet point of view was the fact that hostile-minded states were popping up in practically all directions. One could not consider a hypothetical front against any small country, for example Turkey, as insignificant, because the United States and other great powers stood back of it and might perhaps throw in forces on precisely that front.

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The first great basic problem they had was consequently that of determining which fronts they had to reckon with and where they could calculate that there was no need of a defense front. At this point he went into the relationship between the northern countries and NATO. At this time there had been active negotiations among the three northern countries regarding this problem and likewise regarding the internal problems of the three northern countries, i.e., a conceivable defensive alliance. By this time the outcome was already plain, i.e., it was known that Sweden had chosen a neutral line, which they followed alone, while Norway and Denmark had chosen to join up with NATO, which in fact took place at this time. He further said that from the Soviet viewpoint things looked favorable in the Baltic Sea area. They were inclined to consider that they did not have to reckon with any front in the Baltic Sea area. But here the characteristic Russian suspiciousness came in. It was known that thorough-going military discussions had taken place among the three northern countries. What they were wondering most about on the Russian side was whether there had been any secret agreement which might bring it about that Sweden, in event of war at any rate, would associate itself with NATO. With this as background, there took place a discussion between us regarding these matters, in which I observed that no secret agreements existed, and that Sweden would instead completely and fully pursue the officially declared neutrality line.

This part of the conversation is of a certain significance in that at a later phase there was a reaction to it which I am not going to go into now.

After this predominantly strategically and politically toned conversation he made a shift, and referred to what had occurred between me and Rybachenkov in Stockholm, and further what had taken place during Rybachenkov's visit in Moscow. He further said that as regards this he had been asked by his chief to try to arrange for a meeting between me and this person. Perhaps I ought to say a word about the course of my own private thoughts in this connection. I pointed out earlier, in connection with my meeting with Rybachenkov in Stockholm and my having received the 5,000 crowns referred to, that I became very doubtful about the dangerous game I was starting out on. On this occasion approximately the same thoughts returned. It was naturally not too late to back out and say no thanks to such a meeting as this. Where I now took a further step and met his chief, it appeared that I had definitely burned my bridges and that I was forced to carry through my original line of thought. But on this occasion too, the notion I had earlier, that I was going to continue my march back behind the Soviet intelligence service's curtain, won out. So I consented to meet Nikitushev's chief. It then proved that I was to have entirely free choice as to the form the meeting should take and what day it should occur. The final result was that we were to come to a lunch to which this chief should invite us, and that this should occur on a certain day which we set. We also decided that previous to this I should meet Nikitushev at a specific indicated place. Upon this the first meeting came to an end and we returned to the center of Moscow in the car which was standing at our disposal.

S: The interrogation is broken off at 16:20 o'clock.

(The interrogation continues on Monday, 20 January 1964, at 12:50 o'clock with the same conductor and the same witness.)

S: Last time we closed with the meeting you had with Nikitushev, and today we are to talk about the meeting with Nikitushev's chief and a security man that was present on that occasion. Perhaps I may ask you, Colonel, to give us an account of this.

W: The meeting with Nikitushev took place according to plan. He had the same car and chauffeur at his disposal as at the previous meeting. Probably it would already be appropriate now to say that the whole time in Moscow, insofar as concerns this activity, the same car was assigned to us with two chauffeurs. In addition there was a reserve car. I shall come back to this in a later connection where it is of particular significance.

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The first thing that happened was that we drove to a house in the center of Moscow, located in a back street, and there we went up to an apartment. Here, too, an extra explanation would be in place. The whole time in Moscow we had available the detached house I have mentioned as a sort of headquarters. In addition there was this apartment in the city which was, if I may put it that way, a forward meeting place, more conveniently situated. This state of affairs remained constant during the whole 3 years in Moscow.

When we came up into the apartment I got the first explanation of what it was to be used for in principle, and later I came to know that this day's lunch took place in a staff building in Moscow and on this account special security precautions were adopted. I should now explain that today the difference as regards clothing between an ordinary Moscow resident and a foreigner is minimal. But this was not the case in 1949. At that time the choice of hats and overcoats, for example—which is what was at issue here—was very limited in Moscow. On this account my hat and overcoat stood out on this occasion as decidedly foreign. For this reason they wanted me to take off these articles in the apartment and put on a hat and overcoat of more typically Moscow cut.

Then there took place the trip in the car from the apartment to the staff building \* \* \*. Once we had arrived at the staff building we were taken up in an elevator to a representational apartment. It then turned out that two persons were waiting for us. One of them was Nikitushev's chief, that he had spoken about, and the other was from the security service in Moscow and he was the chief of the organization which carried on surveillance of the diplomats in Moscow.

The lunch, which was very elaborate, was set up on the principle that one started in one room which looked like a large living room, with caviar and vodka and other trimmings. After that came a conversation between me and the general. Then there came the actual lunch in a dining room and after that coffee and tea were served in this outer room, and subsequently there was a concluding conversation. The first conversation took place between me and Nikitushev's chief alone in a kind of library. It should be observed here that from the Soviet point of view, that is to say from the point of view of this Russian general, the situation was pretty unclear. Of course they knew about my initiative in Stockholm, and they had had a talk with Rybachenkov when he was home temporarily in Moscow. They knew that I had talked to Nikitushev and that I had consented to meet his chief. From their standpoint, then, what was involved now was to try and clarify whether they could recruit me as an agent or not.

He commenced his explanations by referring to Nikitushev's conversation with me earlier about the relationships between the North and NATO. He repeated once more how advantageous it was from the Soviet viewpoint that they did not think, now Sweden had chosen the line of neutrality, that they need reckon with any front in the Baltic Sea area. He thanked me for my explanations that there was no secret agreement on Sweden's part, which reinforced the Soviet intelligence service in its view.

After this he brought out the map, or better put, a clipping from the map, that I had given Rybachenkov in Stockholm and which in fact merely bore a dot, indicating the location of an airfield and no other information. I have already recounted this earlier. Then he thanked me simultaneously for my collaboration with Rybachenkov in Stockholm, after which he tore the map up and threw it in the waste paper basket with what I should characterize as a roguish glint in his eyes.

Then he said that under normal peacetime conditions intelligence service information from all quarters, generally speaking, was of interest. The Soviet Union, however, had got into an extremely serious crisis situation and I was to understand that Sweden could not be accorded any major interest from the Soviet point of view, particularly after the declaration of neutrality. Then he went into explanations which I cannot now recall in detail, but it was to the effect of declaring that I need not be uneasy that he might press me for information on Swedish matters; instead it was entirely different matters he was interested in.

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After this he understood a summary explanation of the strategical situation. This was, in the main, devoted to presenting a picture of the way they looked at NATO's emergence from the horizon of Moscow. They saw one state after another join up with NATO and in this fashion, possibilities arising for a large number of fronts. Parallel with this there was a similar situation in the Pacific Ocean, where the proceedings of the Americans in Japan made it necessary for them likewise to reckon with hostilities from that quarter. To be sure, the various NATO countries in Europe were, taken one by one, perhaps not such great problems from the Soviet defense viewpoint. Nor did all the European NATO countries together constitute any really serious danger. The great danger was that the large and powerful United States lay in the background and moreover led and directed the whole. Thanks to this, demonstrations of force could be made from any territory whatever, whether it belonged to a large or to a small state.

The United States was the nucleus, and the United States was the main enemy of the Soviet Union. All resources they had at their disposal must be deployed against the United States.

At that time it had not yet become clear what NATO's war planning was to look like in principle. They understood that the United States must be altogether dominant when determination of this was at issue. He next remarked that, for the present, the most important of all tasks was to endeavor to get a grip on the principles of this war planning. Only after one had got a grip on this was it possible to undertake effective countermeasures. What was at issue first and foremost here was to get a clear idea of how they were looking at two particular methods of compulsion, the conduct of aerial warfare and invasion. At this point in time it was clear to them, he said, that the missions, i.e., the NATO missions in Moscow, were carrying out intelligence work which was directed by personnel of the American Embassy. Information was being gathered together in every way possible. Thus what was of high priority interest in Moscow for the Soviet intelligence service was to get the greatest possible amount of information regarding what this NATO activity in the Soviet Union was aiming at. If they got sufficiently good information on this, that would contribute to their solving the problem of NATO's war planning.

After this he declared that the Soviet intelligence service was organized at a headquarters in Moscow as leadership organ, and that under it there were a number of sectors. Each sector had geographically delimited tasks.

Through developments the American sector had become beyond comparison the most important of all. It also transpired that, of these sectors, only a portion were located in Moscow, for example the American one was located in Moscow. On this occasion I did not learn more, but on later occasions it became clear to me that, for example, the northern sector is located in Leningrad and the Far East sector is located in Vladivostok. This merely as an example.

The conversation closed with his asking whether I wished to enter the Soviet intelligence service with posting to the American sector and with the mission of trying to find out about the above-named matters among the NATO ambassadors. He further declared that he by no means reckoned with my being able at once to answer offhand, but that I was welcome to take my time and answer when I wished, or, as he also in fact said, "if I didn't want to answer at all, it was my own business." After this he said that it was high time to have lunch, and the conversation ended at that point.

After the private conversation all four persons took part in the lunch. During the lunch I had decided to answer affirmatively to the offer, and this took place in connection with the serving of coffee and tea after the lunch.

This led to all four persons gathering in the library. The host now declared to the other two in our company that agreement had been reached between him and me to the effect that I should join the Soviet intelligence service with posting to the American sector. He further said that Nikitushev should be my contact man. Then he turned to the security chief and told him that, in the exercise of his duties, he was to bear this in mind. Regarding me he was to undertake two specific measures. The one was that he should protect my person, the other was that he should see to it I was not shadowed by any irrelevant organization.

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S: I have followed your narrative here the whole time and I have no direct questions to ask, but I have a feeling that you have not actually told us what an important position the host at the lunch had. What was his rank, and what was his position generally speaking?

W: In the first place he was a general, in the second place he served in the headquarters in Moscow that was the leading and coordinating organ for the various sectors within the intelligence service. Thus he was not in the American sector, and this also brought it about that after this meeting I never saw him again. Subsequently it also transpired, although it was not clear at this very moment, that Nikitushev did not belong to the American sector either, but instead to headquarters. And the fact that he was set up as my contact man at the start appeared to have primarily to do with the fact that first of all they wanted to undertake certain monitoring measures regarding me. When it later on became evident that they regarded me as reliable, that I had passed the test, then I got another contact man who was from the American sector.

After this the security chief left the room.

S: The interrogation is interrupted at 14:15 o'clock.

(The interrogation is resumed at 14:30 o'clock.)

W: In Nikitushev's and my presence the general and host explained the need for concentrating on main tasks in the present situation, and for avoiding scattered effort. For Nikitushev's and my part this meant concentration upon the mission vis-à-vis the NATO embassies. In this connection he said that from his and our point of view the Swedish Embassy was of no interest. He further said that insofar as they might have any interest in the Swedish Embassy they had a potential for getting it at—as he expressed himself—a higher level. He offered no further explanation, and neither Nikitushev nor I asked any question.

S: Was there nothing subsequently, either, that clarified what the general meant in this case when he spoke about being able to get information at a higher level in this connection?

W: No, it didn't come into the picture at all from then on.

S: And you did not indulge in any reflections of your own upon the assertion?

W: No, I engaged in no particular reflections, primarily because I was fully occupied with what I had on my hands in general.

\* \* \* \* \*

Furthermore, I was given orientation as to the fact that the Russian security chief at the Embassy was another Russian citizen who also worked in the chancery. He concluded by saying that after this orientation session he did not think he need be uneasy about my possibly making any mistakes as regards security.

S: Before we leave this matter, it appears to me as though we have bypassed a thing that you have mentioned in earlier rundowns, namely that Nikitushev described to you how he and his assistants in their turn would be able to help you, in part with information and in part with opportunities to make contacts.

W: Yes, that had indeed slipped my mind. But it was not Nikitushev that spoke of this, it was his chief who said it in the first conversation and the first orientation before the lunch. The isolation of the diplomatic corps in Moscow had been touched upon between us. It was generally known that it was exceedingly difficult for the members of the diplomatic corps to break out of the isolation so as to come in touch with Russians that were worthwhile contacting. It was also difficult to get tickets of admission to lectures and the like that would be valuable for members of the diplomatic corps to hear. This led to the general's promising, as a counteroffer, to facilitate these contacts for me. Thus he was going to be able to arrange things so that I might meet personnel in whom I might be interested in my service, meaning the Swedish service—for example, personnel in the air force. And he could also arrange it so that I would get tickets to lectures and the like, ones that in normal cases were very difficult to get. Toward the end of our second conversation, the one I was just talking about, the general referred to these matters again and pointed out that with my tasks for the Soviet intelligence service's account I would naturally find it difficult to make the time suffice for my Swedish duties as well. And he then recalled this agreement and he hoped that it would lead to a saving of time for me.

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After this the general said that he intended to leave Nikitushev and me, and he gave Nikitushev the job of working out the further details surrounding our contacts in the future. After this the general took his leave.

Next Nikitushev and I left the representational apartment and the staff building. We returned in the car to the apartment I have mentioned earlier and there we made our arrangements. For my first expenses in Moscow there were handed over 10,000 rubles, old rubles of course. After that I was shown on a map nine different meeting places that were to be used. The principle was that Nikitushev, sitting in a car, was to wait at these places, and I was to come forward in the most convenient fashion and get in the car.

S: We have a map of Moscow which we now show you, Colonel, and perhaps you will be able to give us an approximate indication of where the various meeting places lay.

W: In very general terms I can say that all the meeting places lay within the central part of the city. Sometimes they were in small back streets and also in inner courts, and this map is on altogether too small a scale for me to be able to point out the places. Anyway, these nine meeting places were changed now and then, I mean not all nine at once, but one might for example be changed one month, and then another the next month.

Our meetings were to take place in the way that was agreed upon from one time to the next. So when we met on the day and at the time indicated, in the car, this depended upon how long we were to talk to each other. Perhaps it would be enough if the car were merely to drive around the block. It might be enough for the car to take a short trip out into the suburbs and then come back again. But if there was need for a longer meeting, we either went to the apartment or to the detached house. In connection with a number of these meetings it was planned in advance that we should take a meal together, and in that event this also occurred either at the detached house or in the apartment.

Here we used for the first time, or for the second time at any rate, the principle of reserve days. Because, of course, the first occasion was when we met, Nikitushev and I, for the first time in Moscow. Here the way we arranged it was that we had two reserve times after each set time, in case either of us should be prevented.

S: How were these arrangements about the reserve days made? Did you get word of them when the regular meeting day was decided upon, or was there a standing system?

W: No, it was decided each time, for example, meeting place No. 1 on Monday and if I could not come there it would be, for example, meeting place 3 on Wednesday, and if I didn't come then either, then perhaps it would be meeting place 4 on Thursday.

The conversation naturally dealt with a whole range of other details and subjects that I can no longer recall. But the very first part of my mission was also in fact made plain on this occasion. One must recall that this was the very start, and the first mission was for natural reasons of course that of getting the best possible contacts within the American Embassy above all, but also other NATO embassies. And the entirety of the initial activity was toward this end.

S: In connection with these instructions, there was presumably also communicated to you something about how you were to report?

W: During this early phase only oral reporting was involved.

S: The interrogation is interrupted at 15:45 o'clock.

(The interrogation is resumed on Tuesday, 21 January 1964, at 12:55 o'clock, at the same place and with the same conductor and witness.)

S: Well, Colonel Wennerstroem, we have now come so far in our interrogation that we may perhaps set about describing the first period of activity in Moscow, how events developed, and in what fashion you carried out your assignments.

W: The first period was characterized by two things happening simultaneously. One of them was the so-called \* \* \* which has already been described. Simultaneously with this I was gradually taken into the Soviet intelligence service. On the Soviet side I actually first had a sensation of being accepted quite immediately, and I then thought of my old contacts from several years back with persons

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of consequence, such as for example Madame Kollontay. It proved, however, that this first impression of mine was rather erroneous. They did not have entire and complete confidence in me, but instead the first thing that happened in the association of Nikitushev and myself was what I might call a trial period. They strove to convince themselves that I was really to be relied on.

As I have already said, my first assignment involved creating for myself an information network at the American Embassy and the other NATO embassies, and to this end there was need of contacts, many contacts and good contacts. On the Soviet side they evidently counted on its not being so easy to establish these contacts, and they evidently thought it would take a long time. But this was by no means the case, which perhaps depended primarily upon the fact that I had known one of the defense attachés at the American Embassy from earlier times, when I had taken special care of him in Stockholm. Through him, then, I very quickly "got in" at the American Embassy. This Embassy had a distinctly dominating position among the diplomatic corps in Moscow, and if one only had secured entrée there, the rest came almost by itself.

It was as though the Russians had a sensation that the whole thing was going very fast and that they were therefore making a start by checking various things. Perhaps it will be of interest if I point out some examples of how they checked. For example, I might say that I had been to dinner with a certain person, and I could then indicate that I considered I had established a good contact either with the person or with someone that I met there. Then they checked this by asking, as though in passing, about this person's clothing, or how I or some other person had got there, who were the other guests, and they might ask about some point in time. Subsequently they had the potential for checking these data through information they got from other sources \* \* \*.

My contacts unquestionably became very good with rapidity. And I also had a feeling that this had an imposing effect upon the persons in the Soviet intelligence service who had to do with me. I also had a feeling, however, that it was taking a long time to get past this test period, and I had various thoughts within me about whether it would be a good thing if I could pull off more or less a sort of coup, which would at once make me accepted, so that I might get underway, as you might put it. This personal attitude assumes a certain importance in what I shall now relate.

My first period of service was approaching its end, the day of departure had been determined, and there were only a few days left. I had a last meeting with Nikitushev, and he reverted to our original subject of conversation, one which subsequently had been brought up by his chief, namely the relationship between the North and NATO and the Russian pondering over what fronts they would have to reckon with. This time it was the importance of the Baltic front that came up. I was advised by Nikitushev that, in a short time, there would be a governmental meeting and that there the representatives of the intelligence services were to present their materials, and these would include, among other matters, those to the effect that one need not reckon with the Baltic, as a consequence of Sweden's neutrality for one thing. He urged me, now that I should be in Stockholm, to probe these relationships further, and to let them know if I came upon anything which either reinforced this outlook or which spoke against the idea. It was decided that if there was anything, the communication to Moscow should go via Rybachenkov in Stockholm, whom I had of course known for a long time and whom we considered I should have no difficulty in contacting.

We also decided upon a certain day which should be the last possible one for despatch from Stockholm in order that the information should reach its goal and be processed before this meeting. We also decided upon a password that I was to give Rybachenkov in case I came across anything that was very important and that must be dealt with in Moscow at once, and this password was "lightning."

The most important thing that happened when I came to Stockholm was my meeting with \* \* \*. The proximate cause for the meeting was \* \* \*, and I have already dealt with this, to the end of having all

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that has to do with \* \* \* in a single sequence. I should like to recall that \* \* \* on this occasion asked me, on a commission he had received from the west, what source it was I had used. I also recall that I gave a negative reply: that I didn't want to reveal anything about this, but instead wanted to keep it to myself. After this we opened a conversation about matters which, against the background of what happened later, must be regarded as very important.

First I should say that when I went up to \* \* \*, I continued to have normal feelings of loyalty. Thus I had thought of resuming our earlier conversation, when he had brought up the question of the chances of worming his way into the Soviet intelligence system as an agent. I had thought I would say that I had absorbed what he had spoken of and what had come up in the conversation, and that I myself had had a try at this in Moscow, and that it had been successful. One should of course bear in mind that we talked to each other as two collaborators in international great-power espionage, and not as \* \* \*.

We had made it plain earlier that precisely what I had now recently done in Moscow might be classified as the most difficult and dangerous and perhaps the most sensational thing in the entirety of the variegated work of agents.

For my part, however, there came into play here psychological outlooks and factors which upset my original ideas. When we finished the conversation about \* \* \*, and \* \* \* consequently realized that he would not be able to tell his contact man in the United States about the source of my information, he became extraordinarily cross. One may say that his attitude was the attitude of a dissatisfied superior toward an erring subordinate. I got a marked impression of being his subagent and subordinate in the international game as well. I was the subagent and he was the agent. And this relationship caused me to rage inwardly in a most pronounced fashion.

Psychologically speaking, at this moment I was in a touchy state. As I have recounted in earlier connections, I had recently been passed over in the appointments to wing chief positions. Unfortunately it is the case that in this situation one soon enough feels distinctly that one has been slighted. One feels that one is out of the game and made an exception of. One no longer has any influence, and hardly anyone pays attention to the views one expresses, etc. I had indeed had the great good luck of securing compensation by returning to intelligence service and in once more going out into activity in the embassies. But in principle this did not alter my psychologically touchy state of mind. I considered, at the same time, that so far as concerned intelligence service and the question of this international espionage, it was I that had experience and not \* \* \*. This, then, explains why I reacted very strongly against the sensation of being a subagent in relation to \* \* \*. On this occasion I further thought within myself that there was no occasion at all for me to need a line of contact with the American intelligence service that went via \* \* \*, or for me to be directed by \* \* \*. There was no reason I should not get myself a direct contact and be my own master.

I was tired of playing a subordinate part and I wanted to make an end to this as quickly as possible. Therefore I made a right-about turn in the course of my thoughts, and firmly resolved instead to say nothing which might further bind me to \* \* \* in this activity. In this fashion it worked out that when I left the meeting with \* \* \* I had said nothing of my contacts with the Soviet intelligence service. This meeting proved, also by reason of what happened later, to be my last encounter with \* \* \* insofar as concerns agent activity.

Our conversation now shifted to dealing with purely Swedish matters, which are essentially of less interest in this connection. In principle what was involved was some jobs of technical character that I was to try to carry out in the Soviet Union. This included propositions to the effect that I ought to get into certain dissertations and certain other publications and writings.

At this moment a spark lighted up in me. Why, here was a splendid opportunity to carry off something that would be of special value for the Soviet intelligence service to study before the government deliberations, and here there was unquestionably involved a matter which was

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calculated to increase my prestige of a sudden. Therefore I worked the conversation around in such a way that the analysis in question found a place in the list of publications which I was to study during my stay in Stockholm.

When I got the analysis in question in my hand I arranged things so that it was photographed. It was a long time ago this happened, but it seems to me I remember that I left it, just as it was, with Rybachenkov one evening and that he photographed it over night and that I got it back the morning after. Simultaneously with this I pronounced the agreed password "lightning," which accordingly meant rapid forwarding to Moscow. And in order to complete the picture perhaps I should say that the date when this paper was delivered was before the date which was the last useful one with respect to the governmental meeting in Moscow.

S: This paper which Colonel Wennerstroem has just spoken about and which is entitled \* \* \* has been the object of discussion during the hearing at the air command, and it is also included in the list which is attached to the final interrogation at the air command under point ---- in the table.

In the present connection I should like to ask Colonel Wennerstroem a special question. During the investigation here the then chief of the defense staff's domestic section, Colonel Leche, has been interviewed, and he has said that in the spring of 1949 Colonel Wennerstroem was at home here on a visit from Moscow. Then the colonel visited the domestic section of the defense staff and talked to Colonel Leche \* \* \*.

Well, my question is: Can you remember that visit, and what was involved there?

W: I cannot remember the visit that is in question here, but presumably what happened was that the domestic section wanted to know details about \* \* \*, which is of course a very well-known matter in Moscow. Here I should like to come back to what I said earlier regarding the minute surveillance of the embassies by the Soviet security service, \* \* \*

S: The interrogation is broken off here temporarily at 14:30 o'clock. (The interrogation is resumed at 14:45 o'clock.)

W: After my return to Moscow another contact with Nikitushev took place. My purpose in procuring \* \* \* had been that of getting out of the backwater which the test period in the Soviet intelligence service constituted. I had no need to be in doubt for an instant that the goal had been achieved when I met Nikitushev. The first thing he said to me was that my existence had now been noted higher up and was now known by the supreme chief of the intelligence service, and for that reason they had been obliged to baptize me during my absence. It is usual that at least the more prominent agents, speaking generally, within the international intelligence system, get a code name or a cover name. This had evidently not been regarded as necessary during the first test period, as I call it. But now that the person who had procured this paper had evidently become the subject of talk up at the top, it was part of the picture that my true name should not be mentioned, and I had therefore been dubbed "Eagle" as a code name. I now learned of this. I can add that there was no question of any monitoring queries from here on.

I learned that my password had reached them first in a communication, and for that reason they had been very excited about what might be coming, particularly as to whether it might be \* \* \*. Later I learned that the document had come, and had among other matters occasioned trouble because it was so comprehensive and there was relatively little time left before the governmental meeting. Of course they had had to translate it so that the specialists could read it through.

I then learned that they had brought in a whole plane load of translators from Leningrad, who had in very short order got the translation out. It was in this connection that I learned that the northern sector lay not in Moscow but in Leningrad.

The proximate practical result was that Nikitushev as liaison man or contact man, as I have usually expressed it, was replaced. In his place there entered as contact man a general from the American sector. Nikitushev expressed this by saying that, thanks to the coup in Stock-

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holm, I now had attained the level of generals. This was exhibited, among other matters, in the fact that certain more expensive steps were taken, having to do with contact between me and the new contact man. Thus there was arranged a telephone line that was intended especially for us. It was very ingeniously arranged. I was the only person that knew the number. There was someone on the other end 24 hours a day. So they knew that only I could ring them. In order to protect themselves against a wrong number they had decided that I should first ring and let three buzzes pass by and hang up the receiver, then ring again and pass my message. Since it was only I that could call, I needed never say who I was. Furthermore, I was to call only from booths in the town, the purpose of which was to prevent tapping. The two chauffeurs with a car and a reserve car were constantly at the disposal of the new contact man. He used these cars in order to have a potential for emergency contact, contact which had not been provided for in advance, from him to me. This should be done by having the car in question, which I would of course recognize—for I knew its number and I knew the chauffeur by sight—take up a position either before my residence or outside the Embassy. If I should see the car standing there, I was to phone as promptly as possible.

The car was also to be able to shadow me if I was moving about, and then the car could pass me and stop at the curb so that I would see it. I should then pay no attention to the car, and naturally not talk to the chauffeur, but instead take this as a signal to the effect that I should phone. If on the other hand the general was sitting in the car and beckoned to me, I should get into the car. In this way there was accordingly a two-way connection that one could use when anything urgent came up.

S: Was this system you have just described, about the cars, applied in any other place than Moscow?

W: So far as I was concerned it was not applied in any other connection than in Moscow, but I am convinced that the system has been applied with other persons in other places.

\* \* \* \* \*

S: If I have understood the course of events aright, there also occurred something else side by side with what you have now described, that is to say the Russian reaction to their having gotten \* \* \* and the general's coming into the picture, etc. I am thinking of the sequels to the conversation with \* \* \*, when you decided to establish contact with the Americans yourself and thereby definitively free yourself from \* \* \* and have a direct American contact.

Will you describe these developments in a little more detail?

W: It is entirely correct that parallel with these events contacts with the Americans were taking place in Moscow. The first thing that happened after my return was that \* \* \* came into the picture once more, and that in decidedly abrupt fashion. I have touched upon this earlier in passing, but now I shall give a few more details.

I was contacted by the American air attaché, and he informed me that he had learned from Washington that I had acquired valuable information from a source which must obviously be of value. They had not, however, learned what this source was, and for that reason they had applied to this air attaché so that he in his turn should get in touch with me and pose the question. \* \* \*. Here, however, I took a chance on making direct contact with the American intelligence establishment, and I said that I would furnish information about the source when I left Moscow, and that up till that time I would personally carry out the requirements they might wish to levy upon this source. And I also remarked that one could secure only technical information from it.

Now part of the picture is that the defense attachés who are inside the iron curtain—I mean the American ones—are not attached directly to Washington, but are attached to various headquarters in Germany. The air attaché that I was talking to was attached in this way to the headquarters in Wiesbaden.

What happened from there on was that the air attaché in question sent a report to Wiesbaden. After a while he came back with an answer, and according to its terms I learned that (1) I was to have the air attaché in Moscow as my contact man; (2) I should be directly tied

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up to Wiesbaden through him; (3) my contact in Stockholm should cease; and (4) the compensation for \* \* \* which I had asked to have paid out in Italian lire should be paid me through the air attaché in Moscow. So far as I was concerned personally this meant that I had achieved my aim, namely that of being an independent agent.

\* \* \* \* \*

S: The interrogation is interrupted at 15:55 o'clock.

(The examination is resumed again on Wednesday, 22 January 1964, at 1045 hours at the same place and with the same examiner and the same witness.)

S: Colonel Wennerstroem, when we finished yesterday's examination, you had delivered a report that you had received from your personal contact man to both the Soviets and the Americans. I recall from earlier examination that you had said that this contact man gave you a report on the situation that, in effect, played a role during the entire activity right up to 1963, and I would like to ask you to describe to us the background played by both these contact men in this matter. We can start with this today.

W: It seems better for me to start with the American side. It is well known today, although it was not yet entirely clear back in 1949, that NATO's defense planning against the Soviet Union was based on attempting to overcome the Soviet Union by means of nuclear air attacks. The historic form of invasion would not be used, however, for this purpose. Behind this decision lay a very great deal of American planning. At the end of World War II, the Americans wished to determine what role air attacks on German territory had played. A very extensive investigation was undertaken, place by place and town by town, in Germany. The result was a study that filled printed books and reports occupying a full meter of shelf space. I myself had occasion to obtain access to all the material and to inspect it. It was a work of fantastic precision and detail. It was possible to determine which attacks were worthwhile from the point of view of military objectives, which were less useful, and which were entirely wasted. It was also possible to determine why this had been so. It was possible also to see that what extent the intelligence services that had had the task of choosing the targets and the types of attack had made wise or unwise decisions.

S: The examination is interrupted at 1130 hours for lunch.

(The examination begins again at 1200 hours.)

W: The report was used subsequently as a basis for determining what methods could be considered of use against the Soviet Union instead of Germany. Three conclusions were arrived at as a result of the study.

The first conclusion was that it was not possible to obtain any practical results against the Soviet Union from attacks of the great fleets of planes and bombers such as had been used in World War II. The distance of the targets in the Soviet Union and the expenditure of effort against each one of them were too great. I might mention in passing that some of the attacks against Germany comprised a thousand or more aircraft.

The second conclusion was that it would be possible to achieve the desired results with very few planes in each attack if nuclear weapons were used.

The third conclusion was that the intelligence available for the attacks against Germany had been entirely insufficient. This arose from the fact that the American intelligence service had not been large enough quantitatively during peacetime. Intelligence must be assembled during peace; it is too late to try to do it once war has started.

It was found, moreover, that the intelligence information that was available on the Soviet Union was even less satisfactory than what had been available on Germany. The conduct of an air war against the Soviet Union required, therefore, not only the use of nuclear weapons, but also the organization during peacetime of a particularly effective intelligence service.

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This was the prime reason for organizing a few years after the end of World War II, the present American intelligence service, which is the largest in size in the world after the Soviet. For easily understandable reasons, the American intelligence service directed its efforts from the very beginning toward the Soviet Union. American intelligence operations are divided up in such a fashion that work is carried on in part outside of the Soviet Union's borders for the purpose of penetrating the country, and in part from within the Soviet Union itself. There are certain relationships at present that are of special importance for the continuation of the activities being carried on outside the Soviet Union. Organizations have been built up in different countries surrounding the Soviet Union that are equipped with special radios and radio stations having contacts within the country. This resulted in a restricted range of communication, however. In order to overcome this defect, aircraft were equipped with the same apparatus and patrolled as close to the borders as was thought feasible. It should be pointed out that the much discussed shooting down of American and some other aircraft close to the Soviet border over the past 15 years is connected directly with this activity. At times it so happened that the aircraft lost its way and blundered into Soviet territory, so that it was shot down, one might say, legally. At other times, the Soviet air defense took the risk of shooting down the plane outside of Soviet territory.

Coming to the activities within the Soviet Union, these were carried on in part in the usual way, which is to say by reading everything that was printed, by following radio and TV broadcasts, by obtaining maps and statistics, and so forth. In addition, efforts were made to obtain information about details from travelers, much work being done to coordinate the travelers so that each one could obtain perhaps insignificant bits of the jigsaw puzzle that could be put together with all the others to complete the picture. These travelers were not only members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow—meaning members of the American Embassy as well as of embassies of other NATO nations—but also advantage was taken of travelers, such as businessmen and tourists. Finally, there was a large number of different kinds of secret agents.

It happened also that specially trained agents were dropped within the borders by parachute.

I myself come into the picture in connection with the collecting of information obtained by travelers. I shall come back later on to certain details of these activities under a special heading: Collaborations with the Americans. In the meantime, thinking toward the relation of all of this to my time in Washington, I must explain now the entire course of events.

The activities within the Soviet Union had various goals, but the most important one was to obtain information on bombing targets. This became the largest and most impersonal spying activity thus far in all of history. It began, thus, with travelers, and a critical listener can well ask: Is it possible to obtain worthwhile information from such travelers? And I reply to this that what was obtained from the travelers was typically of a jigsaw puzzle character. It was often very small pieces in the puzzle that came in, but by persevering year after year, there is no doubt that results were obtained. In the meantime, it soon became obvious to the American intelligence service that the end result—though not inconsiderable in itself—was not satisfactory. It was necessary to complement the program with other methods. About 1950, illegal flights were begun over the Soviet Union with a type of aircraft at that time called the RB-36. This was a very large six-engine plane that flew at what was for that period an exceptionally high altitude. It was possible to obtain a worthwhile complement to the picture from the photographs and the radio work from this plane.

At the beginning, the Soviet air defense was unable to put up any defense against these flights, so that they were scarcely known. So far as I can remember, there was no publicity at all about them. Soviet air defenses grew in size and strength to the point where it began to be possible to intercept flights at such altitudes. The Americans anticipated this development and broke off their flights before anything happened. They went over to the use of balloons during

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the 1950's. Special balloons were built that ascended to great heights. They were sent up to the west of the Soviet Union and were carried by the air currents across its territory toward the Pacific, where the best available means were used to try to capture them. The balloons were equipped with cameras and took photographs automatically during their flights. They carried also equipment that made it possible to record the exact position of the balloon when each picture was taken by means of automatic sights on the stars.

These balloons were the object of very great publicity, since many of them came down on Soviet territory. Among other things, there was an exposition in Moscow showing the entire equipment. While the balloon flights were going on, work was being carried forward on the design and construction of the famous U-2. When this plane was ready for use, the balloon flights were discontinued and the U-2 flights over Soviet territory were begun at heights well beyond the range of Soviet air defenses. Little by little, the Soviet air defenses were equipped with modern rockets that could reach the U-2 altitudes, but there were very few such rocket batteries in use to start with. It was possible to keep the U-2 a secret until the well-known Powers case occurred. His plane had come too close to an antiaircraft battery at Sverdlovsk in the Urals and was shot down. So far as is known, there have been no further overflights of the Soviet Union after the Powers affair. It is said, whether correctly or not I do not know, that a new aircraft is under construction that will fly even higher than the U-2.

During all the time this was going on, travel in the Soviet Union continued, year after year, as it does even today.

This is, then, the background of the intelligence activities that took place in the Soviet Union and in Moscow in which I was mixed up. Everything was concentrated on obtaining information on bombing targets.

I go over now to the corresponding description of the background on the Soviet side. From this side, almost everything that happened was the result of four meetings of the Government at which the countermeasures against the newly established NATO should be discussed and decided on. I have already talked about the first of these, which was also concerned with deciding on which fronts it was necessary to be concerned with.

In order to complete the picture, I should tell what happened at the second meeting, which I knew nothing about at the time, but which I learned about later on. At this meeting, it was recognized that NATO had been formed and that America was its core. It had been recognized that activities within NATO stand or fall with the communications across the Atlantic. The Soviet Union has been for a long time oriented toward the use of submarines, so that it was easy to come to a decision that naval strategy should be based almost exclusively on the use of submarines, first and foremost, until such time as a new fleet, based on the Arctic Sea and the Pacific, could be built.

The third meeting of the Government then took place, and it was in the preparations for it that I became involved. For this meeting, a briefing was to be presented by the intelligence service on NATO's defense planning, particularly regarding strategy, the use of air power, and invasion. When my collaborator, the Soviet general, came to tell of our common task, he started off by saying that he was highly pleased that I had been able to obtain such good contacts. He recalled a host of information on how it had been possible to discover a great amount of intelligence work in Moscow that was being carried on by the NATO embassies under the guidance of the Americans. He pointed out that reports had been obtained and related a similar story to the one I have already given in connection with the Americans. He went on to say that it was necessary to obtain some idea of what these activities were aimed at. He thought that, if a reasonable amount of information could be obtained on this point, it should be useful as an indication of NATO's defense and war planning. Of course it was not intended that use would be made only of this information, but that information should be obtained on the subject from all parts of the world. He explained also that I was without doubt the most competent person to

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obtain the desired information among all that could be thought of. He pointed out also the importance of this because of the fact that it was desired to have a brief prepared for a given date for the meeting. And he stressed the need to concentrate on this to the exclusion of everything else.

The task was easier for me than he could ever have thought. Thanks to my role as double agent in this field, it was almost comical. I could get a report from my Soviet contact man that, from his point of view, was fairly hard to obtain. When I would meet my American contact man later, I would get a direct reply to the question in the form of a report from him, as well as a task from him. It began to be a question of a very important relationship on the Soviet side, so that it was no longer a question of the verbal reporting that I spoke of earlier. It was a question of exact information that would reach even almost to the highest levels, and it became a question in part of written reports. The information that I gave to my Soviet contact man showed very quickly that the American intelligence service was interested almost exclusively in the parts of the jig-saw puzzle concerning bombing targets. We set up a map at our headquarters outside of Moscow on which we marked all the information regarding targets that I was able to obtain. And after a while, reports began to come in even from other sources. Little by little, it was possible to observe a pattern in the selection of the bombing targets. With each week that passed it became more and more clear that the bombing targets were exclusively those concerned in some way with air attacks against the homeland: factories, powerplants, antiaircraft batteries, and so on, with no indication on the contrary of anything to do with invasion.

I became convinced from my side that the picture that was building up on the map agreed with information coming in from other parts of the world. Taken together, everything began to show little by little that the essence of NATO's planning was air attacks against the Soviet Union and no invasion.

It became clear to me also that it was the task of the Soviet intelligence service to give a detailed report on the foundations for this opinion to the Government at the meeting. It became clear to me also that it would be difficult for the military and political leaders to accept this idea because of an inherent leaning toward land-based strategy. The Soviet general said at one time that there had been no difficulty in coming to a decision in the Government when it came to building up the submarine fleet, but that when it came to replacing the traditional land-based strategy by one based on air power, the job was a lot harder. The result was that particularly clear proofs had to be presented in order to make any progress.

Among the many peculiarities in this international game, I should mention that the American Embassy was also putting together a map with targets marked on it. The American map came to have a special meaning for my future relations with the Soviet intelligence service. This came from the fact that I told my Soviet contact man of the existence of the American map from the very beginning, even though I never got to see any details on it. In addition, thanks to certain information I furnished, I was able to get a copy of the map. Certain details have been abridged about this particular matter, but it will be taken up under the heading: "Collaboration with the Soviets."

As I said before, certain difficulties were expected in the briefing to be given at the approaching Government meeting. Since a copy of the American map had been obtained in the meantime, there was now the advantage of being able to show the American map and compare it with the target map that had been made at my headquarters outside of Moscow. The copy of the American map thus became an obvious piece of evidence. Of course my contact man, the Soviet general, had pointed out to the head of the Soviet intelligence service that it was thanks to me that they had been so fortunate from their point of view in the way things had turned out. The head of the intelligence service [said] that, because of this, I would be given what the Soviets call a top agent's authority. The title of top agent means, first of all, that the agent will be given independent assignments, which he will carry through to the best of his ability. He will be given no detail work. Secondly, it means that the agent has full control over funds; thus it

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is never necessary to request authority for expenses, for example, if bribes are to be paid to a certain person, if a trip is to be made, and so on. In addition, a rank is assigned to the top agent—in my case that of major general. This is of no direct value in itself, since the agent does not have a permanent position, but it does have a most important bearing on the agent's relations with personnel belonging to the Soviet intelligence service. And it makes it possible to go over the head of certain persons.

S: I should like to ask two questions in this area. First, what was the result of this promotion from the point of view of income? And, second, can you tell us approximately when this took place?

W: Regarding the economic side, let me say that there are two sides to it. The first can be called expenses resulting from the activities themselves; the second is the personal compensation received. I assume the question concerned the pay.

S: I was concerned with clearing up the difference in personal income as compared to what was received previously. From previous testimony, I know, in connection with the 10,000 rubles that Nikitushev turned over to you, 5,000 rubles were promised per month, and it was about this principally that I was concerned.

W: Yes, that amounted to personal compensation, and it is correct as it says here that I first received 10,000 rubles, old rubles, as my pay, and then it was arranged with Nikitushev so that I received a regular 5,000 rubles a month.

This arrangement of so much per month doesn't apply in the case of a top agent. It is assumed in the case of a top agent that he lives normally under certain conditions, and that he has a certain income, so that he needs no additional funds for his normal daily life. It is also felt that, since he has full authority to pay out money and can decide on the purposes and amounts, he can take out a certain minimum for himself, just so it doesn't attract attention. At the same time, there is nothing against having money deposited for his account at the main headquarters of the Soviet intelligence service, and that these funds, on later occasions, may be used when circumstances are such that their withdrawal will not cause questions.

Concerning my relations with my contact man, the Soviet general, he was also involved in this question, so that he could see to it that goods or money deposited for me could be withdrawn on later occasions.

Now I carried on these activities for a very long time, and the general impression was that I had taken out very little for my own account. The attitude was, therefore, that whenever it became necessary in the future, I could reckon on very large payments from the Soviet side.

In answer to the other question, the time was toward the end of 1949.

S: I would like to ask something else in this same connection. Was it true that you were appointed as a top agent exclusively because of the assistance you had given with the information already referred to, and without any training at all from their side? Was there no training at all for intelligence work?

The examination is interrupted for a few minutes at 1415 hours.

(The examination is resumed again at 1435 hours.)

W: There are special training establishments in the Soviet Union under the direction of the intelligence service, but there was never any thought in my case of having me undergo training. What was of value from their point of view was the knowledge and connections I had when I started out. For the sake of completeness, perhaps I should mention that there was talk of my going to the Soviet Union for a geodesics course, but nothing came of it because of my arrest here in Stockholm.

On the other hand, there were certain small matters that I was thought to have a knowledge of that were useful in intelligence work. The most important factor in this continuous training—if I may use the term—lies especially in the orientation that I obtained in an increasingly wide field as time passed. I have already given examples earlier in my testimony of greater political and military orientation.

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Let me go back now to the third meeting of the Soviet Government. The briefing given at the meeting by the intelligence services among others led to the acceptance of the line of thought that NATO's defense planning was based on air attacks against the Soviet Union. At this meeting, it was determined as the first stage in the decisions that the highest priority should be given to building up antiaircraft defenses. This was obviously necessary in view of the aforementioned developments.

The political as well as the military leaders had now gone over from the old attitude based on land strategy to an outlook based more on air power, and to this reasoning had to be added the problem of how to develop Soviet strategic air power. There was no firm decision at this meeting, however, something that would be changed at the fourth meeting.

With the work of the third meeting then, the first task that the Soviet general and I had worked on was concluded, so it was now time for new tasks to be taken up. A new orientation was introduced by my collaborator. He pointed out now that since the antiaircraft defenses had been given high priority, so far as the military was concerned, it remained an obvious fact that if the argument had been accepted that NATO would make use of air attacks as the means of subduing the Soviet Union, it would be necessary to build up the air defenses against them. There was only one system of air defense in the world that could serve as a model for this, and this was the British. I was thus given the task of trying to obtain information on what part of it could be used in the planning of the Soviet air defenses. The general pointed out further the need to find out everything possible on the details of how the American strategic air force was formed, how its activities were organized, and above all in what fashion it was thought that it would be employed against the Soviet Union.

Some background information is required at this point. I mentioned previously that, after studying the complete report on the results of the bomb raids on Germany, it was decided that strategic bombing would be the basis of NATO's defense planning. I mentioned then also that one of the consequences of this was the enlargement of the American intelligence service. Another consequence was that the American strategic air force was given top priority, and America undertook a rapid and powerful development of this weapon. Planes began to be built that had considerably greater range than previous ones. Airbases were built in allied nations so that aircraft could be used that had a more restricted range. Apparatus was perfected for refueling of planes in the air. Work went on at a high pitch in the development of the atom bomb and even greater efforts were put forth in the development of the hydrogen bomb. New types of planes were developed that would accompany the bombers, and new bombsights and navigational apparatus were developed. It is public knowledge that this intense activity was looked on with the greatest uneasiness by the Soviets.

This was reflected in the tasks given to me by my Soviet contact man. He wanted to obtain all possible details on the American strategic bomber's development. And everyone knows that there was also great interest in the planning of airbases so that countermeasures could be studied according to the routes from the bases into Soviet territory.

Now, all these tasks lay completely within the natural bounds of my knowledge as an air force officer. It can certainly be said that it was a coincidence both for me and for Soviet intelligence that I happened to be an air force officer at the moment when what occupied the center of the stage for the Soviet political and military leaders was precisely the problem of air defenses and air power strategy.

I had no other means of fulfilling these tasks in Moscow than those already described; namely, my contacts with American personnel in the first place and with personnel of the other NATO nations in the second, and by means of conversations with travelers especially when they returned from their trips to their headquarters in attempts to obtain different details. In addition, scattered bits of information could come in the reports received at the Swedish Embassy. Back home in Stockholm, I had the possibility of going over certain publications or similar sources of information on the matter in question. They were few in number, but their contents were obviously of definite value.

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S: Perhaps I can put in a question about the last commission given you as a result of the third meeting of the Government. You said that it was desired to find out how the British air defenses had developed after the war, and it would be of interest to know how you obtained your contacts.

W: It was done in the same way as for the information on the American situation. One source of information was the British air attaché, and another was the British Ambassador in Moscow. Later on, I made use of publications that I came across in Stockholm.

I was given a third task somewhat later on. It is of special interest that this was the first time that rockets came into the picture. As the years passed, the importance of rockets grew of course. Some background information may be useful at this point. It is well known that, during World War II, the Germans developed the V-2, which was used against London. In the meantime, a project had been under development in Germany when the war came to an end. This was a rocket that would reach the United States from Germany. Information on the details of construction of this rocket was obtained by both the Americans and the Soviet Union at the end of the war. This third commission was relatively simple: the Soviet general wanted me to do all I could to find out if the Americans had continued research on the German rocket or if they had let the matter drop.

(The examination is stopped at 1615 hours.)

S: The examination is resumed on Thursday, 23 January 1964 at 1045 hours at the same place and with the same examiner and the same witness.

Colonel Wennerstrom, we ended yesterday's examination with a recollection on your part of the commission given to you as a result of the third Government meeting, and today we want to continue with the fourth meeting of the Soviet Government and the changes that resulted from it.

W: We come now to the next phase of the developments from the Soviet side, and that is the fourth Government meeting. Since this had a fundamental influence on my future activities, I find I must go into it in detail. Before that, I should interject a short account concerning my relations with my Soviet contact man.

S: The examination is adjourned at 1140 hours for lunch.

(The examination is started again at 1215 hours.)

W: Among the many different methods used by Soviet intelligence, there is one called pair-work. It is seldom used, but it was the one used in my case. The pair consisted of my contact man: the general, and me. The two-man team is used when there is an agent from who it is felt that qualified information can be obtained and a fully qualified person who can be spared from within the service. From then on, the pair works in more or less close contact depending on how best the results can be obtained. In any case, however unusual the two-man may be, in our case it continued for 14 years. Had I not been arrested, it is probable from what I had understood that it would have gone on for at least another 5 years. I should explain that my contact man should be retired now, by 1964 or 1965, but a special arrangement had been arrived at by which he would not retire until we had finished our work together. As I mentioned earlier, his increasingly wide experience and background of knowledge became of significant importance, to the extent that it awakened my interest, carried me along, and engendered my enthusiasm, all of which was further sharpened by his personal knowledge.

What I am about to relate now about the fourth meeting of the Soviet Government is an entirely well-documented account. I should point out, however, that when the meeting took place—during my stay in Stockholm—I did not know all the details of it that I now know; these were given to me over the course of the years by the Soviet general. It had already been decided definitely during the third meeting that priority would be given to air defenses. If it was possible to achieve a strong air defense system, that would in itself be a delaying factor and an impediment, but it could not be said to be of

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any greater value from the point of view of discouraging the enemy. Especially not when it was recalled that the American nation had assembled all its resources in order to build up an effective strategic air force. At this fourth meeting, the purpose was to come to a decision on a deterrent that could be put to use at the moment and that could also function to prevent war over a long period of time.

What came into the picture as the immediate deterrent was the Soviet Union's own strategic air force. It was immediately obvious, however, that if such a deterrent was to have any practical application, it would have to be capable of reaching American territory. It would also be necessary to achieve a position of such strength that a balance would be established. In other words, the effective force that the American strategic air force could apply against the Soviet Union had to be more or less balanced by the effective force the Soviet Union's strategic air power could bring to bear on America. No extensive explanations were necessary to show the impossibility of such a thing. The quality and quantity of the Soviet strategic air power lay far below that of the Americans from the very start. The Americans were engaged in building a system of air bases around the Soviet Union's borders, which made it possible to make use of long-range aircraft flying directly from the United States as well as short-range planes taking off from forward bases.

From its side, the Soviet Union had no possibility of obtaining a ring of forward bases against America, but could depend only on long-range aircraft, of which not a single one was under construction at that time. An armaments race with the United States in this area had to be considered as entirely hopeless.

Was there any other means of reaching American territory and thus achieving the balance of power that was aimed at. We come now to the interest that I have mentioned for the German rocket project, meaning a rocket that could be shot from Europe to the United States. Soviet Intelligence was of the opinion that the material that was found in Germany at the end of the war, and that had been taken in part to America and in part to the Soviet Union, had not been used for further research by either country. It was thought that there was a possibility here. If the highest priority were given to the development of long-distance rockets, it might be possible to surpass the United States in this field. There was also a much smaller risk of being surpassed in this development by the United States. The decision to do this was also the most important one taken during the fourth meeting.

For any usefulness to result from a project gobbling up billions in the development of a long-distance rocket, the weapon had to be provided with a nuclear warhead. The V-2 attacks on London had already shown that the effect of ordinary explosives was far too little to be worthwhile.

From this point of view, the situation in the Soviet Union was favorable. It had been found that, at the end of the war, research was being done in Germany aiming at the development of hydrogen bombs. The result was that the Soviet Union had set up an organization immediately after the end of the war that took up the groundwork done by the Germans and went on from there; for that matter, in part with the help of German scientists.

In addition, by means of an intensive espionage program, the progress in development of the atom bomb in America had been absorbed, beginning with the two atom bombs released over Japan in 1945. At that time, however, the Soviet Union was not able to properly correlate all that the Germans and Americans had done. This led to the establishment of an independent organization that worked on the information being obtained from the United States. At the time of the fourth government meeting, there were already two organizations at work: one for development of the atom bomb, the other for that of the hydrogen bomb.

The decision regarding rockets came thus to include the decision to give the highest priority to continuation of research on the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb with the aim of having nuclear warheads ready by the time the rockets had been developed. I might add parenthetically that in the years immediately following the fourth meeting, the first thing achieved by the Soviet Union was the atom

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bomb. By that time, it had also been determined that the atom bomb would have to be used as the fuse for the hydrogen bomb. It could thus be seen that it had been the wisest possible foresight to go ahead with the original German V-bomb research, because as things came out the hydrogen bomb was ready very shortly after the atom bomb.

From the economic side, consequently, all the necessary elements were provided for development of the rockets and nuclear warheads. This made it necessary to be sparing in expenditures for other fields of defense. It is worth remarking in this connection that there are two military areas that have always been foremost in Soviet military thinking: submarines and rockets. It is remarkable to find that modern developments in the Soviet Union have shown that the greatest weight should be given to these elements.

As a consequence of the decision taken, it was also decided of course to develop strategic aircraft according to the most modern techniques, but to limit their aims to European and Asiatic targets, particularly in consideration of the American forward bases. Here of course the political factor arose. Could it be expected that this threat, against the European countries for example, would prevent them, in case of war, from allowing the United States to make use of the airbases on their territory?

S: What, then, was the result of the explanations your contact man gave to you about the results of this meeting? Was there any fundamental change in the commissions you were charged with as a result of the meeting?

W: I learned from my contact man that as a result of the developments, thousands of agents had been put to work little by little in the NATO countries to obtain information on the construction of the airbases, and above all the American contributions in different respects. He explained that this was a typical jig-saw puzzle that had to be assembled. A picture of the situation that became clearer and clearer was built up at the headquarters of the intelligence service.

What was a special importance was whether it would be possible to establish a complete and detailed table of the distribution of American aircraft so that it would be possible to see at all times exactly what the units were and where they were stationed. This was to apply to the entire world. The reason for the importance of this knowledge was that it made it possible to obtain an overall picture that was known to be correct at any given moment, which in turn would make it possible to correct the thousands of data coming in from every side in such a way as to have a correct appreciation of the situation at all times.

My contact man wanted me to keep my eyes open to see what I could uncover on this score. This was a task I could also develop little by little back in Stockholm, and further circumstances on this subject are given under the heading: "Collaboration with the Soviets." I had come across a similar arrangement some years earlier in Washington, and with what I have just described in mind I sent in a correlation that thus gave intelligence headquarters in Moscow a means to establish a situational chart.

In addition, it was desired that I should continue so far as possible to provide information on American strategic aviation, but concentrating now on what was most important. The indication of what was most important came to be more and more typical of the work as time passed. In this respect, they wanted me to be specific about flight routes into the Soviet Union, which targets had been selected, information on escort and fighter planes that would protect the bombers, and so on. And this is when technological details first entered the picture in the form of requests for me to obtain every possible kind of detail on the development of bombsights for the strategic bombers. This was obviously something that had to be developed for the Soviet strategic bombers and thus information they were anxious to have.

I should mention at this point that with the position I had in Moscow, intelligence of a technological nature was hard to come by. I mention this because this area came later on to be typical of my activities.

Finally, information was desired on a continuing basis—so far as possible—on British air defenses from the point of view that they could serve as a pattern.

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S: Perhaps I can ask, What were your qualifications from the point of view of what was required just then that could be of help to the Soviets while you were stationed in Moscow?

W: My qualifications for this work had not changed in principal but were the same ones I have already mentioned when speaking of the commissions I was charged with after the third meeting. In the meantime, I enlarged my contacts with the Americans in particular and with NATO countrymen in general, and my first contacts were more and more valuable with the passage of time as I came to know the person better and better. What was also of special importance was that I also worked for the Americans, so that I was looked on by the Americans who knew this as on their team. It should be borne in mind especially that the tasks with which I was charged were given to me by the American air attaché, so that it is obvious that my relations with him were on the same basis of those with the Soviet general. Here also there were conversations on a variety of subjects, and although I would not say that the relationship was the same as on the Soviet side, they were of a similar nature. It is natural, however, that my truly great opportunities did not open up until I went to Washington.

S: From what you have just told us, it seems obvious that your collaboration with the Soviet general and contact man influenced you to such an extent that your interest in working with the Soviets soon came to be preponderant, and that your interest in collaborating with the Americans no longer had the same significance as it had in the beginning. Is this correct?

W: This is absolutely right, and this perhaps calls for some additional explanation. When I first jumped into international espionage among the big powers, I had a feeling of sympathy for NATO and an antipathy for the Soviet Union. It so happened, however, that during my stay in Moscow there was a progressive change in my sympathies, which ended up by swinging completely to the other side. What I have said may be incomprehensible to those who may read this, since the normal attitude in Sweden is the reverse, but I cannot do otherwise than to relate how things actually developed. A strong supplementary reason was that I had a chance to see behind the scenes on both sides. It was entirely obvious that the Soviet intelligence efforts were of a defensive nature and that those of the Americans were offensive.

If I had fulfilled my original intentions as a result of my conversation \* \* \* in Stockholm, then I would have so to speak delivered my Soviet contact man to my American one. Such a thing became very quickly repulsive to me. So the final consequence was that I became a double agent.

As a result of the concatenation of events and the undoubtedly great influence that the Soviet general's personality had on me, I came to feel myself more and more a trusted member of a powerful organization. To this must be added the fact that I had been fortunate in my activities in a way, which had not corresponded to anything that I had intended to undertake in the course of my life.

The transformation in my attitude went a step farther, I might say, to the point that I looked on my work with the Americans as an excellent way to achieve better results for the Soviet intelligence service.

I can say also without hesitation that, after about 2 years a significant feeling of loyalty began to grow in me toward both my Soviet contact men as persons and toward the organization in its entirety. I never went so far, however, as to mention to my Soviet contact man anything about my relationship with the Americans.

S: Before we go into a more detailed account of the different tasks, perhaps you should describe the end of your Moscow assignment and include at the same time how you came to be sent to Washington as air attaché, and in part how the Soviets discovered your collaboration with the Americans, and finally the orientation given to you by the Soviet general and contact man before you definitely left Moscow.

The examination is suspended at 1430 hours, since Colonel Wennerström is expecting a visit.

(The examination is resumed on Friday, 24 January at 1040 hours at the same place and with the same examiner and witness.)

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W: The first of the three questions concerns how I became air attaché in Washington. I should point out that from the Soviet side there was no expectation whatever that could happen, or that from their point of view they could be so fortunate as for me to be sent to Washington. So far as the Soviets are concerned, this development must be considered as purely accidental. They were interested, on the contrary, in having me remain in Moscow as long as possible. They began to have vague ideas about this time, however, about the possibility of making use of me after my assignment in Moscow would have come to a close. These ideas had not taken shape, however, before I informed them that I would be sent to Washington as air attaché. Their thoughts followed the same course as they did much later when it was settled that I would work for them in Spain.

The situation on the Swedish side developed as a result of the conversation I had had with General Nordenskiöld before I was appointed as air attaché in Moscow. He had mentioned then, without any sort of promise at all, that he would try to see that I obtained a similar assignment abroad when my tour in Moscow had finished.

On one of my trips back to Stockholm, I had a talk with General Westring about how long I could expect to remain in Moscow. I remember saying that I was very happy with my Moscow assignment and was not at all averse to having it extended several years. At the same time, I recalled what General Nordenskiöld had mentioned, and said that I would naturally be very interested in changing my assignment to either London or Washington. We had altogether only three air attachés. He then asked if there was anything special I was interested in, and I replied that I was most interested in Washington. Colonel von Schinkel was air attaché in Washington at that time, and there was no thought of bringing him home. This was, then, merely a casual conversation, even though Von Schinkel's situation had been mentioned in it.

Colonel von Schinkel took sick some time later and returned to Stockholm, at which time it was decided that he would not go back to Washington. General Westring then wrote to me in Moscow explaining the situation and mentioned that they would have to come to a quick decision on a replacement in Washington. He referred to our earlier conversation and asked if I would be willing to take the post. I accepted it by cablegram. I learned in a second communication from General Westring that I could consider the matter as settled, even though formal orders had not yet been issued, and that I should plan to make the change on 1 April 1952.

I could thus inform my Soviet contact man that it was certain that I would go to Washington. This came as a complete surprise to him and to his superior, and their reaction was somewhat as though they had just won the big prize in a lottery. I can say in brief that the Soviets were setting great store on the possibility of my working for them in the United States.

My activities for Soviet intelligence now sank into the background, and the principal interest centered around my coming activities in Washington, which became the subject for a series of deliberations during various meetings. About the middle of this period of discussions, the occurrence mentioned in your second question took place; namely, the Soviets discovered my connections with the Americans.

The discovery was not the result of any sort of cleverness on the part of the Soviets or of any carelessness or lack of caution from my side. It was the result of carelessness by the Americans. The Soviets had sufficiently impressed on everybody, and that included me, that the real name of an agent should never be used in his reports in the intelligence service. A code name or a cover name was always to be used. As I mentioned earlier, I had already had occasion to use the designation "Örnen" (Eagle). A cipher came to be used later, but a cipher that could not be deciphered. The result was a difficult and hard to handle cipher. The Americans broke both of these fundamental rules.

In a radio report, they used my name as well as a cipher that the Soviets were able to break. The whole thing came about through an entirely routine monitoring by the Soviets. Radio messages from the radio station in the American Embassy were monitored and the ciphered material was assembled and efforts made to decode it, which

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was possible at times. When it was possible to break a code, the message in that code was automatically clear of course. I know that on certain occasions also the Soviets had been able to obtain the key to codes from the American Embassy. The radio message in question referred to certain information I had furnished upon my return from certain trips. After the Soviets had checked their procedure, they had no doubt at all about my being a double agent.

I was told of the discovery at a meeting in the villa outside of Moscow that served as our headquarters. My first reaction was one of unheard of bitterness against the Americans for not being able to protect themselves better. I was faced with this entirely unexpected situation, and of course I had no idea at the beginning of what I should do. I had no idea what might be the Soviet reaction. I remember that I thought it strange that the Soviet general had with him on this occasion no less than four other persons. Because of this circumstance, the first thought that went through my head was that it was very possible that they were prepared to liquidate me with a shot in the nape of the neck or something similar. We were a long distance from Moscow, and nobody knew where I was. It developed however that I was completely mistaken in my suppositions on how the Soviet intelligence service would react. I don't know what happened between my contact man the general and his superior before our meeting. One thing stood out clearly, however, and that was that my contact man was heart and soul on my side. There was not a single word from the Soviets of reproach or bad humor about their having been misled. The Soviet general had thought about my situation before, and he and several of his superiors had wondered many times how I could possibly obtain the information I did from the Americans. He said now, "Here is the explanation of your success."

I took up later the question of sympathies, saying that neither he nor anyone else had any doubts whatsoever of where my sympathies lay in the game. He went on to explain that if the discovery had occurred at a considerably earlier stage, it could have had consequences that there was no use in even talking about now. As things now stood, it was a tremendous advantage to have contacts within the American intelligence service. And looking toward my coming appointment to Washington, it was the desire of the Soviets that I continue to cultivate these contacts as though nothing had happened, and that I should if possible make them even more intimate.

Consequently, it can be said that from my side the swing to the Soviet side was complete and definitive. I had arrived in Moscow with sympathy for America and NATO and antipathy for the Soviet Union. I had come to Moscow with the intention of insinuating myself into Soviet intelligence as a false agent. The net result upon leaving Moscow is that the United States and NATO are antipathetic to me and that all my sympathy lies on the side of the Soviets. Instead of being a false agent inside of Soviet intelligence, I am now this same thing within the American organization.

It may be asked how the Soviets never discovered my activities, leaving aside the carelessness of the Americans with the radio message. To this I would reply that it must have been very difficult to discover my doings. The situation was that I had special orders from the Soviet side to cultivate as much as possible my contacts with the Americans and to make these contacts as close as I could. So that to have discovered that I was an American agent in such a milieu had to be very difficult.

As I have said, the Soviet security chief was present on this occasion. The Soviet general ended the conversation, as I have described, by explaining that the security chief had been given certain instructions about me when I first came to Moscow, and one of his tasks had been to watch over my security. He then turned to the security chief and said that he could testify with satisfaction that he had watched over my safety with great care, both while I was operating as a Soviet agent and as an American one.

S: I think I can understand the judgment your Soviet contact man arrived at in the situation you have described, but I would still like to ask a question on something that is still not clear.

Were no question asked and was no check made on what you had delivered to the Americans during all this time about the Soviet situation?

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W: Yes, this was investigated. Very little was revealed, however, that was useful to them from their standpoint. The situation had been that I had been gathering information for the Americans on bombing targets. I had had instructions at the same time from the Soviets to find out which were the targets. The result was that I came to the Americans with bits of the jigsaw puzzle concerning the overall objective, and I could see that this information was plotted on an American situations map along with many other data. I came to know little by little what the bombing targets were, or at least a part of them. This information I turned over in turn to the Soviets, who plotted the bombing targets on their own map.

S: It can be interesting also to know what this meant for the future. Were you to continue with the contacts you already had, naturally with frankness toward the Soviets in telling them of your contacts, but did you reach an agreement on this?

W: Yes, that is quite correct.

S: The examination is recessed at 1145 hours.

(The examination is resumed at 1215 hours.)

W: I come now to the third question. It concerns the orientation I received before my departure for America. And further, what tasks I was expected to carry out.

In summing this up, some background explanation may be useful. I would like to recall the fourth meeting of the Soviet Government, at which it was decided to concentrate on the military and technological development of intercontinental rockets and of nuclear weapons.

Regarding the research on rockets, they started with the German work as a basis. This was a rather weak foundation, so a long period of development was foreseen. It can be said that rocket development was undertaken with the aim of achieving complete parity in the 1960's. This was done at the expense of a calculated acceptance of a period of weakness in the military field. This period came to embrace the entire decade of the 1950's. This period in the 1950's was one of great nervousness about both the political and the military situation of the Soviet Union. Even though research and development were being concentrated on long-distance rockets and nuclear weapons, a whole series of other areas had to be developed simultaneously, although it was necessary to count on limited economic and manpower resources for the purpose. The development of aircraft and of other types of rocket weapons was involved. I mean by the latter such things as air defense rockets, rockets with a shorter range, air-to-air rockets, etc.

In order to carry out these developments, and above all to save time, it was considered imperative to establish a particularly extensive intelligence service. The aim was to obtain intelligence on modern developments in foreign countries that could be either copied by the Soviet scientists and technicians or form the basis for modifications in the Soviet program.

A further consideration was that, at this time, the Soviets had already been able to build up a suitable intelligence system concerning the NATO bases and the distribution of forces, but against this the intelligence network on technical and scientific matters was still undeveloped.

S: We must recess the examination at 1250 hours, since Colonel Wennerstroem does not feel well.

S: The examination is resumed on Tuesday, 28 January 1964 at 1015 hours at the same place with the same examiner and the same witness.

W: The first step in the preparations was of course an explanation from my side of the activities that I would cover in the United States. This concerned the Swedish outlook. What struck the observer first was the unusual double function of my office in Washington, or of what would be my office. There was first of all the usual office of an air attaché with its normal functions; then in addition, there was a special purchasing office set up by the Air Force administration and staffed by members from it.

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I should add that this information about Washington was already known to me in Moscow because of the yearly meetings in Stockholm of air attachés, who came back for the purpose.

Considered from the point of view of the money involved, the purchasing section was quite important. The most characteristic feature of this activity was, in the meantime, the large number of articles of most modern construction that were purchased in limited quantities. It can be said that the activity so far as purchasing went was much greater as to contacts with industries and other sources of material than the value of the goods purchased implied.

I indicated also the scope of my work as air attaché insofar as I was informed. Activities in this branch of my office were also directed largely toward the technical side. Efforts were made among other things to obtain technical descriptions of modern materiel.

My description indicated thus that my activities in Washington would be largely directed to the technical aspect of matters. This fitted in very well with the picture so far as Soviet intelligence was concerned. As I said, in the background briefing the need had been stressed for building up an extensive intelligence service of a technical nature. The result was that in principle I should devote myself to the solution of technical tasks during my stay in Washington.

In all my work with Soviet Intelligence, the principle of concentration on a specified field of activity was always stressed. This had begun in Moscow, and the assignments in America became another good example. This very thing has been difficult for certain interested persons in intelligence work in Sweden to understand on a later occasion. Using this approach, the Soviets adopted methods that put certain fields outside of my responsibilities, so that I did not have to concern myself with them. This made it possible to neglect unnecessary intelligence, which would have given unnecessary work back in Moscow, regarding the American sector, where the service was already overburdened, and it gave the further advantage of not overloading communications and of avoiding unnecessary risks. To the extent that it was necessary to take risks, they were taken for something useful. I learned in this connection that there was an agent, or agents, inside the Pentagon. The Soviets were not interested, therefore, in the situation in the Pentagon as regards organization and personnel, for example, telephone books and personnel lists. So far as I was concerned, they were not interested in the composition of American military forces in the United States or elsewhere in the world. The espionage network was so well organized in this respect that there was no use for me to report on what planes might be stationed at different bases in America.

There was, however, an exception. They pointed out \* \* \*. It had been possible for them to obtain a complete and exact picture at a given moment of \* \* \*. It was thus possible to correct mistakes that had occurred and that could otherwise have continued. They could also make comparisons on how different agents had made their reports. If I could discover in the future similar complete \* \* \*, then I should send it in. This was not given to me as a definite task, but only something not to be overlooked if the occasion came my way.

### Task 1

What they were interested in regarding organization was any changes that might take place on which they could not obtain reports from different sources. We can call this task 1 for the sake of good order.

### Task 2

During my stay in Moscow, my most important task had been to follow as far as possible the planning work concerned with air warfare against the Soviet Union. This task was to be continued in Washington, so we can call it task 2.

Stress was placed here on the role the American Navy would play in this area. There was a reason for this special stress, since as air attaché in Washington I would be accredited not only to the air force but also to the navy. The navy has an air arm in the United States but is of enormous proportions compared to European standards.

The principal task, namely, intelligence of a technical nature, was concerned with more explicit information on preparations and progress.

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### *Task 3*

The development of nuclear weapons had the very highest priority in the Soviet Union. It was thus obvious that they wanted information on this subject. It was very quickly explained, however, that it would be meaningless for me to concentrate exclusively on this area. This was not to be thought of—with one exception: that I should keep informed on the extent to which information on this subject was being given to Great Britain. I shall call that task 3.

S: The examination is recessed at 1130 hours.

(The examination is resumed at 1200 hours.)

W: Intercontinental rockets now found themselves within Priority 1 also. The Soviets had the idea that these were the first to be started, as I have already said. Therefore, there could be no thought of following up initial development.

### *Task 4*

On the other hand, it was desired that I should follow up any possible signs of development that might be undertaken. Information of this kind, if anything new developed, was thought to be available from the immediate staff of Werner von Braun, the German scientist. He was the scientist who led the V-2 developments in Germany and who was taken over by the Americans after the war. It was known that he was working in the United States with very great resources available for his work. I shall call this task 4.

### *Task 5*

I come now to task 5, which was the principal one for me. This was to keep up with technical developments of aircraft and robot planes of different kinds, bombsights, especially for atom bombs as well as for fighter planes. In addition, development in radar and in radio, especially in very high frequencies. Further, photographic equipment and miniaturization in the electronics field. I have already explained that it was in this area that the Soviet scientists and technicians needed help so they could copy the new developments or obtain ideas that would assist toward obtaining better solutions to technical problems. For the information to be of value, it had to concern completely new construction. As a general rule, nothing was to be sent in that had not come out in the current year, or at the latest in the previous one. This portion of my activities lay entirely within the limits of my Swedish work.

I recall asking if they were interested in this respect in biological and chemical weapons. The question of biological warfare had arisen during my stay in Moscow. Information on this will be found under the heading "Collaboration with the Soviet Union." The answer to this question was, however, that there was no interest in this field so far as I was concerned. This resulted from the Soviet attitude that they were far ahead in these fields.

### *Task 6*

A further assignment, which I shall call task 6, had to do with American industry. It was explained that the technical intelligence section that was being built up was aimed in great measure toward American industry. In order to get agents into the right place and to have them working on the right objectives and in contact with the right persons, it was necessary to have a map of the distribution of industries, their organization, production, and activities. For my part, it was natural for me to have contacts with industries, partly through our purchasing activities, and partly because industry had to be the source of a great part of the information with which task 5 was concerned.

It was desired, therefore, that I should follow industry even more closely than would be necessary in carrying out my other assignments. I should thus obtain the best possible contacts with industries or with persons who visited them. They wanted me to contribute to the map of industries by means of the information of that kind that I named by way of introduction when it came to task 6.

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I have now reviewed the assignments given to me when I left Moscow. The details I gave regarding the six different tasks were given for the sake of clarity. The discussions about the assignments were so long drawn out and detailed that it is difficult to discern six separate tasks.

It can be said that the main theme of all these deliberations was the question of balance of power. As I have mentioned previously, the Soviet Union was striving to attain a political, military, and military technological balance of power. It was explained thus that, so far as nuclear weapons and intercontinental rockets were concerned, which were the most important things, they had confidence for the most part in their own strength. But when it came to the other areas in which I should work, they had limited resources of their own and had to depend on the results of the intelligence service. My contact man, the general, recalled our teamwork, however it might turn out, as a contribution to the great effort to achieve a balance of power.

S: While all these deliberations were going on, during which time you were being briefed on your eventual assignments in Washington, were there no instructions on how you were to carry out your activities there? Was there no talk of photographing or of how delivery should be made, where contacts would take place and how, or was this something to be arranged later?

W: Practically nothing at all was said on the subjects you are now asking about. I would point out in this respect that I had a top agent's authority, as I have already mentioned.

This meant that I myself was supposed to use my own resources in fulfilling my assignments. As for contacts in Washington, I was told only that the Soviet air attaché would be my contact. I was given a password for our first meeting. I was asked also how much money I would need to start with in Washington and told that the air attaché would have it on hand for me.

S: Could you tell us in a few words how your first contact in Washington was to be made? What was the password and how would it be used?

W: He would tell me that an acquaintance in Moscow had asked to be remembered to me, a man called Nikolaj Vasilevitj. And in reply I would thank him and say that I knew the person very well, and that I remembered having met him several times at a place in Moscow called Spiridonovka.

As for further meetings and dealing in Washington, this was left entirely to their air attaché to decide how to arrange these things depending on how many activities developed.

S: We have now gone through events from 1930 to 1952. The continuation of Wennerstroem's activity during his time in Washington will be taken up in the section called Washington Section.

We shall now come to exemplify and describe briefly some of the assignments Wennerstroem carried out.

\* \* \* \* \*

(The examination is recessed at 1505 hours.)

(The examination is resumed on Wednesday, 29 January 1964 at 1155 hours at the same place and with the same examiner and the same witness.)

S: In the account you gave about events from 1930 to 1952, you mentioned how your contact with the Americans came about and how you were given the first assignment from them in 1946; then how you were given further tasks \* \* \* so we shall not go into those details further at this time.

Instead, I am going to ask you to exemplify and to describe to some extent what happened during your time in Moscow, the trips, and the eventual tasks you carried out for the Americans.

I would mention that here also in this part we shall limit ourselves to describing mainly the assignments and to make the descriptions as brief as possible.

W: My collaboration with the Americans in Moscow was in part of a continuous character, in part based on special assignments I took on.

I shall begin with the continuing collaboration. As I have already said, the American service attachés and the service attachés of the other NATO nations made up a sort of common work team. They

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were all held on a tight rein by the Americans. I have also mentioned that the groups worked, often depending on circumstances, with civilian officers. Because of my special standing in connection with this, I came to become more or less a working member of this team. The special circumstances surrounding my situation were known, however, only to a small number of Americans. The continuing work concerned of course everything of military interest in the Soviet Union although bombing targets were the main objective. Through my collaboration in the continuing work, I came little by little to understand the way of thinking of the NATO members and had a fairly clear picture of what their fundamental assignments were. My collaboration in this is hard to exemplify and should be of little consequence. What is of special importance is the special assignment I spoke of.

The special assignment was based on the fact that I was going to travel around in the Soviet Union and that, therefore, I would not be so closely watched. The Soviet security service had a limited capacity, which was utilized for the most part against the Americans and their allies. Moreover, its capacity was not enough to do more than carry out sample vigilance or temporary shadowing. The special task was concerned, therefore, with long trips and with short visits in the vicinity of Moscow to places where I was the only one within the group that could get in. This sort of thing was not continuous but could embrace a stretch of time or a given point in time.

As examples, I have chosen three trips: to Siberia, to the Caucasus, and to the Ukraine. I can add a visit to a certain place outside of Moscow.

The trip to Siberia was by plane with stops at Kazanj, which lies to the west of the Urals and on their flank; at Sverdlovsk, which lies a little to the east of the Urals, and then on to Omsk, Tomsk, and Novosibirsk in Siberia. The same route was used on the return flight. The reason for the trip was originally an assignment from Sweden regarding Novosibirsk. I cannot remember what was wanted, but the report was sent in through the usual Embassy channels.

From the beginning, there was more general interest in this trip from the American point of view, as they were interested in all trips for the most part. There was, however, a very special reason that developed. Instead of landing at the commercial airfield in Kazanj, the plane came down at the military airbase lying to the east of Kazanj. The Americans suspected that this was a base for strategic bombers, but they knew nothing definite about it. There was a twofold interest in this base. First of all, all airbases in the Soviet Union for strategic bombers were automatically bombing targets; and second, they were interested in the strategic bombers themselves, since it was to be supposed that they were for use against the American forward bases. Attempts were made to obtain plane tickets to Siberia when the matter of the airbase in Kazanj became known. This could not be done, which increased the impression of the Americans that there was something special that was being hidden. This was in May 1950. The plane landed, as I said, at the strategic airbase, which appeared to be composed of two adjoining flying fields.

The bombers were of the latest type of Soviet strategic bombers. I was able to obtain relatively good information by personal observation from both the air and the ground. In addition, I took photographs with a telescopic lens from a toilet window at the station building set aside for passengers. I turned the film over later to my American contact man. Thanks to the telescopic lens, it was possible to discern all the details of the planes within its range.

To illustrate further the operations, I shall name another circumstance. The station's buildings were not intended for civilian passengers, since this was a purely accidental arrangement resulting from the stopover. The passengers had to stay at a sort of military mess. There was an announcement board in the mess, and on it was a notice of a job being offered for an aviation meteorologist at an airbase in Varlamovo, where the same pay would be received as for the corresponding position at Kazanj. The notice had been sent out from the staff headquarters of the strategic aviation command in Moscow. The notice gave me of course information on the existence of a further base at Varlamovo, which lies near Murmansk on the Arctic Sea.

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The trip to the Caucasus was camouflaged as a vacation trip. I took two members of my family with me, staying most of the time in Tiflis, Georgia. The Americans had found out through some agent I did not know that a factory between Tiflis and Baku had begun production of a jet fighter plane. They had also found out that the test flights of the plane would take place on certain days and over certain routes. My assignment was to discover what type of plane was being produced, always suppose of course that the information was true. Two points had been plotted from which it was expected that it would be possible to observe the test flights. One of the points was in Tiflis, the other some distance west of it. The reports turned out to be true. The plane arrived at the calculated time. I was able to identify the type, and thus the assignment was fulfilled.

The trip to the Ukraine resulted from an appointment I had with an eye doctor called Professor Filatov. The appointment took place in Moscow as the result of some special help I was to get from my Soviet contact man as to what contacts were worth in general among the members of the diplomatic corps. The professor in himself was of no interest to me or to the Swedish intelligence service, but he complemented my acquaintanceship in military circles. He was chief of the ophthalmological institute in Odessa, an institute that I learned later was the largest in Europe. As a result of our meeting, he invited me to visit him and inspect the institute. With this as an excuse, I made the trip to Odessa. The trip was of a more complicated nature and included train and bus. The task given me by the Americans seemed almost laughable at first glance. They wanted to know whether the roofs in a certain village were thatched or of sheet metal. The origin of this investigation had to do with American bombsights. The particular bombsight in question was constructed so that the plane could be navigated at night and flying over or in fog with the help of radar. A picture of the ground the plane was flying over was obtained in the bombsight by means of radar. Without going into details, it is enough to say that a village with sheet metal roofs would show up on the screen and that the other would not.

I made only one trip to do with sheet metal roofs, but any number of other persons made trips for the same purpose.

Here is where my position as double agent comes into the picture. I informed my Soviet contact man that the Americans were interested in sheet metal roofs, from a navigational point of view obviously. He began to plot sheet metal roofs on the situation map in the hope that it would be possible to figure out which bombing targets would be selected to attack by using these roofs as points along the course. It could be seen little by little, however, that there was no special kind of factory or something similar selected as the target; rather, the targets lay spread over the entire Ukraine and Kuban area. The latter lies north of the Caucasus. And there were no targets anywhere else. Little by little it became apparent that the object of the whole thing was to employ biological war materials against the harvests in the Ukraine and in Kuban, which are the Soviet Union's special breadbasket. To do so effectively, courses had to be set for the aircraft, for which purpose these points were needed over the flat plains, since it is difficult to navigate without them.

Let me say that later on during my tour in the United States I had a chance to see use was made of this information on sheet metal roofs.

The visit outside of Moscow concerned a summer villa belonging to a foreign journalist. He lived some 10 kilometers from a proving ground where jet engines and rockets were test run. This was in 1951. The journalist had told the American air attaché about the different kinds of noises he heard from the proving ground. The air attaché went out to the villa and listened several times, and he thought he could hear among other sounds that of tests of a V-2 rocket as well as sounds of new and more powerful jet engines. He became tired of making constant trips out to the villa, so he asked me if I could go out there a few times. The journalist was wild to try to obtain something suitable for publicity. What I was able to observe was that they were making test runs on an ordinary V-2, since the sound lasted 55 seconds, which is the normal burning time for the V-2 rocket. They tested also, however, a rocket that was twice as loud as the V-2, even though

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the burning time was the same. The sound was so loud that windows shook for miles around. I came to the conclusion myself that this was the first sample of the new Soviet rocket developments, which would consequently be the beginning of the intercontinental rocket research. I myself thought this was unusually interesting. This was, however, so late in the day—I mentioned 1951—that my change of sympathies had gone so far that I said nothing about it to my American contact man.

S: What you have just recounted is some of the big assignments you carried out. I should, however, like to hear something of the range of your activities, and how you yourself looked on this. Were there many trips besides these, and were there many assignments or few assignments beyond those mentioned that you carried out for the Americans? I would also like to know if you received any sort of compensation for this, either cash payments for the tasks you completed or if traveling expenses were paid on the trips you took?

W: I cannot say that the activities were of great scope. Beyond those I have mentioned, for example, there were only a few other longer trips or short tours around Moscow.

Regarding the trips and compensation, I was repaid for all my expenses; for example, when I went to Tiflis, the entire cost of the vacation for my family and me was paid. Beyond this, I received no pay at all except for certain valuta when I took my summer vacation in either 1950 or 1951.

S: The examination is recessed at 1355 hours.

(The examination is resumed at 1415 hours.)

S: During other testimony, you touched on one or more trips to Wiesbaden around 1950 or 1951, when you had contacts with American headquarters there.

Could you tell us something about these trips?

W: I visited Wiesbaden three times—twice during my Moscow tour, in 1951, and once while stationed in Stockholm. As I mentioned, Wiesbaden is of special interest in being the main headquarters of American Air Force in Europe. This is where my contact with the American air attaché in Moscow ended. The reason for my first visit was not connected with this at all however.

\* \* \* and it was thus that I became better acquainted with him.

\* \* \* He is now a colonel. I had mentioned in 1951 that I expected to travel from Stockholm to the French Riviera and back by car. \* \* \* suggested that I should stop over in Wiesbaden so we could meet. Thus I met \* \* \* and his wife and I and my wife in Wiesbaden. We were lodged by headquarters at a hotel that had been requisitioned by the Americans.

I met a number of American intelligence officers on that occasion, which had a certain importance when I went to Washington later on. My special activities for the Americans in the Soviet Union was never mentioned, and so far as I understood it was not known by anyone I met. It happened in the meantime that someone had expressed interest in meeting me who for some reason could not be in Wiesbaden at the time I was there. It was arranged, therefore, that I should stop off in Wiesbaden on my drive back. This time, headquarters had us put up at an entirely different place. I then met the person in question, whose name I cannot recall at this minute. He was acquainted with my work in the Soviet Union. What he wanted to find out especially was what I knew about the Varlamovo Air Base on the Arctic Sea. This had been one of the pieces of information I obtained during my Siberian trip. The particular interest in this base stemmed from its being thought that a base so far to the north would be a suitable takeoff point for flights over the North Pole and Canada to the United States.

Also, I met a number of other Americans I knew on my return trip, so there was a certain amount of intermingling. After this, I left Wiesbaden.

I can understand that this information on Wiesbaden should be included in the testimony for the sake of completeness. Except, however, for what I have just mentioned, the visits had no relation to my activities in Moscow. This was not at all a case of trips made as an assignment from the Americans.

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S: We have now completed the most important aspects of the American work, and we shall now go on and take up the collaboration with the Soviets.

The examination is recessed at 1515 hours.

(The examination is resumed on Thursday, 30 January 1964 at 1300 hours at the same place and with the same examiner and the same witness.)

### COLLABORATION WITH THE SOVIETS

S: Under this heading, the investigation distinguished markedly between what happened during Wennerstroem's tour of duty in Stockholm and his visits there, and what happened in Moscow and in the Soviet Union.

\* \* \* \* \*

Colonel Wennerstroem explained earlier regarding his collaboration with the Soviets in Moscow that there was very little of interest here from the Swedish point of view. He mentioned in earlier testimony, however, that his Soviet contacts suspected the whole time a certain collaboration with the NATO nations, and that Swedish neutrality was not always complete. He also spoke of the interest of the Soviets in knowing about the American assignments led to some of the information coming into the Swedish Embassy being turned over to the Americans.

I would like to ask you to develop this subject a little more.

W: The first question concerns the concern of the intelligence service in the Soviet Union for Swedish neutrality. The question is of special interest because this matter was of continuing interest from 1949 until the end of my activities. My first information about this led to the conclusion that Sweden's neutrality was unshakable and thus to be depended on from the Soviet point of view. Over the course of the years, however, one thing after another came to change the Soviets' confidence in this.

\* \* \* \* \*

W: The next question concerned to what degree information available in the Swedish Embassy was useful for my activities. As I have already explained, the Swedish situation was of very little interest. On the contrary, everything concerning NATO and the United States was of the highest interest. Activities within the Embassy were such that the Ambassador called me constantly into conferences. In addition to the Ambassador himself, the military attaché and I myself as well as the counsellor of embassy were usually present. All phases of the current situation were discussed at these conferences. Each one contributed information from within his field of interest and gave his opinion on it. Such information showed up often of course in the reports written by the Ambassador himself.

Documents of an informative character came into the Embassy, the most important ones in connection with our subject being copies of reports from Swedish embassies elsewhere. These reports were circulated among the four persons just named. A sprinkling of information on American or NATO activities came in these reports that I had use for. The whole thing, however, played a very minor role, and I cannot remember any exact details.

S: The examination is recessed at 1400 hours.

(The examination is resumed at 1415 hours.)

\* \* \* \* \*

In this section there is given only the American situation, meaning the information on the Americans that the colonel turned over to the Soviets.

W: I have already explained fairly completely the two-man teamwork with my Soviet contact man. It should be remembered that the Soviets already had built up an intelligence organization of considerable importance to work against NATO and the Americans in Moscow and the Soviet Union. It was only natural, therefore, that the scope of my activities in all of this had to be severely restricted, as I have already testified.

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The service I was able to render, and that nobody else in the Soviet intelligence organization could render, concerned my particularly intimate contacts with the American intelligence personnel at the American Embassy in Moscow. My first task was to build up these contacts as much as possible, and this was the first assignment that I completed. Thereafter, there were one or two assignments to obtain more precise information on certain subject of interest to the Soviets. Thanks to my contacts, I was also able to answer successively many questions put to me.

I have already explained how part of this information was plotted on a situations map on which intelligence from other sources was also plotted. I have also [told] how my reports were made part of the overall picture and how they were used.

Since we shall not go into too great detail here, I shall limit myself to referring, for example, to my remarks about biological warfare against harvests in the Ukraine and in Kuban. I should specify that biological warfare in this sense is of a bacteriological nature that is not directed against human beings.

S: The Colonel explained in previous testimony that his activities were only a small part of Soviet intelligence, and that use was made of bits of the jig-saw puzzle furnished by him to help in completing the entire picture.

Would you please give some examples of this.

W: One example is the sheet metal roofs in the Ukraine. (see p. —)

Another example is the situations map in the American Embassy that I spoke of earlier. It was a map on which information of this kind was plotted, so that it was possible to discern from it what the bombing targets were. I discovered accidentally that a copy of this map was to be sent by courier to Wiesbaden, which is to say that one of the younger military officers was to be the courier. I myself thought this information was entirely useless, but I still turned it over to my Soviet contact man. It so happened that the courier was to leave Moscow the evening of the day on which I gave the information to the Soviets. To my great surprise, my contact man was highly interested and wanted to know all about the trip, for example, who would be the courier, how would he travel, when would he leave, and so on. I heard nothing more about the matter for a short time, perhaps a week. Then my Soviet contact man made use of the direct line for contacting me in urgent matters, which was by means of the intelligence service's service car. That day, as I was walking from my home to the Embassy, this car passed me and drew up at short distance ahead at the curb. The general was in the car. I merely noted that the car had stopped and went on my way. I then went to the nearest telephone booth and called our secret telephone number. It was arranged for me to go out to our headquarters in the villa outside of Moscow. There, the general showed me a map and asked if I could identify it as being the so-called situations map from the American Embassy. I could do so, and I explained to him how. When I asked where the map came from, he gave me the following explanation: Thanks to my information on who would be carrying it, when he would leave, and how he would travel to Wiesbaden, Soviet agents had been able to get hold of the map, whether it was in the baggage or in a diplomatic pouch, and photograph it.

As I have already stated, this situations map became important at what I have called the second Government meeting. The Soviets showed a noteworthy ability to carry out such missions on a number of occasions.

I shall mention also another example concerning a black notebook. It so happened that the military attaché at the American Embassy, who was the ranking service officer, used to put down confidential information in this notebook. I had noticed this a number of times because he had the book before him often when I was talking to him. My Soviet contact man asked me something on one occasion that seemed to me very strange. Is it true that the American military attaché is used to carrying in his lefthand inner pocket a black notebook containing confidential information? I probably seemed surprised, and I merely replied that such was the fact. What happened later caused a sensation throughout the entire world.

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The American military attaché traveled back to his headquarters in Heidelberg for some sort of meeting. I heard what happened when I met this person later in the United States. He had hung up his military jacket in the corridor outside the room at headquarters, forgetting all about the black notebook. During the meeting, someone removed the book from his pocket, photographed it, and put it back. After studying the contents of the book, the Soviet intelligence service decided to publish its contents in an East German newspaper. As a result, the officer was court-martialed, and it was this trial that received so much publicity in the press.

S: The Colonel mentioned by way of introduction his ability to obtain information on the American situation as being almost exclusively the result of his good contacts among the intelligence personnel at the American Embassy. I seem to remember that the Colonel explained in another context that, at the end of his Moscow tour of duty, he was beginning to build up his source of information through holiday trips. Perhaps we should touch further on this phase now.

W: We are dealing with a question here that is perhaps of fundamental importance. During my 15 years of activity, holiday trips came to play an increasing important role for the Soviet intelligence service.

The whole thing started with my holiday trip of 1949, which was also the first one from Moscow. I went to Italy. Among other cities I visited was Venice, where I found an American warship making a visit. I met some officers from the vessel, the upshot of our conversations being intelligence information that I turned over to my contact man in Moscow. This led me to think that in the future I might plan my vacations with some particular goal in mind. As a result, I spent my 1950 and 1951 vacations at a particular hotel on the French Riviera that was frequented by large numbers of American officers on vacation also. I can't say that these two vacations gave any positive results, but they certainly were a beginning of my activities, and perhaps I can say that I obtained some experience from them. Valuable information resulted many times in the future from my vacations.

\* \* \* \* \*

### *Contacts with the American intelligence service in Stockholm*

B: Before we finish with the part of the testimony laying the groundwork, I want to ask you this: During the period up to 1952, did you have any contacts with the illegal American intelligence service in Stockholm, and did you receive any information from them?

W: During this period, I was in contact only with personnel from the American Embassy.

B: Did you receive from these persons any information that could be looked upon as of an illegal nature?

W: No, this did not happen.

\* \* \* \* \*

W: Yes, I met several others, but I remained closest to the one mentioned \* \* \*. I don't remember the names of the others.

B: Did you hear on any occasion talk of something called \* \* \*?

W: No, I have no recollection of it.

B: Did you report those visits \* \* \* to your Soviet contact man \* \* \*?

W: There was no continuous reporting on this. I reported, as is shown in another connection regarding my contact man, what the situation was in general. After that, there was no further interest shown from their side. They undoubtedly informed their agents in Wiesbaden about this and got future information from them.

### *Sources of information made use of by Colonel Wennerstroem during his illegal activities*

B: We shall attempt to investigate what sources of information were used by you currently up to 1952. At the same time, we shall illustrate the importance of the General Defense Staff during all your activity in illegal intelligence work. We can start with the importance of the Staff in the above-mentioned case. By means of our examination \* \* \* we have already illustrated the importance that the intelligence section of the General Defense Staff had in this special case.

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The same section's importance at another time has also been shown by means of the UD examination among other things. Perhaps we can show beyond that that the intelligence section of the General Defense Staff had a certain importance during the period 1949-1952, which we shall come back to later in greater detail. But what was the situation in this respect before 1949 and after 1952?

W: Before 1949, there was no activity on my side that concerned the General Defense Staff in the area that is now being discussed. After 1952, there was first the tour in Washington from 1952 to 1957. The General Defense Staff had no importance during that time. There was then the FKE period of 1957 to 1961. The General Defense Staff was of no importance beyond a sporadic, isolated case, though I can remember nothing specific at the moment. During the UD period of 1961 to 1963, the staff was of no importance.

B: It has been shown that in 1959 or 1960 you went to the files of the General Defense Staff's intelligence section and asked to inspect the reports coming in from the air attaché in Washington. According to this informant, it seemed as though you were waiting for something to come in from there. The same person [said] further that at about the same time you asked to look at the card file on American regulations. Can you remember this occasion, and if you can do so, can you tell us what you were waiting for and if it had some connection with your illegal intelligence work?

W: There is nothing that stuck in my mind about this, so it could not have had anything of very great importance.

B: Have you anything to add to this examination before we conclude it?

W: No.

B: The examination is therefore ended at 1530 hours.  
Stockholm as above.

RUNE W. BECKMAN.